Hufford v. Herrold

• Decision Date: 02 October 1920
• Docket Number: No. 33852.,33852.
• Citation: 189 Iowa 853,179 N.W. 53
• Parties: HUFFORD ET AL. v. HERROLD ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

189 Iowa 853

179 N.W. 53

HUFFORD ET AL.

v.HERROLD ET AL.

No. 33852.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 2, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Hubert Utterback, Judge.

Action in equity to enjoin the removal of a school building formerly used by the subdistrict to another site within an independent consolidated district, and to enjoin the collection of certain taxes levied for school purposes, and also to enjoin the issuance and sale of bonds voted at a special election for the erection of a school building within said district. A demurrer to plaintiffs' petition was sustained, and they appeal. Affirmed.Brockett, Strauss & Blake, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Parsons & Mills, of Des Moines, for appellees.

STEVENS, J.

Plaintiffs are residents and taxpayers within the consolidated independent district of Jefferson, Jefferson township, Polk county, Iowa, and defendants comprise its board of directors, and the auditor and treasurer of said county. The petition assails the validity of the organization of said district upon the grounds of indefiniteness, irregularity, inaccuracy, and conflict in the description of the proposed boundary and territory thereof, as set forth in the petition and notice of election therefor; that the requirement of the statute, that separate ballot boxes be provided for the residents within towns and villages within said proposed district and the territory outside thereof, was not complied with; that the promoters of the proposition to organize said district acted in bad faith, and procured sufficient nonresidents to cast illegal votes at the election to obtain a majority in favor thereof, without which the proposition would have been defeated.

The petition also charges that if the incorporation of the district was valid, it had at the times complained of ceased to have a legal existence, for the reasons that since its organization the United States government has acquired more than two sections of the territory situated therein for military purposes, same constituting a part of the cantonment known as Camp Dodge; that 120 acres originally included therein has been ceded by the board of directors to the neighboring district of Grimes; that no effort to carry out the purpose of said incorporation has been made since its organization in 1917, and that said district has been abandoned and ceased to function as such, and that by reason of the action of the United States government and the board of directors, as above set forth, the territory within said district has been reduced to less than 16 sections.

It is also alleged in said petition that the defendant board of directors has determined that no school shall be conducted in said district, except in a building located within the limits of the territory acquired by the United States government for military purposes, and are threatening and proposing to remove a schoolhouse, situated in said consolidated district, to a site located outside of the territorial limits of the said district, and which is unsanitary and unsuitable for school purposes, for the reasons that same is located near an interurban railway and station, and in the vicinity of picnic grounds and of a place frequented by, and forming a common meeting ground for, immoral characters of both sexes and used for immoral purposes; that soldiers in charge of trucks and automobiles in great numbers pass, and drill, near said site, and that the attention of the pupils will be distracted from their studies; that no suitable playground can be provided for the use and benefit of pupils attending said school; that same is remote from the center of the school population, and is opposed by the patrons of said school.

It is further alleged in said petition that on or about June 30, 1917, at an election held for that purpose, the electors within said district voted to issue bonds in the sum of $20,000 for the purpose of creating a fund to be used in the erection of a schoolhouse, and that subsequent thereto the defendant board of directors made and certified a tax levy for school purposes to the county auditor of Polk county upon a part only of the real estate originally comprised in said district; that the taxes so levied, if payment thereof be enforced and the bonds issued and sold, would impose an unlawful and oppressive burden upon the property and taxpayers within said district, and a burden not contemplated by the parties at the time of the organization of said district. Plaintiffs pray that the defendants be enjoined from removing said school building, from issuing and selling bonds, and that the taxes levied and certified to the county auditor be canceled and their collection enjoined. Possibly, the foregoing summary of the allegations of plaintiff's petition does not include all of the essential matters therein set forth, but the omission, if any, will be supplied in the discussion to follow:

[1] I. In so far as the petition charges irregularities and defects in the organization of the consolidated district, it does not state ground for injunctive relief. We have repeatedly held that the validity and legality of the incorporation of a consolidated school district can be tested only by quo warranto. Haines v. Board, 184 Iowa, 401, 164 N. W. 887, 167 N. W. 192;State v. Rowe, 175 N. W. 32;Harvey v. Kirton, 182 Iowa, 973, 164 N. W. 888;Nelson v. Cons. School Dist., 181 Iowa, 424, 164 N. W. 874.

This is practically conceded by counsel for appellant, but they seek to make a distinction between a direct assault upon the validity of the incorporation of the district and a situation wherein such questions arise as a mere incident to the main grounds upon which equitable relief is demanded. The allegations of the petition, however, specifically challenge the legality of the organization of the district, and relief is asked upon this ground.

[2] II. Appellants also maintain that, even if it were conceded that the original incorporation of the district was in all respects valid, yet because of the matters set forth in the petition, and admitted by the demurrer, it has ceased to have a valid existence. The acquisitionby the United States government of a portion of the territory included within said district for military purposes, it is true, deprived the district of the right to levy and collect taxes therefrom, but our attention is called to...