Huffman v. INDIANA DEPT. OF ENVIR. MAN.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0207-CV-564.,49A02-0207-CV-564. |
| Citation | 788 N.E.2d 505 |
| Parties | Rosemary Adams HUFFMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT and Eli Lilly and Company, Appellees-Respondents. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rosemary Adams Huffman, Indianapolis, IN, pro se Appellant.
David L. Steiner, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee Indiana Department of Environmental Management.
Daniel P. McInerny, George T. Patton, Jr., Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, David B. Barnard, Jodie L. Mitchell, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Eli Lilly and Company.
Rosemary Adams Huffman appeals the dismissal of her petition for administrative review on grounds she did not have standing. Specifically, Huffman argues that the Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (OEA) erred when it interpreted the requirement that a person be "aggrieved or adversely affected" to mean that a person needs to show direct injury as defined by the judicial doctrine of standing. We agree that the OEA applied the wrong standard and should have given the term "aggrieved or adversely affected" its plain meaning, namely, "a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right or the imposition upon [the person] of a burden or obligation." Further, after reviewing Huffman's petition and amended petition, we find that there is not substantial evidence to support the dismissal of her petition, and we reverse.1
Eli Lilly & Co. (Lilly) petitioned the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) for the renewal of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit in relation to its Greenfield laboratories. IDEM subsequently issued the renewal permit.
Shortly thereafter, Huffman filed a petition seeking administrative review by the OEA of IDEM's issuance of the permit. In her petition before the OEA, Huffman claimed to qualify for administrative review under the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) as a person "aggrieved or adversely affected" by IDEM's order renewing Lilly's NPDES permit. Specifically, she asserted aggrieved status as a citizen of Indiana and because her family owned an interest in property located contiguous to Lilly's Greenfield facility. She also objected to the permit because of health risks to contiguous property owners.
During a prehearing conference, Lilly objected to Huffman's lack of standing to petition for administrative review. Because of this concern, Huffman amended her original petition to state that her "interest in this matter is as a member of the public and that her family has residential property, in which she has had a legal interest for several years, contiguous to the Lilly property." Appellant's App. p. 42.
Lilly then moved to dismiss her petition and argued that the judicial doctrine of standing, which requires a showing of direct injury, applied to administrative proceedings and that Huffman failed to allege facts sufficient to establish any direct injury. In granting the motion to dismiss, the OEA agreed with Lilly that the proper definition of "aggrieved or adversely affected" was that of the judicial doctrine of standing. After applying that standard, the OEA concluded that Huffman lacked standing to petition for administrative review, and therefore the OEA did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Huffman subsequently filed a timely petition for judicial review of the OEA's decision. On appeal, the trial court affirmed. This appeal ensued.
Huffman appeals the trial court's decision to affirm the OEA's dismissal of her petition for administrative review. In particular, Huffman argues that the OEA erred when it required her to show that she satisfied the requirements of the judicial doctrine of standing in order to qualify for administrative review. When reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, this Court is bound by the same standard of review as the trial court. Hopkins v. Tipton County Health Dep't, 769 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). An administrative decision should be reversed only if it is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence. See Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d); Ind. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Adapto, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ind.Ct. App.1999). However, we are free to determine any legal question that arises out of the administrative agency's decision and are not bound by its interpretation of the law. Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor, 610 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). The law is the province of the judiciary. Cowper v. Collier, 720 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
In this case, the OEA found that a person must satisfy the requirements of the judicial doctrine of standing in order to petition for administrative review. In particular, the OEA found that Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane, 170 Ind.App. 586, 354 N.E.2d 259 (1976), requires that the judicial doctrine of standing, as now defined in Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind.1990), reh'g denied, be applied to those seeking administrative review of agency decisions. Appellant's App. p. 25-26. The judicial doctrine of standing states:
[I]n order to invoke a court's jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue.
Schloss, 553 N.E.2d at 1206 (quoting Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind. 1985)). While we agree that a person is required to show some form of standing in order to petition for administrative review, we do not agree that the judicial doctrine of standing is the proper formulation. The judicial doctrine of standing applies to lawsuits filed in a trial court and to matters not covered by the AOPA; however, this case was before an administrative agency to which the AOPA applied. Therefore, we look to the AOPA for guidance as to the standard one must meet to petition for administrative review.
The AOPA explicitly defines who may seek administrative review of an agency action. In order to qualify for administrative review of an agency order under the AOPA:
Ind.Code § 4-21.5-3-7(a)(1).2 When interpreting a statute, the first step is to determine whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (Ind.2002). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Id.
In this case, Huffman sought administrative review as a person "aggrieved or adversely affected" by the administrative order. The phrase "aggrieved or adversely affected" is not ambiguous and must be given its plain meaning. In order to qualify for administrative review as an "aggrieved or adversely affected" person, one must show "a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition ... of a burden or obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 43 (6th ed.1991); see also Bagnall v. Town of Beverly Shores, 726 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ind. 2000)
.
Rather than giving "aggrieved or adversely affected" its plain meaning, the OEA read into the phrase the common law requirements of judicial standing. It did so despite the clear, unambiguous language of the AOPA. This was error. Had the legislature intended to require that a person "aggrieved or adversely affected" also establish that he or she met the requirements of the judicial doctrine of standing, it could have inserted statutory language that clearly suggested that intent.3 Because the legislature already has defined who qualifies for administrative review, it was error for the OEA to read into the phrase "aggrieved or adversely affected" a common law standing doctrine.4
Accordingly, we conclude that in order to qualify for administrative review as an "aggrieved or adversely affected" person, one need not show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury. Rather, a person need show the imposition of a burden or obligation, a substantial grievance, or the denial of some personal, pecuniary, or property right.5
We must now determine whether, after applying the plain meaning of "aggrieved or adversely affected," there is substantial evidence to support the OEA's decision to deny Huffman standing. Before the OEA, in addition to arguing she had standing as a citizen of the State, Huffman also claimed aggrieved status in her amended petition as the owner of a property interest in land adjacent to Lilly's Greenfield facility. Lilly countered in its motion to dismiss that Huffman does not own a property interest in any adjacent land. Also, Lilly claimed that even if it were decided Huffman owns a property interest, she has failed to allege the denial of any rights as an adjacent property owner. Finally, in its motion to dismiss, Lilly argued that Huffman is unable to show harm because the property in which s...
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