Huffman v. Huffman

• Decision Date: 18 April 1905
• Docket Number: 5,218
• Citation: 73 N.E. 1096,35 Ind.App. 643
• Parties: HUFFMAN v. HUFFMAN
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

73 N.E. 1096

35 Ind.App. 643

HUFFMAN v. HUFFMAN

No. 5,218

Court of Appeals of Indiana

April 18, 1905

Rehearing denied June 8, 1905.

From Greene Circuit Court; Orion B. Harris, Judge.

Action by Jane Huffman against Josiah R. Huffman. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Slinkard & Slinkard, for appellant.

Cyrus E. Davis, for appellee.

OPINION

ROBY, J.

The substance of the complaint is that the parties hereto, who have been since 1858 husband and wife, were living apart, but not divorced, when this action was begun; that appellee's father after their marriage gave and conveyed to her eighty acres of land in Clay county, and afterward gave her an additional twenty acres; that she was induced to and did convey said eighty acres to the appellant, and that such conveyance was made because of his earnest request solicitation and importunity, coupled with threats that if she did not deed the land to him he would leave her, and take their then minor children with him, together with his refusal to pay the taxes upon said land unless it was so conveyed; that, before her father conveyed the twenty acres, appellant, by threats of desertion and importunities, procured her consent that a conveyance be made to a third party, who purchased the same and paid the price thereof --$ 900--to him in 1889. It is further shown that the eighty-acre tract was sold in 1890, and that the income from it and the proceeds of both tracts were converted by him to his own use. The prayer is that he be decreed to hold said sums in trust, and for judgment for the amount thereof, with interest thereon. To this complaint a demurrer for want of facts was overruled; an answer in general denial, together with various paragraphs of affirmative answer, was filed; trial had and special finding of facts made; conclusions of law stated in appellee's favor, and judgment for $ 4,550 rendered in accordance therewith.

1. Appellant's learned counsel treat the action as one to declare and enforce a resulting trust, and rely largely upon § 3396 Burns 1901, § 2974 R. S. 1881. The facts stated tend to establish the existence of a constructive, and not a resulting, trust. The distinction between constructive and resulting trusts is clear and well defined, although the terms have sometimes been improperly used.

2. For the purpose of working out justice, constructive trusts are raised by equity, when in fact there was no intention by the party charged as trustee to create such relation, and usually, indeed, when his intention was otherwise. The gist of every constructive trust is fraud, which may be founded upon misrepresentation and concealment, or arise from the use by one party of some influential or confidential relation which he sustained toward the owner of a legal title, thereby obtaining such title himself upon more advantageous terms than he could otherwise have done. And therefore one who obtains the legal title to property by arts or acts, or through circumvention or imposition, or by virtue of a confidential relation and influence arising from it, under such circumstances that he ought not, in good conscience, to hold and enjoy the beneficial interest therein, is converted into a trustee, and ordered so to execute the trust as to protect or indemnify the party defrauded, and at the same time promote fair dealing and common honesty in the interest of society and the state. 1 Perry, Trusts (5th ed.), § 166; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3d ed.), § 155; 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3d ed.), § 1044; Hughes v. Willson (1891), 128 Ind. 491, 26 N.E. 50; Jackson v. Landers (1893), 134 Ind. 529, 34 N.E. 323; Cox v. Arnsmann (1881), 76 Ind. 210; Wright v. Moody (1888), 116 Ind. 175, 179, 18 N.E. 608.

3. Whenever two persons stand in such relationship that, during its continuance, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and a corresponding influence possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused and influence exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding or dependent party, the person availing himself of his position for such purposes will not be permitted to retain an advantage thereby secured. The principle extends to every case in which a fiduciary relation exists, as a fact; confidence being reposed on the one side and accepted on the other. The fiduciary relation, with its corresponding duties, does not need to be a legal one; it may be moral, social, domestic or personal. McCormick v. Malin (1841), 5 Blackf. 509; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3d ed.), § 956; 1 Perry, Trusts (5th ed.), § 194.

4. The confidential relation and the transaction having been shown, the burden of proof is upon the person occupying the superior position to establish the integrity of his claim. Rochester v. Levering (1886), 104 Ind. 562, 568, 4 N.E. 203; Wainwright v. Smith (1886), 106 Ind. 239, 242, 6 N.E. 333; French v. Cunningham (1898), 149 Ind. 632, 49 N.E. 797; 1 Perry, Trusts (5th ed.), § 195.

5. The relation existing between the parties hereto at the time appellant acquired title to the real estate belonging to appellee was one which requires the application of the doctrines above stated. As was said by the New Jersey court of chancery: "The confidence of the marriage relation is so complete, and the trust of the wife in the honor, good faith and love of her husband is generally so perfect, that in all business affairs she depends upon him, and suffers herself to be controlled by his judgment. Unless, therefore, the court, in the language of Lord Eldon, watches transactions between parties thus situated, where fraud may be committed with such facility and its discovery may be so easily baffled, with a jealousy almost invincible, it will oftener lend its assistance to fraud than punish the fraud doer." Farmer v. Farmer (1884), 39...