Huff v. Uhl
Decision Date | 18 June 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 13929,13929 |
Citation | 647 P.2d 730,103 Idaho 274 |
Parties | Gary HUFF, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Chris Andrew UHL and Minidoka Irrigation District, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Kathryn Anne Sticklen of Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, for defendants-appellants and cross-respondents. William K. Fletcher of Parsons, Smith, Stone & Fletcher, Burley, for plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant.
The appellants in this action contest a judgment against them for damages arising out of a vehicular collision. Defendant appellant Chris Uhl was driving a dump truck in the scope of his employment with defendant appellant Minidoka Irrigation District when he turned out from a private roadway in front of the plaintiff respondent Huff. Huff attempted to avoid an accident by veering left into the barrow pit; however, Uhl's dump truck crossed into the left hand lane and came into contact with plaintiff's vehicle while it was in the barrow pit. Uhl claimed his brakes had failed.
Huff unsuccessfully endeavored to have defendants pay for the damages, had his truck repaired, and then filed an action against the defendants in small claims court to recover the costs of repairing his truck. Judgment was entered in his favor for the sum of $688.07 plus costs of $17.50. Defendants appealed to the district court. The district court held a trial de novo and granted judgment in favor of Huff for $688.33, but limited the award of costs to $50, including the costs of filing in small claims court, and limited attorney fees to $25. Defendants have appealed the judgment, and plaintiff Huff cross appeals.
Appellants first argue that Huff failed to adequately comply with the notice provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code title 6, chapter 9. The facts relevant to this issue were found by the district court to be as follows:
Although the evidence on some of the above findings is conflicting, there is substantial competent evidence to support them, and we will therefore not disturb those findings on appeal. E.g., Cougar Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 597 P.2d 1070 (1979). The question thus presented to us is whether the above facts as found by the district court support the conclusion that respondent Huff's notice of claim was sufficient as measured by the requirements of the Tort Claims Act.
In particular, appellant challenges the sufficiency of Huff's notice based upon the following statutes:
"6-902. DEFINITIONS.-As used in this act:
(Emphasis added.)
(Emphasis added.)
First, it is argued that the written estimate of damages presented by Huff was not a "written demand " as required under I.C. § 6-902(7) because the writing itself did not contain a statement of demand upon M.I.D., and that the written estimate was also deficient as notice in that it did not contain all of the information required under I.C. § 6-907. In Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978), this Court, by reason of the following language in I.C. § 6-907, declined to take such a narrow view concerning the form that a notice of claim under the Tort Claims Act should take:
"A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby."
In light of that provision in I.C. § 6-907, we pointed out in Smith that the primary function of notice under the Tort Claims Act was to "put the governmental entity on notice that a claim against it is being prosecuted," and that notice serving that function would not be insufficient unless the governmental entity was "misled to its injury." 98 Idaho at 621-22, 586 P.2d at 1066-67. The facts of this case show that although the written estimate itself did not contain a statement of demand, M.I.D. was clearly apprised of the fact that a claim was being prosecuted against it, and the amount thereof. Certainly, the activities of both Nelda Spevak of M.I.D. and M.I.D.'s insurance carrier subsequent to Huff's delivery of notice confirm that fact. As was the case in Smith, there is no evidence here that M.I.D. was misled to its injury by any deficiency in respondent's notice. Consequently, we conclude that Huff's notice of claim was sufficient under the Tort Claims Act.
Appellant also argues that Huff's notice was insufficient under I.C. § 6-906 because it was not presented to and filed with the secretary of the irrigation district. The district court found that the...
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Bell v. City of Kellogg
...Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e). Rule 54(e) creates no substantive right to attorneys' fees under Idaho law. Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d 730, 733 n. 1 (1982). Because Rule 54(e) is procedural in nature, this court is not bound by it or Sec. 12-121. Wetzel v. Goldsmith, 16 B.R.......
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Wickstrom v. North Idaho College
...the amounts of claimed damages and the nature of the injury claimed. The claim is, therefore, barred. I.C. § 6-907; Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d 730 (1982). It should be noted, however, that appellants admitted at oral argument that the letter of August 21, 1984 was never intended t......
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Smith v. Mitton
...Court has held, "Certainly, as long as the notice is delivered to the secretary's office, it is sufficient." Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 277, 647 P.2d 730, 733 (1982) (requiring plaintiff to give notice under the ITCA). Smith was fired on January 29, 2001, and a Notice of Tort Claim was tim......
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Van v. Portneuf Medical Center
...and notice serving that function is sufficient unless the governmental entity is "misled to its injury." Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 276, 647 P.2d 730, 732 (1982) (quoting Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1066-67 (1978)). Further, the purpose of the statute is ......