Hughes v. Chitty, 7689.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 7689.,7689.
• Citation: 283 F. Supp. 734
• Parties: Robert HUGHES v. Leonard CHITTY, d/b/a Tideland Towing Company et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

283 F. Supp. 734

Robert HUGHES v. Leonard CHITTY, d/b/a Tideland Towing Company et al.

No. 7689.

United States District Court E. D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division.

April 9, 1968.

Owen J. Bradley, Plotkin, Sapir, Bradley & Krasnoff, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Monte J. Ducote, Schoemann, Gomes & Ducote, New Orleans, La., for defendants.

COMISKEY, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a motion by the defendants, Ernest L. Canulette,¹ Charles W. Wall, Sr.,² and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin³ to dismiss and/or for summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is directed against the supplemental libel of plaintiff, Robert Hughes.

The plaintiff, Hughes, was employed as a carpenter for M & W Marine Ways, Inc., which was engaged in the business of repairing various types of watercraft. M & W had been engaged to perform general overhaul and repair work to the tugboat "TIDELAND" which was owned by Leonard Chitty.

The "TIDELAND" was swamped and capsized in the Mississippi River on August 18, 1964 near New Orleans. It sunk to the bottom of the river where it remained until October 1964, when it was raised and taken to M & W repair facilities to commence the overhaul work. On October 14, 1964, the plaintiff, Hughes, went aboard the "TIDELAND" to engage in the work of his employer, when an explosion occurred causing his injuries for which he seeks damages. The tug, at the time of the explosion, was docked on the Mississippi River.

At this point in time, all defendants have been dismissed from this action except for Canulette, Wall and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin. In a summary judgment granted in favor of Leonard Chitty, d/b/a Tideland Towing Company on February 4, 1966 made final on May 11, 1966, Judge Ainsworth concluded that the vessel was out of navigation, hence no unseaworthiness claim could lie. He also concluded that the shipowner was not negligent, thus defeating all other causes of action that plaintiff might have had against the shipowner.

It is clear that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was the result of a maritime contract and occurred over navigable waters of the Mississippi. It is well settled that a contract to repair a vessel is maritime. North Pacific Steamship Co. v. Hall Brothers Marine Railway & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119, 39 S.Ct. 221, 63 L.Ed. 510 (1910). Hence, admiralty jurisdiction attaches, and the only question raised by the plaintiff in this regard is whether the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act has concurrent jurisdiction with Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act⁴ so that the plaintiff has an election. Or put another way, is this accident in the "twilight zone" defined in Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S.Ct. 225, 87 L.Ed. 246 (1939) by Mr. Justice Black but limited by Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962). The limitation imposed by Calbeck was after a complete historical analysis of the Longshoremen's Act. The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan in Calbeck said, "Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law." Furthermore, he said "* * * the Acts adoption of Jensen line between admiralty and state jurisdiction as the limit of federal coverage included no exception for matters of `local concern'". The Calbeck decision has been subject to wide discussion both in the case law and the legal journals.⁵ The Fifth Circuit immediately after Calbeck in Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock and Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 held that where it is clearly an admiralty jurisdictional injury the federal remedy is mandatory.⁶

It is our conclusion that where injury occurred on a vessel in navigable waters while engaged in a maritime contract of repairing a vessel out of navigation, then admiralty jurisdiction attaches and the injured employee's mandatory remedy is under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

The plaintiff, Hughes, is attempting to hold defendant Wall, Canulette and their liability insurer for the damages sustained. Under the provision of 33 U.S.C.A. § 905⁷ the exclusive liability of the employer shall be compensation under this act. Also under 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(i),⁸ as amended 1959, fellow workers including officers are immune under the act from suit by injured employees, however they may still have a right of action against third parties. This is made crystal clear by looking to the Congressional intent under the amended provisions:⁹

"The other major provision of the bill relates to immunization of fellow employees against damage suits. The rationale of this change in the law is that when an employee goes to work in a hazardous industry he encounters two risks. First, the risks inherent in the hazardous work and second, the risk that he might negligently hurt someone else and thereby incur a large common-law damage liability. While it is true that this provision limits an employee's rights, it would at the same time expand them by immunizing him against suits where he negligently injures a fellow worker. It simply means that rights and liabilities arising within the `employee family' will be settled within the framework of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act."

Therefore, if we accept admiralty jurisdiction and the injured parties remedy as the Longshoremen's Act, it becomes manifest that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act would exclude this action against defendant Wall, an officer of the employer, M & W, and defendant, Canulette, the operations officer of the employer. So with regard to these two defendants the motion to dismiss should be granted.

But the plaintiff maintains that this action against the insured under the Direct Action Statute of Louisiana¹⁰ creates a separate and distinct right of action in favor of an injured party¹¹ and that the immunity granted by the Longshoremen's Act is in the nature of a personal defense unavailable to insurer. A search of the jurisprudence has revealed no case on point to support this proposition and the plaintiff admits this is res novo with regard to the Longshoremen's Act.

The insurance policy is a "Comprehensive General Liability Policy" which includes as named insured "any executive officer, director or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his duties as such" and under its exclusions is included "any obligation for which the insured or any carrier as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar law;" because Workmen's Compensation is provided under a separate policy, it is maintained that this action would not come under this provision.

In support of plaintiff's position, In re Independent Towing Co., 242 F.Supp. 950 (E.D.La.1965) is cited, referred to here as ITCO. In ITCO the question before the court was whether the statutory provision limiting liability of a vessel owner to the amount of the vessel was a personal defense unavailable to an insurer who received a premium under a contract of insurance for liability coverage. The court concluded that it was a personal defense available only to the shipowner and the apparent benefits cannot be urged or asserted by the liability insurer. At page 954 the ITCO court said:

"Since equity traditionally has been concerned with those mitigating circumstances more or less personal in nature which involve one individual's relations vis-a-vis another, it then follows that limitation, as `the administration of equity in admiralty" is a proceeding in personam which evokes defenses personal in nature. Therefore, as a defensive action, in personam a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability is the assertion of a personal defense."

In ITCO the Louisiana Direct Action Statute was the vehicle used to hold the insurer as in the case at bar, and the court concluded that it has been consistently held to deprive insurers or underwriters of the insured's personal defenses. Personal defenses held not to be available to insurers as a defense are such as lunacy, minority, bankruptcy, governmental immunity, charitable immunity, interspousal immunity and family immunity.

However, if we conclude that this defense is unavailable to the insurer defendant, we would in substance be creating a new remedy for injured employees in actions not only against fellow workers, but also against employers. Such a position would clearly contravene the...