Huggler v. Elkins Stroud Suplee & Co., Civ. A. No. 79-3505.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
Writing for the CourtGILES
Citation505 F. Supp. 9
PartiesBarbara Ann HUGGLER v. ELKINS STROUD SUPLEE & COMPANY
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 79-3505.
Decision Date11 July 1980

505 F. Supp. 9

Barbara Ann HUGGLER
v.
ELKINS STROUD SUPLEE & COMPANY

Civ. A. No. 79-3505.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

July 11, 1980.


505 F. Supp. 10

Methuselah Z. O. Bradley, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Ian A. L. Strogatz, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GILES, District Judge.

In her first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges sexual harassment by her defendant-employer in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16. She claims that on December 12, 1978, within one hundred eighty days of the alleged discriminatory practice, charges of employment discrimination were filed with the Philadelphia District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") as required by Title VII.1

Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant has moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege in the complaint that she, or the EEOC acting on her behalf, exhausted state or local administrative remedies prior to instituting an action in federal court. Such exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite, defendant submits. The court agrees. However, for the reasons set out below, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff shall be granted leave to amend her complaint within

505 F. Supp. 11
fifteen days from the date hereof to further state whether the EEOC, acting on her behalf, exhausted state and/or local administrative remedies before commencing this lawsuit

Section 706(c) of Title VII establishes the procedure for the enforcement of its substantive provisions and provides, in pertinent part, that

In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section with the EEOC by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)

Defendant correctly states that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"), acting pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa.Stat.Ann. Tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 Pa.Supp. 1980-81), is the state administrative body empowered to grant relief. The PHRC is a "706 agency", that is, a state agency which "satisfies the criteria stated in Section 706(c)." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.3 & 1601.74.

Compliance with Section 706(c) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing of a Title VII action in federal district court. Black Musicians v. Local 60-471, American Federation of Musicians, 375 F.Supp. 902 (W.D.Pa.1974), aff'd mem., 544 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1976), Bell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 448 F.Supp. 133 (E.D.Pa.1978). This prerequisite may be satisfied, though, by the EEOC by its internal procedures, pursuant to regulation, as well as by the plaintiff.

In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 at 816, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2492, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 525, 92 S.Ct. 616, 618, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972), to the effect that "nothing in the Civil Rights Act suggests that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself." The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly held that state proceedings are properly instituted and § 706(c) is satisfied by the EEOC when it promptly forwards a copy of plaintiff's charge to the appropriate state agency.

The EEOC has adopted a deferral procedure "to simplify filing procedures for parties ... and thereby avoid the accidental forfeiture of important Federal rights." McAdams v. Thermal Industries, 428 F.Supp. 156, 158 n.6 (W.D.Pa.1977); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13. This regulation mandates that if a charge is filed prematurely with the EEOC, a copy must be transmitted to the appropriate 706 agency. The charge itself is held by the EEOC...

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2 cases
  • Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., Civ. A. No. 81-2918.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • August 27, 1982
    ...would be exempted from having first to exhaust his remedial avenues with the PHRC. See generally Huggler v. Elkins Stroud Suplee and Co., 505 F.Supp. 9, 11-12 (E.D.Pa.1980). Since the Supreme Court has made clear that the EEOC referral procedure comports with the jurisdictional requirements......
  • Stocker v. Green, Tweed & Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-4503
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • July 31, 2020
    ...file his ChargePage 8 of Discrimination when he went to the EEOC on August 31, 2017. They rely on Huggler v. Elkins Stroud Suplee & Co., 505 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1980), which states that "when an individual makes a good faith effort to comply with the administrative process by filing charge......

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