Huffman v. State, 1D05-3200.

Citation937 So.2d 202
Decision Date24 August 2006
Docket NumberNo. 1D05-3200.,1D05-3200.
PartiesRobert Hayden HUFFMAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Elizabeth F. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BROWNING, J.

Robert H. Huffman, Jr., appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and use or possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to his nolo contendere plea, which he entered after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment and sentence.

An information charged Huffman with possession of a controlled substance, cocaine (Count One), and use or possession of drug paraphernalia (a "crack" pipe) with the intent to use it to introduce a controlled substance into the human body (Count Two). The offenses occurred on October 30, 2004. Huffman moved to suppress all evidence recovered as a result of his alleged "illegal seizure," specifically, one piece of "crack" cocaine and an alleged "pipe used for smoking crack." In support of his motion, Huffman cited, as pertinent to the issues, Coney v. State, 820 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); State v. A.M., 788 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Abdullah v. State, 745 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); and Burnette v. State, 658 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Lt. Jimmy Anderson, a member of the Chiefland Police Department. Finding that the officer had sufficient lawful grounds to act as he did, the trial court orally denied the motion to suppress and subsequently entered a written order. Huffman then entered a plea of nolo contendere to both charged offenses, expressly reserving the right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress. See § 924.051(4) & .06(3), Fla. Stat. (2004); State v. Carr, 438 So.2d 826, 828 (Fla.1983). The factual basis of the plea is that on October 30, 2004, Huffman possessed cocaine and a "crack" pipe in Levy County. Accepting the plea, the trial court adjudicated Huffman guilty and sentenced him to 24 months' incarceration on Count One and to time served on Count Two.

The State presented the only witness at the suppression hearing. Lt. Jimmy Anderson, who had been with the Chiefland Police Department for more than eight years, testified that his routine duties included investigating for the Department, serving as evidence custodian, commanding the patrol division, and training within the Department. He had worked 2-1/2 years previously with the City of Cedar Key. Around 1:00 a.m. on October 30, 2004, Lt. Anderson was on patrol, wearing a uniform and driving an unmarked vehicle. At the intersection of 4th Avenue and 4th Street in Chiefland, the officer encountered Huffman on a bicycle. The police had received several complaints from citizens regarding that general area, where vehicles would stop and park in the middle of the road and drug dealers would approach and talk to the occupants of the vehicles. Increased patrolling had resulted in the ticketing of vehicles for stopping and standing in the roadway. The officer knew of at least two prior arrests for drug-dealing very near that same intersection. The block comprised 10 or so government houses and another eight houses on the other road.

Very early on the morning in question, Lt. Anderson approached the crossroads and saw a gold Lincoln Town Car stopped in the middle of the intersection. A man on a bicycle was at the driver's window. The officer recognized the car as belonging to a specifically named individual known to have prior arrests for drug-related offenses. In fact, Lt. Anderson had personally arrested the car's owner for possession of cocaine in the past. The officer did not know who was driving the car on the morning in question. As Lt. Anderson drove up behind the automobile, he observed the man on the bicycle hand something to the driver of the car, who, in turn, handed something back. The officer suspected a drug deal was occurring. Stepping out of his vehicle, the officer asked the man on the bicycle to come to him. However, the man turned away and tried to pedal off on the bicycle. As the Lincoln Town Car sped off, the officer chased the bicyclist, grabbed him, and pulled him off the bicycle. The officer then saw the man throw down a piece of "crack." Lt. Anderson testified that at the police academy he had learned drug identification. During his employment in Chiefland, he had attended several narcotics classes addressing drug identification, undercover street-level buys, and drug-trafficking. He had made at least 200 drug arrests.

On cross-examination, Lt. Anderson clarified (after reviewing his deposition) that he had seen the person in the automobile hand something to the man on the bicycle, Huffman. The witness had not seen Huffman give anything specific to the person in the car. When the officer approached the scene, he did not know or recognize Huffman. Lt. Anderson testified that he activated his blue lights as soon as he pulled behind the gold Lincoln Town Car. The bicyclist and the driver of the car did not know Lt. Anderson was a police officer until the blue lights were engaged. The officer exited his unmarked patrol vehicle. As Huffman pulled away from the Lincoln Town Car (which sped off) on his bicycle, trying to get away, Anderson grabbed him about 20 feet from where the car had been. The officer pursued the suspect in the belief that a drug deal had just occurred in "a known drug area" where prior drug-related arrests had been made. The citizen complaints about drug dealing in that area had not mentioned Huffman by name. The officer testified that another factor leading him to believe drugs were being dealt was the unusual presence of a white male, Huffman, in that part of town on a bicycle at that time of the early morning. The Lincoln Town Car was owned by a known drug dealer. Lt. Anderson testified it was commonly known among law-enforcement officers that white males would ride bicycles to that part of town to buy drugs. When he was asked how many drug-related arrests of bicyclists had been made, the witness testified he could not say exactly how many, but he mentioned one individual by name.

At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, the State argued that Huffman lacked standing to move to suppress the evidence because he had voluntarily discarded it and was not claiming ownership of the contraband or any other "property interest" in it. Defense counsel argued that Huffman did have standing to challenge the alleged "illegal seizure" and "illegal arrest" because the State was asserting the drug contraband was his. The trial court rejected the State's standing challenge.

Defense counsel argued that the State had failed to meet its burden to show that Lt. Anderson had probable cause when he arrested and searched Huffman. In support of suppressing the evidence, the defense relied on Coney and the other cases cited in its motion. Defense counsel argued that the officer's testimony that the car he saw was owned by a known drug dealer did not indicate who actually was driving on that morning and did not incriminate Huffman. The State argued that Walker v. State, 846 So.2d 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); and Glover v. State, 843 So.2d 919 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), support denial of the motion. The State asserted that the totality of the circumstances supported the officer's reasonable, well-founded belief that he had observed a drug deal.

"By state constitutional mandate in the conformity clause, we are to resolve Fourth-Amendment search and seizure issues in accordance with applicable United States Supreme Court precedents." Brye v. State, 927 So.2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); see Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1997). The trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law. See Brye, 927 So.2d at 80. Facts are reviewed for whether competent substantial evidence supports them, whereas the trial court's application of a constitutional standard to the facts in a particular case is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (stating that findings of historical fact should be reviewed only for "clear error," with "due weight" to be accorded "to inferences drawn from those facts" by the trial court and by local law-enforcement officers); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (11th Cir.1991); Brye, 927 So.2d at 80-81. "A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct." See Bonifay v. State, 626 So.2d 1310, 1312 (Fla.1993). "We must construe all the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." Hines v. State, 737 So.2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 211 (Fla.1990). Huffman has the burden to demonstrate prejudicial error pursuant to section 924.051(7), Florida Statutes (2004). See Hines, 737 So.2d at 1184.

A stop and/or brief detention of a person for investigatory purposes is permissible if an officer has a well-founded suspicion (supported by articulable facts) of criminal activity, even if the officer lacks probable cause. See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2004); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993); Brye, 927 So.2d at 81-82; State v. Gonzalez, 682 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The totality of the circumstances must be taken into account when determining whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop. See Jenkins v. State...

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