Huffman v. U.S., 95-5234
| Decision Date | 03 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-5234,95-5234 |
| Parties | Thomas W. HUFFMAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; United States Postal Service, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.
Michael P. DeBourbon (argued and briefed), Pruitt & DeBourbon, Pikeville, KY, for Thomas W. Huffman, Deborah Huffman.
Thomas Lee Gentry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Lexington, KY, Lori J. Dym (argued and briefed), U.S. Postal Service, Law Dept., Washington, DC, for U.S., U.S. Postal Service.
Before: KENNEDY and COLE, Circuit Judges; COHN, District Judge. *
Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting summary judgment to the United States in their suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2674, claiming that noise emitting from a United States Post Office constitutes a nuisance under Kentucky law. The District Court held that plaintiffs' claim was barred by the FTCA statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we REVERSE.
The Landmark Inn and the Pikeville Post Office stand next to each other on North Mayo Trail, in Pikeville, Kentucky. The post office was built in 1960, when the Inn was already in existence. Some years later, an addition to the Inn was built. The addition runs immediately behind the post office and faces an area of the post office used as a loading zone, where mail is received and delivered.
In 1984, plaintiffs Thomas and Deborah Huffman purchased the Landmark Inn. According to the affidavit of Thomas Huffman, occasional annoying noise began coming from the loading zone of the post office in the summer of 1985. As a result of the noise, which occurred during the early morning hours, guests at the Inn were apparently unable to sleep and complained to plaintiffs. In response, Mr. Huffman spoke with officials at the post office and secured assurances that efforts would be made to abate the noise. According to plaintiffs, these efforts were successful and the problematic noise ceased for a period of time.
However, the annoying noise returned, and the process of complaint-and-abatement discussed above continued for nearly seven years. Plaintiffs allege that in early 1992, the noise became continuous and more intense, and efforts to reduce it ceased. 1 Further, post office officials allegedly began ignoring plaintiffs' subsequent complaints.
As a result, plaintiffs initiated this nuisance suit against the United States under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, for damage to their business. The United States filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, in part, that plaintiffs failed to bring the claim within the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the statute of limitations began to run in 1985, when plaintiffs first complained about the noise, and expired well before the 1992 filing of the administrative prerequisite to the instant lawsuit. Finding no factual dispute, and no reason to equitably toll the statute, the District Court entered summary judgment on behalf of the United States. Plaintiffs now appeal.
Plaintiffs argue that their 1992 complaint is not time barred because it states a cause of action for temporary nuisance which, under Kentucky law, is presently actionable.
The United States, however, argues that noise resulting from Pikeville postal operations constitutes a permanent nuisance, that the cause of action for this nuisance accrued in 1985, and that the two-year statute of limitations has thus expired.
Because there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether the noise emitting from the post office constitutes a temporary nuisance or a permanent nuisance under Kentucky law, we reverse the decision of the District Court.
We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Michigan United Food and Commercial Workers Unions v. Muir Co., 992 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1993). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Further, at this stage in the litigation, we must view all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Michigan United, 992 F.2d at 597.
The FTCA statute of limitations requires that a claim be presented against the government within two years "after such claim accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The FTCA further dictates that the federal government be liable in tort in the same manner and to the same extent that state law would impose liability on a private individual in similar circumstances. Young v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1241 (6th Cir.1995) (citations omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Thus, Kentucky state law both provides the cause of action and governs the application of the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations. See Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.1991) ().
Kentucky law recognizes both temporary and permanent nuisances. See, e.g., Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755 (Ky.1965). A nuisance is permanent if it is created by a permanent structure that has been properly constructed and operated. Id. at 757. A claim for relief from a permanent nuisance accrues when a plaintiff first suffers an injury resulting from it, and such a claim is subject to the statute of limitations. Id. at 758.
A nuisance is temporary if it is created by a permanent structure that has been improperly constructed or operated. Id. at 758. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jachetta v. U.S.
...property owners could proceed against the United States in their FTCA action under a permanent nuisance theory); Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703, 705–06 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment in the plaintiff's FTCA action, which alleged a nuisa......
-
Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates
...782, 783 (1889). 14. See, e.g., Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1122 (D.C.Cir. 1988); Huffman v. U.S., 82 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Kentucky law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Res. & Chem. Corp., 600 F.Supp. 797, 801 (D.C.Idaho 1985) (applying Id......
-
McLellan Highway Corp. v. U.S.
...Circuit cases to bolster its argument for the application of state law to determine when its claim accrued. In Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir.1996), the court held that "state law both provides the cause of action and governs the application of the FTCA's two-year statu......
-
Nieman v. NLO, Inc.
...used to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. 9 This court recently encountered a similar issue in Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703 (6th Cir.1996), where we reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a case alleging a temporary nuisance under the Fede......
-
Takings, torts and turmoil: reviewing the authority requirement of the Just Compensation Clause.
...Id. at 1331. See also Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1971). (189.) Id. at 1331. (190.) Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. (191.) Id. at 706. In this case, whether the plaintiff's claim was time-barred turned on whether the post office constituted a temporar......