Huff v. State
Decision Date | 28 July 1995 |
Docket Number | CR-94-509 |
Citation | 678 So.2d 293 |
Parties | Darren HUFF v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
James B. McNeill, Jr., Selma, for Appellant.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Joseph Marston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.
The appellant, Darren Huff, was convicted of murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975, in 1989. His conviction was reversed, Huff v. State, 596 So.2d 16 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), because of erroneous jury instructions that violated certain fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant by the Constitution of the United States. On re-trial, the appellant was again convicted of murder. That conviction was reversed because the state had called the appellant's convicted codefendant to the stand and had inquired into a statement implicating the appellant that the codefendant had given to the police. The codefendant answered some questions on direct examination before refusing to answer further, but refused to answer any questions on cross-examination. This court concluded that the appellant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was violated. Huff v. State, 639 So.2d 539 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
This right is also guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which states:
"That in all criminal prosecutions the accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, or either; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to have a copy thereof; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and, in all prosecutions by indictment, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense was committed; and that he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by due process of law."
Article 1, § 6, Constitution of Alabama 1901.
In 1994, the appellant was again convicted of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. It is from this third conviction that this appeal is taken and upon essentially the same grounds as he asserted in his second appeal.
The appellant's sole contention on appeal is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. This contention is once again based upon the fact that the state called a convicted codefendant to testify against him at trial and also based upon the prosecution's reference in closing arguments to the codefendant's testimony. Specifically, the appellant argues that he was unjustly prejudiced by being allegedly improperly linked to a man who had already been convicted of this murder, and that, because the accomplice refused to testify, he was denied his right of confrontation and his right to a fair trial. He argues that the jury was left to infer that because the accomplice had been convicted, this defendant must also be guilty. The state contends on appeal that this issue is not preserved for appellate review.
The record reveals that before trial defense counsel presented a motion in limine seeking an order preventing the state from calling the codefendant, Jessie McDole, as a witness. Defense counsel argued that the codefendant had refused to testify in the first two trials and that there was no new evidence that showed that he would now testify. Defense counsel stated:
The court denied the appellant's motion in limine and stated:
The appellant again objected to his codefendant's testifying when the codefendant was called to the stand. The record shows that McDole was handcuffed and shackled when he was brought into the courtroom. Defense counsel voiced the following objection and requested a mistrial:
The trial court again overruled the objection and allowed McDole to be questioned. McDole invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and he refused to testify. The trial court placed him in contempt. Defense counsel then made the following objection:
(Emphasis added.)
At the close of the state's case, the appellant again moved for a mistrial based upon the allegedly prejudicial nature of the presence in court of the codefendant. During the discussion on the motion, the trial court stated "I think we're going to have a reversal again based on what [the Court of Criminal Appeals] said in the last decision." The state's attorney then apparently asked the appellant directly whether he would like a mistrial. The attorney then stated to the court for the record that the state was not opposed to the court's declaring a mistrial. Defense counsel evidently concluded that reversible error had already occurred and at this time withdrew his motion for a mistrial. However, this was not the first or only motion for a mistrial made. Defense counsel, during the course of the trial, voiced numerous objections to the codefendant's presence and moved for a mistrial when McDole was brought to the courtroom in handcuffs and shackles, stating that the appearance of the codefendant in this condition prejudiced the appellant. The court, denying the motion, stated: "I don't believe they could have seen the chains from where he's standing." This issue was not waived for purposes of appellate review.
There are repeated references in the transcript to the appellant's codefendant and the outcome of the state's case against him. Detective Robert Jacobs testified to the following:
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...[the appearance at his trial of a convicted co-defendant, who refused to testify] as grounds for appeal." Huff v. State, 678 So.2d 293, 301 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (Cobb, J., dissenting). MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., ...