Hughes v. Branton

• Decision Date: 20 September 2013
• Docket Number: 1101051.
• Citation: Hughes v. Branton, 141 So.3d 1021 (Ala. 2013)
• Parties: Donald E. HUGHES and John H. Hughes v. Robbie Jean BRANTON and Billy Joe Hughes.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

141 So.3d 1021

Donald E. HUGHES and John H. Hughes

v.Robbie Jean BRANTON and Billy Joe Hughes.

1101051.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 20, 2013.

David K. Hogg, Dothan, for appellants.

Deborah S. Seagle, Dothan, for appellees.

MURDOCK, Justice.

Donald E. Hughes (“Don”) and John H. Hughes (“John”) appeal from a judgment of the Houston Circuit Court vacating a deed and imposing a constructive trust upon real property formerly owned by Henry C. Hughes (“Henry”) and Emma Lucille Hughes (“Emma”), both of whom are deceased. Because we conclude that the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction of the claim at issue, we vacate the judgment and dismiss the appeal.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Henry and Emma, who was born in December 1913, had five children: daughters Robbie Jean Branton (“Robbie”) and Sarah Spears (“Sarah”) and sons Billy Joe Hughes (“Billy Joe”), Don, and John. Emma and Henry owned approximately 100 acres of real property in Dothan, which they farmed (“the farm”). At the time of trial, the farm had a value of $582,500 according to a recent ad valorem tax assessment.

In 1988, Henry died and Emma became the sole owner of the farm. After Henry's death, Emma executed a purported will (“the 1988 will”). The 1988 will provided that Emma's estate would pass upon her death to her five children “to be divided equally, agreeably and peaceably.” The 1988 will named Don as personal representative of the estate, and it named John as successor personal representative.

In 1995, Emma executed a second purported will (“the 1995 will”). The 1995 will revoked all earlier wills and provided that Emma's estate would pass upon her death to her five children “to be divided among them in such a manner as my Co-[personal representatives] may determine and such divisions need not be equal.” The 1995 will named Don and John as co-personal representatives of the estate. At the same time she executed the 1995 will, Emma also executed a durable power of attorney naming Don and John as co-attorneys-in-fact.

In February 1997, Emma executed a deed that transferred the farm to Don and John, subject to a life estate in favor of Emma (“the 1997 deed”).¹

In 1998, after Emma sustained a fall in her home, Don moved Emma into an assisted-living facility. Later that year, she was moved into a nursing home.

In November 1999, Don and John, as co-attorneys-in-fact for Emma, executed a deed transferring Emma's life estate in the farm to Don (“the 1999 deed”).

Emma died in 2003, after which Don met with Emma's other children. In the meeting, Don gave each sibling a copy of the power of attorney, the 1995 will, and the 1997 deed. At the meeting, Don stated that he and John owned the farm and that they were not going to give any portion of the farm to Robbie, Billy Joe, or Sarah.

In January 2005, Robbie and Billy Joe filed in the Houston Probate Court a petition to probate the 1995 will for the purpose of contesting it. See Hooper v. Huey, 293 Ala. 63, 68, 300 So.2d 100, 104–05 (1974) (noting that the same person may both initiate a proceeding to probate a will and contest the will at issue), overruled in part on other grounds, Bardin v. Jones, 371 So.2d 23, 26 (Ala.1979). The petition also included a claim to set aside the 1997 deed. Robbie and Billy Joe attached a copy of the 1995 will to their petition, and they requested that the probate court order Don and John to produce the original of Emma's 1995 will.

In regard to the will contest, Robbie and Billy Joe alleged that the 1995 will was ambiguous, that Emma lacked testamentary capacity when she executed the 1995 will, and that she was the subject of fraud or undue influence by Don and John. Robbie and Billy Joe requested that, upon receipt of an answer from Don and John, the probate court transfer “this entire matter” to the Houston Circuit Court. Robbie and Billy Joe also requested that either the probate court or the circuit court require an inventory as to the real and personal property composing Emma's estate. Further, they requested that “the appropriate Court remove [Don and John] as the administrators of the estate,” though the record does not reflect the appointment of any “administrators of the estate.” ²

In regard to the 1997 deed, Robbie and Billy Joe alleged that Emma lacked the capacity to execute the 1997 deed or that she was the subject of undue influence by Don and John in regard to the 1997 deed. Robbie and Billy Joe also alleged that Don and John

“committed a fraud on [Robbie and Billy Joe] in this matter ... by concealing the [1997 deed], and by continually indicating, both prior to, and upon the death of [Emma], that [Robbie and Billy Joe] ... were due a proprietary disposition in accordance with the [1995 will].”

Robbie and Billy Joe requested that the 1997 deed be set aside and that “any encumbrance or collateralization of [the farm] which may have already occurred, due to actions taken by [Don and John] since the execution of the [1995 will], ... be satisfied immediately.” ³

In addition to their petition, Robbie and Billy Joe also filed in the probate court a “Request for Removal to Circuit Court.” The removal request alleged that Robbie and Billy Joe had filed a petition contesting the 1995 will and that,

“pursuant to the provisions of law, the Petitioners/Contestants demand that the probate proceeding be transferred and removed from the Probate Court of Houston County to the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, in order that this matter may be fully adjudicated.”

Upon receipt of the petition, the probate court entered an order directing Don and John to produce the 1995 will. Thereafter, the attorney for Don and John filed an appearance in the probate court, and the original will was delivered to that court. In conjunction with the delivery of the 1995 will, Don and John filed a petition for letters testamentary and an answer to the petition filed by Robbie and Billy Joe. Don and John denied the allegations in the Robbie and Billy Joe's petition as to their alleged wrongful acts regarding the procurement of the 1995 will and the 1997 deed.

In February 2005, the probate court entered an order transferring “the proceeding” to the circuit court.⁴ According to an index in the record before us, the probate court's “file” that was transferred to the circuit court consisted of the following:

“1. Copy of Last Will and Testament of [Emma] Lucille Crutchfield Hughes[;]

“2. Petition to Probate Will, Contest Will and Vacate Deed w/Exhibit ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, & ‘F’[;]

“3. Request for Removal to Circuit Court[;]

“4. Order to Produce Will w/proof of service on Donald E. Hughes & John H. Hughes[;]

“5. Entry of Appearance of Reginald A. Rhodes[, the attorney for Don and John;]

“6. Original Will of [Emma] Lucille Crutchfield Hughes[;]

“7. Petition for Letters Testamentary and Answer to Petition to Contest Will and Vacate Deed[;]

“8. Alabama Certificate of Death[;]

“9. Order (to Transfer to Circuit Court).”

After the probate court transferred its file to the circuit court, Robbie and Billy Joe filed an answer in that court alleging that the issuance of letters testamentary to Don and John would be premature. Also, Robbie and Billy Joe filed a motion requesting that the circuit court stay the issuance of letters testamentary pending resolution of the issues raised in the petition.

In March 2005, based on an agreement of the parties, the circuit court stayed the case “until further notice.” Approximately one year later, the parties began to engage in discovery, which continued sporadically over the next several years.

In February 2010, Don and John filed a motion for a summary judgment and Robbie and Billy Joe filed a response to the motion. In April 2010, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion for a summary judgment and bifurcating, for purposes of trial, the will contest and the request to vacate the 1997 deed. Reasoning that “[i]f the deed is valid, the decedent would not own any real property subject to the will,” the circuit court set the claim to set aside the 1997 deed for a nonjury trial and set the will contest for a jury trial.

In October 2010, Robbie and Billy Joe filed a motion to amend their petition. The circuit court granted the motion. The amended petition added allegations that Emma had conveyed the farm to Don and John “in order save the property from being surrendered to Medicaid should the necessity to enter a nursing home arise.” Robbie and Billy Joe further alleged that Don and John held the farm “as trustees for [Emma] and other members of the family” and that after Emma's death Don and John “claimed the property for themselves outright without regard for the trust interest of the remaining family members.” Robbie and Billy Joe requested that the circuit court “declare the deed to [Don and John] to be a Deed in Trust and [Don and John] trustees of the property for all the natural heirs.”

The circuit court subsequently held a nonjury trial concerning the claim to set aside the 1997 deed. After the trial, the court ordered the respective attorneys “to brief the issue of a constructive trust.” After receiving the requested briefs, the circuit court entered an order that concludes as follows:

“It is stated in Brothers v. Moore, 349 So.2d 1107, 1108 (Ala.1977):

“ ‘A constructive trust is a creature of equity which operates to prevent unjust enrichment. A constructive trust will be found when property has been either acquired by fraud, or where in the absence of fraud it would not be equitable to allow it to be retained by him who holds it. (Emphasis supplied.)’

“Additionally, a constructive trust has been imposed where a confidential relation exists. In Cole v. Adkins, 358 So.2d 447, 450 (Ala.1978) the Court opined:

“ ‘A constructive trust will also be imposed upon property whenever the circumstances under which it was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the holder of legal title provided some...