Huff v. State

Decision Date08 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 04–13–00891–CR,04–13–00891–CR
Citation467 S.W.3d 11
PartiesDonald F. Huff, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Dayna L. Jones, San Antonio, for Appellant.

Nathan E. Morey, San Antonio, for Appellee.

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice, Karen Angelini, Justice, Marialyn Barnard, Justice

OPINION

Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice

A jury convicted appellant Donald F. Huff of felony murder—the underlying offense was driving while intoxicated, third offense, and the trial court sentenced Huff to forty-five years' confinement. On appeal, Huff raises four issues, contending: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for a dismissal based on a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IADA”); (3) the trial court erred in denying him the right to a speedy trial; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Background

The record shows that on August 6, 2009, EMTs were dispatched to a motorcycle accident in Bexar County, Texas. EMT Kevin Norman described the accident as “severe” and “bad.” When he arrived, he saw a woman on the ground; she was lying near some kind of bent road sign. He noted that a man was “trying to drag the female individual and put her back on—back on the motorcycle again.” Norman identified the man as Huff. The woman was ultimately identified as Arlene Harding–Watts. EMT Norman told Huff they would take over. Huff seemed uninjured, so the EMTs turned their attention to Harding–Watts. They determined her condition was serious enough to warrant Airlife, and she was airlifted to the hospital. Harding–Watts ultimately died from her injuries. A doctor from the Bexar County Medical Examiner's Office testified she died from “multiple blunt force injuries,” including an injury to the spinal cord

and liver.

EMT Norman testified that although he could not say with certainty, he believed Huff told him at the accident scene that he was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. Norman's belief was based on the notes he made for his report, which were made “some time between when we started treating Mr. Huff to the time we got to the hospital.” He explained that once he is at the hospital, he normally has twenty to thirty minutes to finish his report. He wrote in his notes that Huff was driving approximately thirty miles per hour and lost control of the motorcycle. Norman stated he would not have written in his report that Huff was the driver unless Huff gave him that information. Norman also wrote in his report that Huff denied using drugs or alcohol before the accident.

After the testimony from the EMT, the State called San Antonio Police Officer Alfonso Peeler to the stand. Officer Peeler testified he was dispatched to the motorcycle accident involving Huff and Harding–Watts. After blocking off the intersection where the accident occurred, Officer Peeler was instructed by his sergeant to “to do the HGN and handle the DWI portion of the accident.” When he walked toward the actual accident site, he saw Harding–Watts lying on the ground. He described her condition as “horrific,” stating “her foot was almost amputated ... bone was sticking out through the leg.” The officer stated EMTs were attending to Harding–Watts; his primary focus was Huff. At this point in his testimony, Officer Peeler identified Huff in the courtroom.

Officer Peeler testified that when he approached Huff at the scene, he was “shuffling around next to the curb.” According to the officer, Huff was hesitant, slow, and appeared “impaired.” The officer smelled a “faint odor of intoxicants” on Huff's breath and person. Officer Peeler specifically testified Huff told him he lost control of the motorcycle while driving himself and Harding–Watts home from a hair salon. Huff stated several times that he was the driver and lost control of the motorcycle; he was repeating himself. The officer included in his report Huff's admission that he was the driver.

The officer performed the HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus

) test on Huff. According to the officer, Huff showed six clues, indicating he was impaired. Huff declined to take any other portion of the field sobriety test, asserting his back was hurting. Officer Peeler opined that Huff was “impaired,” i.e., “intoxicated.” The officer testified that based on his observations at the accident scene, the accident occurred, in part, because Huff was intoxicated.

The EMTs inserted an IV line and took Huff to the hospital by ambulance as a precaution. At the hospital, Officer Peeler asked Huff if he would voluntarily provide a blood sample. When Huff declined, the officer advised Huff that he was going to take a blood sample. At the officer's direction—without consent or a warrant—a nurse took a blood sample from Huff. The blood sample was tested by the toxicology laboratory of the Bexar Medical Examiner's Office. At trial, the chief toxicologist, Veronica Hargrove testified, over objection, that Huff's blood sample had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.17 grams per deciliter, more than twice the legal limit of 0.08. She also testified that a subject will show signs of impairment from alcohol consumption at 0.05 grams per deciliter. The toxicology report showing Huff's blood alcohol level was admitted into evidence over objection. On cross-examination, Chief Hargrove admitted Huff's blood alcohol level could have been higher or lower at the time of the accident, which occurred more than three hours before the blood draw. However, on redirect, she stated that given the elimination rate of alcohol from the body, it was unlikely Huff's blood alcohol content was less than 0.08 at the time of the accident.

Detective Carlos Reyes, a member of the traffic investigation unit at the time of the accident, testified that as an accident investigator he is called upon to determine how an accident occurred, whether it could have been avoided, and who bore responsibility for the accident, if there was fault. Detective Reyes testified he reviewed all of the reports prepared by the EMTs and the officers at the scene. He stated, based upon his review, he found no reason to believe Huff was not the driver of the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The detective opined that based on his investigation, he believed Huff was driving at the time of the accident, the motorcycle was traveling approximately thirty or forty miles per hour, and because of intoxication, [Huff] failed to make the turn and he dropped the bike.” Detective Reyes acknowledged on cross examination, however, that his opinion that Huff was the driver was based upon what other officers told him and their reports. He admitted he could not say who was driving at the time of the accident based on personal knowledge.

The State next presented testimony from Sergeant Scott Foulke, who is assigned to the traffic investigation division. He testified he spent two years as a motorcycle officer before he was promoted to sergeant. In order to become a motorcycle officer, he had to attend basic and advanced schools. Moreover, Sergeant Foulke testified that in his personal life, he had been legally riding motorcycles since the age of fourteen.

Although Sergeant Foulke admitted he knew a “little bit ... but not a lot” about Harley Davidson motorcycles, which was the type of motorcycle at issue, as a motorcycle officer, he drove a “big road bike,” a Honda Goldwing. He testified he was familiar with Harley Davidson “basic models, horsepower, weights and things of that nature.” Looking at a picture of the motorcycle involved in the accident, Sergeant Foulke stated it would be a “little more difficult for the passenger” to get off of the motorcycle while it was in motion because of the back rest. The passenger would have to “clear” the back rest and the driver to dismount. He also testified that when you learn to ride a motorcycle, you are taught that when a motorcycle is “going down,” you should “push yourself away from the bike, get away from the bike, curl up into a ball and roll to reduce the injuries and the road rash and things of that nature.” Sergeant Foulke testified that an experienced driver could escape essentially unharmed from a motorcycle crash. He stated he had crashed, even flipped a motorcycle over, without suffering an injury.

An investigator with the Bexar County District Attorney's Office, Albert Lary, testified that at the prosecutor's request, he pulled records from the Department of Motor Vehicles, part of the Texas Department of Transportation, regarding ownership of the motorcycle involved in the accident. The records, which were admitted into evidence, established Huff was the registered owner of the motorcycle. Investigator Lary also testified Huff had a standard driver's license with a motorcycle endorsement. Harding–Watts had a standard driver's license as well, but she did not have a motorcycle endorsement.

The defense called three witnesses to testify. The first was a private investigator, James McKay, who was hired by the defense to take photographs and distance measurements at the accident scene. Mr. McKay authenticated several photographs and testified regarding certain distances along the road where the accident occurred.

The defense then called John Monaco to testify. Mr. Monaco testified he worked at a gas station/convenience store in 2009—the year of the accident. While working at the convenience store, he met Huff. Mr. Monaco described Huff as a regular customer who came in “every day.” He saw Huff driving a motorcycle and sometimes saw a woman with him. Mr. Monaco said he met the woman, but could not recall her name. Mr. Monaco testified he remembered “many, many times that the woman was driving the motorcycle and Mr. Huff was just on the back smiling.” He said that generally when the couple came to the store together, the woman was driving the...

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