Huggins v. People of State

• Citation: 39 Ill. 241,1866 WL 4388
• Parties: P. C. HUGGINS et al.v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Decision Date: 31 January 1866
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

39 Ill. 241

1866 WL 4388 (Ill.)

P. C. HUGGINS et al.

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1866.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Shelby county; the Hon. CHARLES EMERSON, Judge, presiding.

The opinion of the Court contains a sufficient statement of the case.

Mr. A. THORNTON and Messrs. HENRY & READ, for the plaintiffs in error.

In a proceeding by scire facias on a recognizance, a plea of duress of the principal upon both principle and authority is a good plea, and is equally available when pleaded by the security. The State v. Bruntley, 27 Ala. 44; The People v. Slayton, Breese, 329.

The third plea interposed by the security in this case was, that Martin, the principal, was in the service of the United States at the time he was arrested, and that he was held to said service and taken by the military authorities to the State of Mississippi, and prevented by reason thereof from appearing in accordance with the undertaking in said recognizance and by reason of his being so held by the military authorities aforesaid in the State of Mississippi, it was out of the power of his surety to surrender him, and out of his power to appear, etc. We insist the court below erred in sustaining a demurrer to this plea. Under this assignment of error, two questions arise:

First, whether a party who is in the service of the United States, or who is in the custody of the authorities of the United States, can, without a formal requisition being made on the military authorities, be arrested by the State authorities. In the case of the United States v. Booth, 21 How. 523, it is said, that where “the prisoner or person is within the dominion and jurisdiction of the government of the United States, that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” If he has committed any offense against the State laws, the proper way to obtain jurisdiction over him is by the State authorities making requisition on the federal authorities to surrender him. And until he is surrendered by the federal authorities, he is as much without the jurisdiction of the State authorities as if he was in the State of Indiana or Ohio. This is rendered necessarily so, from the complex character of our government, and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, and each of them restricted in its powers, and each within its sphere of action prescribed by the Constitution of the United States independent of the other. It will scarcely be contended that a ministerial officer of the State of Illinois could legally pass over into Indiana and make an arrest upon a warrant issued by the courts of this State, and take a bond from the party so arrested. And yet such is the practical effect of the proceedings in the case. If the State authorities had properly proceeded by requisition, as it was their duty to have done, then there would have been no complication, and the plaintiff in error would have been free and at liberty to have appeared and have answered the charge against him.

This brings us to the second proposition, that is: That Martin was prevented from appearing and answering the charge in accordance with the requirements of his recognizance by vis major, and is as much excused as if he had been prevented by the act of God. Brown v. The People, 26 Ill. 31. Neither could the security have surrendered him. He had been taken by the military authorities beyond the limits of the State, and when the court entered a forfeiture he was in active service in the army.

And, finally, the court erred in finding the issue for the people, upon the plea of nul tiel record. There was no evidence, neither in fact is there any record, showing that the indictment against Martin was found by the grand jury and returned into open court; and this the record must affirmatively show, otherwise the court has no jurisdiction. Rainey v. The People, 3 Gilm. 71; McKinney v. The People, 2 Id. 40; Gardner v. The People, 3 Scam. 35.

Mr. C. M. MORRISON, State's attorney, for the people.

Sureties in a recognizance cannot plead the duress of their principal in discharge of their liability. Plummer v. The People, 16 Ill. 538. To hold such a plea good would destroy all recognizances.

The court properly sustained the demurrer to the third plea. See 33d article of war, Brightley's Digest, 76; Brown v. The People, 26 Ill. 28; Mix v. The People, Id. 32; Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 67; Devine v. The State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 624.

It was not necessary to show a valid indictment against Martin before a recovery could be had against his sureties upon the issue on nul tiel record. It has been decided by this court, in adjudicating upon a recognizance entered into before a justice of the peace, that the affidavit, warrant, etc., will not be examined in this court, and no defects in any of them will vitiate the bond. Is there not as much reason for requiring a proper affidavit to be filed to give the magistrate jurisdiction, as that a perfect indictment should be found to authorize the sheriff to arrest and take bail?

The following authorities show that the validity of an indictment cannot be questioned in a proceeding on a recognizance: Williams v. The State, 20 Ala. 63; The State v. Weaver, 18 Id. 293; The People v. Dennis, 4 Mich. 609. Mr. JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a scire facias on a recognizance given by Martin as principal, and Huggins as security, to secure the...