Hughes v. Chicago, Indianapolis And Louisville Railway Company

• Decision Date: 24 April 1912
• Docket Number: 7,608
• Citation: 98 N.E. 317,50 Ind.App. 278
• Parties: HUGHES ET AL. v. CHICAGO, INDIANAPOLIS AND LOUISVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

98 N.E. 317

50 Ind.App. 278

HUGHES ET AL. v. CHICAGO, INDIANAPOLIS AND LOUISVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY

No. 7,608

Court of Appeals of Indiana

April 24, 1912

From Carroll Circuit Court; James P. Wason, Judge.

Action by Sidney R. Hughes and another against the Chicago Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed.

C. W Watkins, C. A. Butler and A. C. Johnson, for appellants.

E. C Field, H. R. Kurrie and C. R. Pollard, for appellee.

OPINION

FELT, C. J.

Appellants brought this action against appellee to recover damages for the loss of a trunk. The cause was tried by a justice of the peace, without a jury, and from a finding and judgment against them, appellants appealed to the Carroll Circuit Court. On motion of appellee, the appeal was there dismissed, and appellants now allege error in such ruling.

Appellee first contends that error, if any, in dismissing an appeal from a justice of the peace cannot be reviewed in the Appellate Court on an independent assignment of error, as in this case, but that such error can only be presented as one of the grounds of a motion for a new trial. Appellee's position is, however, not well taken, for error in sustaining a motion to dismiss an appeal from a justice is not an "error of law occurring at the trial", and the only way to present the question of the correctness of such ruling is by an independent assignment of error. Galey v. Mason (1910), 174 Ind. 158, 161, 91 N.E. 561; Werley v. Huntington Waterworks Co. (1894), 138 Ind. 148, 153, 37 N.E. 582; Tibbetts v. O'Connell (1879), 66 Ind. 171; Vawter v. Gilliland (1876), 55 Ind. 278; Tyler v. Bowlus (1876), 54 Ind. 333.

The substance of appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal to the circuit court is that it does not appear from the transcript that the justice ever entered a judgment such as authorized an appeal. Appellee bases his contention on two grounds:

(1) That what purports to be the judgment of the justice is, in fact, no more than a finding, and (2) the alleged judgment is not signed by the justice.

It is true that the judgment in question is informal, and its phraseology open to criticism, but, when liberally and fairly construed, the language shows a trial, a finding in favor of appellee (defendant below), and a judgment that plaintiffs take nothing by their action, and pay the costs of suit. This is a final disposition of the action, and is sufficient in form to evidence a judgment. 24 Cyc. 654; Kennard v. Carter (1878), 64 Ind. 31, 40; Britton v. State, ex rel. (1876), 54 Ind. 535, 540; Brewer v. Murray (1845), 7 Blackf. 567.

The statutes (§§ 1725, 1780 Burns 1908, §§ 1437, 1489 R. S. 1881) require the judgment of a justice of the peace to be entered of record and signed, and it has been held that until this is done there is no valid judgment. Galbraith v. Sidener (1867), 28 Ind. 142, 150; Emery v. Royal (1889), 117 Ind. 299, 303, 20 N.E. 150; State, ex rel., v. Wanee (1892), 4 Ind.App. 1, 30 N.E. 161.

Section 1725, supra, requires a justice of the peace to keep a docket, "in which he shall record the proceedings, in full of all suits instituted before him; which record shall contain the names of the parties at full length, a copy of the cause of action, * * * and * * * be signed by such justice," etc.

In the case of Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Smither (1863), 20 Ind. 228, a motion to dismiss, made in the circuit court on appeal from a justice's court, because the justice had failed to copy in his record "the plaintiff's cause of action", was overruled. This case has been followed in later decisions. Hopper v. Lucas (1882), 86 Ind. 43, 50; Reed v. Whitton (1881), 78 Ind. 579.

In Catterlin v. City of Frankfort (1882), 87 Ind. 45, it was held that the fact that the judgment of the circuit court was signed in vacation rendered it irregular but not void.

In Baldwin v. Runyan (1893), 8 Ind.App. 344, 35 N.E. 569, where the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace was questioned, this court, by Reinhard, J., said: "The circuit court is not a court of error, and does not undertake to review the proceedings before the justice. It can only inquire into the jurisdiction of the justice for the purpose of deciding whether it has itself jurisdiction, and when it has so found, it proceeds to try and dispose of the case as an original action."

In O'Reilly v. Block (1893), 23 N.Y.S. 670, under a statute very similar to ours, it was held that the unsigned minutes of the justice, showing the amount of the judgment, for whom rendered, and awarding costs, was sufficient on appeal to give the court jurisdiction, provided the appeal was otherwise regular.

It has been held in other jurisdictions that for the purposes of an appeal it is immaterial whether the judgment of a justice of the peace is valid or invalid, provided it appears that he had jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter. Finke v. Lukensmeyer (1892), 51 Minn. 252, 53 N.W. 546; Giett v. McGannon Mercantile Co. (1898), 74 Mo.App. 209; Stephenson v. Jones (1900), 84 Mo.App. 249, 255; Turner v. Harrison (1884), 43 Ark. 233; Matlock v. King (1856), 23 Mo. 400.

While the question has not been squarely decided in Indiana in regard to the effect of an unsigned judgment of a justice of the peace on appeal to the...