Huffman v. Huffman

• Decision Date: 17 April 1933
• Docket Number: 18
• Citation: 166 A. 570,311 Pa. 123
• Parties: Huffman, Appellant, v. Huffman
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

166 A. 570

311 Pa. 123

Huffman, Appellant, v. Huffman

No. 18

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 17, 1933

Argued March 20, 1933

Appeal, No. 18, March T., 1933, by plaintiff, from judgment of Superior Court, April T., 1932, No. 101, affirming judgment of C.P. Erie Co., Sept. T., 1930, No. 383, for defendant, in case of Agnes V. Huffman v. Winifred Cecelia Huffman, administratrix c.t.a. of estate of Albert F Huffman, also known as Bert F. Huffman. Reversed.

Assumpsit on contract of support of children. Before ROSSITER, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Demurrer to statement sustained and judgment entered for defendant by lower court; judgment affirmed by Superior Court. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned was not sustaining assignment of error to judgment of lower court.

The judgment of the Superior Court and of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the record is remitted to the latter court with a procedendo.

Frank B. Quinn, with him Charles B. English, of English, Quinn Leemhuis & Tayntor, for appellant.

S. L. Gilson, for appellee.

Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON:

For some unstated reason, Albert F. Huffman and Agnes V., his wife, "agreed to live separate and apart" from each other. At that time they had two minor children, respectively 7 and 14 years of age. For their support, the father was primarily responsible, but in case of his death or inability, that duty, under section 1012 of the Act of May 14, 1925, P.L. 762, 787, would devolve upon their mother, if she was financially able to care for them. The husband was also liable for her support, and, in adjustment of all these matters, they entered into the written agreement out of which the present controversy arises.

By it, he settled upon his wife a small property in the City of Philadelphia, and also agreed to "pay to [her] the sum of $30 on the first day of each and every month hereafter in sickness and in health for the support and maintenance of [their daughter] until such time as the [daughter] should become self-supporting." A subsequent clause contained a precisely similar agreement for the support and maintenance of their minor son. It is evident from these two clauses, though it is not specifically so stated, that from the money thus contributed by her husband, she was to support the two children, and that she would forfeit all right thereto if she did not. It is further evident therefrom that if she did support them out of those payments, her right thereto, if she lived that long, was to continue until they should "become self-supporting," and was subject to no other contingency.

Subsequently, his wife obtained a divorce from him, he remarried and later died. By his will, he left his entire estate to his second wife and she was appointed administratrix c.t.a. The will made no provision for carrying out the above-mentioned agreement for the support of his minor children, though he had regularly paid to their mother the amounts specified therein, as long as he lived. She made demand on his administratrix for the later payments, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and, this being refused, brought the present suit against the administratrix to recover the amount due.

To the statement of claim setting up the above facts, the administratrix filed an "Affidavit of Defense in the Nature of a Demurrer," averring the agreement was unenforceable for want of a consideration to support it, and alleging that it "was personal between the plaintiff and [testator] and is not binding in any way on his administratrix." The Court of Common Pleas sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for the defendant; the Superior Court, by a majority vote, affirmed it; and the case is now before us on an appeal, which we specially allowed. The judgment must be reversed.

It is clear beyond question that the agreement has not been fully complied with, since the children are not, as yet self-supporting. The exact situation has arisen, therefore, against which the wife sought to protect herself, and for which the agreement, in plain and unambiguous language, provided. The father being dead, she will have to support and maintain the children, if of sufficient ability, and no reason exists why testator's estate should not relieve her therefrom, in accordance with his agreement. It is idle to say there was no consideration for the agreement; no fraud or overreaching being alleged, the family settlement was, itself, ample consideration: Burkholder's App., 105 Pa. 31; Linea-weaver's Est., 284 Pa. 384; Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414. It is equally idle to say that the agreement was personal between the plaintiff and testator, or that it was intended to terminate at his death. There is nothing in the agreement, or in the surroundings of the parties at the time they made it, from which either conclusion can properly be drawn. As we said in Foundation & Construction Co. v. Franklin Trust Co. et al., 307 Pa. 10, 15: "The standard for the interpretation of words is their natural meaning to the parties who have contracted at the time and place where the contract is made, considering all the circumstances surrounding it: McMillin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 500. . . . Words are to be construed according to their primary acceptation unless, from the context of the instrument and the intention of the parties to be collected from it, they appear to be used in a different sense." By his agreement, testator agreed to pay the specified sums for the support and maintenance of his minor children, until they became self-supporting, and there is no other language therein which in any way otherwise limits or fixes the time during which the...