Huffman v. Rickets
| Decision Date | 26 January 1916 |
| Docket Number | 8,827 |
| Parties | HUFFMAN, GUARDIAN, ET AL. v. RICKETS |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Wells Circuit Court; Wm. H. Eichhorn, Judge.
Action by Nancy Rickets against Samuel H. Huffman, guardian of Cyrus F. Rickets, and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, this appeal is prosecuted.
Affirmed.
L. B Simmons and Simmons & Dailey, for appellants.
John A Bonham and Edwin C. Vaughn, for appellee.
This action, commenced in the Blackford Circuit Court, was venued to the Wells Circuit Court and there tried. Appellee, by her complaint, sought to procure the cancelation of a deed of warranty executed by her August 17, 1911, to her son, the appellant, Cyrus F. Rickets, and Margaret Rickets, husband and wife. Her action is based on the alleged breach of conditions subsequent for her support and maintenance contained in the deed. A trial by the court resulted in a judgment and decree canceling the deed as prayed. The errors assigned and not waived are based on the overruling of the demurrer to the complaint and the overruling of the motion for a new trial. Under the latter assignment, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is presented.
Three points to the following effect are urged against the sufficiency of the complaint: (1) That Margaret Rickets having died, and Cyrus F. Rickets having become incurably insane, the condition subsequent contained in the deed is impossible of performance by reason of the acts of God, and the demurrer should have been sustained; (2) that the complaint is insufficient by reason of the absence of an allegation that the guardian, after his appointment and the children of Cyrus F. Rickets, after he became insane, failed to support and maintain appellee; (3) there being no allegation of fraud or bad faith on the part of either grantee to the deed or of appellant Huffman, or of a wilful intention not to comply with the conditions of the deed, appellee is not entitled to the equitable relief demanded, and the demurrer should have been sustained.
The complaint to the extent necessary to a proper consideration of the objections urged against it, is to the following effect: On August 17, 1911, appellee was a widow more than eighty years of age, in poor health, and owned in fee a described tract of land in Blackford County, containing 49 acres, on the income from which she was dependent for her support. On that day she executed a warranty deed by which she conveyed the tract to appellant Rickets and wife. A copy of the deed is embodied in the complaint, its material provisions being as follows:
* * *"
It is alleged that Cyrus F. Rickets and his wife accepted the deed, and thereupon entered into possession of the lands thereunder, and that the grantees thereafter controlled, managed and cultivated the lands, and appropriated the crops therefrom. It is also alleged that the money consideration named in the deed was not paid or intended to be paid, and that the sole consideration for the execution of the deed was the provision for care and support.
As bearing on the first objection urged against its sufficiency, the complaint discloses that Margaret Rickets died soon after the execution of the deed, and that Cyrus F. Rickets as surviving tenant by the entireties thereby became the sole owner of the title conveyed by the deed, and that thereafter in March, 1912, he became violently, permanently and incurably insane, and that he at that time was confined in the hospital for the insane at Richmond, where he remains.
As bearing on the second objection urged, the complaint alleges in substance that under appointment made by the Blackford Circuit Court at the June term, 1912, appellant Huffman is the guardian of appellant Rickets as an insane person; that appellants have continued to cultivate the lands and appropriate the proceeds for their own purposes, and that since March, 1912, neither appellant, nor any person for them or either of them has complied with the conditions contained in the deed; that they have failed and refused and still fail and refuse to furnish anything for appellee's support, or to maintain or care for her or to pay any of the expense thereof, or to deliver to her any of the rents and profits from the tract of land; that appellee has been compelled to and has received from other persons and other relatives all support, maintenance and care that she has received since March, 1912, such persons being under no obligations to support her without compensation.
As to the third objection urged, there is no allegation in the complaint that appellants, Rickets and Huffman, guardian, in their failure to support and maintain appellee were actuated by fraud or bad faith, or that such failure was induced by a wilful intention to disregard the conditions of the deed. In the absence of an allegation to the contrary, it will be presumed that until Margaret Rickets died, the grantees to the deed faithfully performed its covenants, and that appellant Rickets, the surviving grantee, thereafter up until some time in March, 1912, continued to do so. Since that time, however, for reasons made obvious by the complaint, there has been a total failure on the part of the grantees personally to perform such covenants. If it were allowable for persons other than grantees thereafter in their behalf to perform such covenants, in the absence of appellee's consent thereto, it sufficiently appears from the complaint that no other persons representing grantees did so. From that time appellee was supported, maintained and cared for by persons under no legal obligations to do so, and prompted by motives other than those growing out of some relation to privity to grantees. It, therefore, follows that the second objection to the complaint is untenable. We proceed to a consideration of the first and third objections.
Contracts by which aged and infirm persons convey all or a substantial part of their property to others in consideration of an agreement for support, maintenance and care during their declining years, are with practical uniformity recognized by the courts as constituting a class by themselves in matters pertaining to their interpretation and enforcement. Bruer v. Bruer (1909), 109 Minn. 260; 123 N.W. 813, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608. See, also, Brady v. Gregory (1912), 49 Ind.App. 355, 366, 97 N.E. 452; Cree v. Sherfy (1894), 138 Ind. 354, 37 N.E. 787; Bogie v. Bogie (1876), 41 Wis. 209. The grantee to such a conveyance is usually a child, a near relative, a close friend, or other person in whom the grantor has such confidence that he is willing to entrust to him the peace and comfort of his last days. A conveyance is made to such a person by reason of a desire to have that person, rather than another, support and care for the grantor, and hence courts interpret such a contract as imposing on the grantee a personal obligation not delegable or assignable to another without the consent of the grantor. The deed here was made to a son and his wife, and its language to the effect that the grantees thereby agreed to maintain and care for appellee imports such a personal obligation. Cree v. Sherfy, supra; Lindsay v. Glass (1889), 119 Ind. 301, 21 N.E. 897; Glocke v. Glocke (1902), 113 Wis. 303, 89 N.W. 118, 57 L. R. A. 458. Thomas v. Thomas (1893), 24 Ore. 251, 33 P. 565; Eastman v. Batchelder (1858), 36 N.H. 141, 72 Am. Dec. 295; 2 Devlin, Deeds (3d ed.) § 859; 6 R. C. L. 817; 13 Cyc 695
It seems to be the settled rule in this jurisdiction that a grant of lands in consideration of an agreement for the future support of the grantor, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, creates in the grantee an estate on condition subsequent. Cree v. Sherfy supra; Tomlinson v. Tomlinson (1904), 162 Ind. 530, 70 N.E. 881; Brady v. Gregory, supra; Richter v. Richter (1887), 111 Ind. 456, 12 N.E. 698; Hefner v. Yount (1847), 8 Blackf. 455. The rule, although not universal, prevails in most other jurisdictions. Blake v. Blake (1882), 56 Wis. 392, 14 N.W. 173; Mansfield v. Mansfield (1892), 92 Mich. 112, 52 N.W. 290; Glocke v. Glocke, supra; Mash v. Bloom (1907), 133 Wis. 646, 114 N.W. 457, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1187, 14 Ann. Cas. 1012. The deed here, by its express terms, creates an estate on condition subsequent, in that it provides that on a failure or refusal to comply with the covenants of the deed, it shall at once become null and void. Van Horn v. Mercer (19...
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