Hughes v. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Inv. Co.

Decision Date08 August 1884
Citation21 F. 169
PartiesHUGHES v. DUNDEE MORTGAGE & TRUST INVESTMENT CO.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

George H. Williams and Charles B. Bellinger, for plaintiff.

William H. Effinger, for defendants.

DEADY J.

This cause comes before the court on exceptions by both parties to the report of the referee. It was commenced on February 12 1883, to recover the sum of $21,255 for professional services as an attorney and counselor at law. It was tried by the referee upon an amended complaint, in which the sum demanded was reduced to $19,155, and an amended answer and the replication thereto. From these, it appears that prior to the commencement of this action the Oregon & Washington Trust Investment Company, the Oregon & Washington Mortgage Savings Bank, and the Dundee Mortgage & Trust Investment Company were each foreign corporations, formed under the laws of Great Britain, and engaged, among other things, in the business of loaning money in Oregon and Washington upon note and mortgage, with a principal office at Dundee, Scotland, and a common local office, board, and manager at Portland, Oregon that the plaintiff was the attorney for these corporations in this country for the periods following: for the first one from January 1, 1876, to January 1, 1880, when it was amalgamated with the latter; for the second one, from July 1 1876, to July 17, 1881, when it was amalgamated with the latter; and for the latter, from January 1, 1880, to July 17, 1881; that by the terms of his employment the plaintiff was required to examine and pass on the title to any real property offered as security for a loan, and certify the result to the local manager, and to prepare and have properly executed and recorded all notes and mortgages taken by the corporations, for which service he was to receive a certain percentage on each loan, to be paid by the borrower; and generally to aid and advise in any matter of interest to the corporations. It is on account of services rendered under this latter provision that this action is brought, less the sum of $756.80 for fees earned in foreclosing two of said mortgages for the defendant.

By the amalgamation of the two elder corporations with the defendant, it is admitted that it succeeded to their rights and assets, and became liable for any valid claim or indebtedness against either of them.

It is not alleged in the Complaint that there was any express agreement to pay a fixed or any price for these general services, but only that they were rendered at the request of the corporations, and that their reasonable value is the sum sued for. In reply to a demand for a bill of particulars, the plaintiff filed a statement to the effect that he could not furnish an itemized account; that he was the general attorney and counselor of these corporations during the period charged for, and the sole legal adviser of their local manager; that he was consulted almost daily by said manager on the business and affairs of the corporation, but made no current charge therefor, expecting to be paid a gross sum per annum, to be thereafter agreed on by the parties.

It is alleged in the answer that it was 'understood and agreed' between the parties that the plaintiff was not to receive any compensation for his services from any of these corporations, but 'was to render, without charge, such general advice as might be desired by either of said corporations,' in consideration of the fees he received from borrowers. The answer admits the plaintiff's services in foreclosing the mortgages as alleged, and also the value of them, but avers that by special agreement they were to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises, after the payment of the debt due the corporation, and that the defendant was obliged to bid in the property sold in said foreclosure suits for the amount of the decree, and is not able to sell the same; and therefore said fees are not yet due from the defendant.

The replication denies that it was 'understood or agreed' that the plaintiff should furnish the general service he did for nothing, or on account of the fees received from borrowers; and admits the agreement stated in the answer as to the payment of the plaintiff's fees in foreclosure cases, but alleges that such agreement was made upon the express condition that the plaintiff was to have the foreclosure of all the defendant's mortgages, which conditions the defendant has failed to keep; and denies that the defendant has not been able to sell said mortgaged premises. On July 17, 1881, a change was made in the mode of compensating the plaintiff, by which the defendant agreed to pay him for the examination of titles at the rate of 1 3/8 per centum on the amount of all loans, including loans renewed, and to allow him to charge borrowers with expense of travel incurred in such examination, whereby his receipts were materially increased, and in consideration of which he expressly undertook to give the defendant verbal advice about its affairs, without further charge. But the defendant soon became dissatisfied with this method of compensation, and the result was that, as the plaintiff would not perform the service on terms less favorable to himself, the relation terminated about the end of the year.

The facts about the foreclosure fees appear to be as stated in the replication, except that the defendant has not been able to sell the property, and the referee so found, and that the defendant is therefore now liable to the plaintiff for the amount of them.

Concerning the claim for compensation for general services, the only question arising on the pleadings is their value, and whether there was any agreement that they should be rendered gratuitously, or in consideration of the fees received from borrowers. Prior to December, 1875, when the plaintiff was appointed attorney for the Oregon & Washington Trust Investment Company, he was in partnership for a short time with M. A. C. Gibbs, the then attorney of said corporation, and was familiar with the fact that his fees for abstracts, searches, investigation of titles, preparing and recording mortgages, not exceeding a certain percentage on each loan, were to be paid by the borrowers, and that there was no express provision for his compensation by the corporation for any service he might render it directly. When the plaintiff became the attorney of said corporation he was furnished with the following schedule concerning his duties and responsibilities:

'(A) To prepare all mortgages, deeds, notes, coupons, and other documents in connection with the company's loans, and to be responsible for their due execution, publication, registration, and validity; (B) to be responsible that all mortgages taken are a clear and indisputable first lien upon the subjects mortgaged, and to grant certificates to that effect; (C) to take charge of and to conduct such proceedings as may from time to time be instituted by the company, or in which the company may be interested, subject to such instructions as may be issued thereanent; (D) to advise the local board and directors of any point of legal or other interest to the company which may be developed or come under his or their notice from time to time by legislative or judicial action, or otherwise; (E) and generally to give his best attention to all the matters connected with the legal department of the company's business, and to give such information and advice as may from time to time be requested or occur to him.'

-- And was advised that his compensation for services in connection with taking security for loans should be paid by the borrowers, as in the case of his predecessor.

On March 3, 1875, a scale of fees to be paid the attorney by borrowers was fixed in the Dundee office, in which the percentage allowed the attorney on eight classes of loans, ranging from $500 to $4,000, was from 2 1/4 to 1 1/8 per centum on the amount loaned, but all loans over the latter sum paid a uniform rate of 1 per centum. This was the rule when the plaintiff was employed, but the local manager claimed and had been privately permitted to take, from this allowance, one-half of 1 per centum to aid in compensating him for his services to the corporation. To this division of his fees the plaintiff soon demurred, on the ground that what was left for him was not an adequate compensation for the labor, expense, and responsibility involved in the service to borrowers, and after some correspondence with the Dundee office it was arranged that the plaintiff should receive the whole amount of the fees paid by borrowers for services in and about the applications for loans. The official resolution on the subject was passed on November 23, 1876, and is in these words:

'Attorney. That Mr. Hughes, the company's attorney, be remunerated by fees charged to borrowers in terms of scale of March, 1875, and now current. The directors trust that these rates of remuneration, which, along with the relative appointment, are to continue during their pleasure, will be satisfactory to all concerned.' The referee found (1) that there was no express contract between the plaintiff and these corporations concerning compensation for his direct and general service to them, but that, during the time of his employment by them, the directors and local manager 'understood and supposed' that the plaintiff was rendering said services 'in consideration of the fees' paid him by borrowers, and the fees that might be received in foreclosure cases; and 'that such was their contract with the plaintiff, and their dealings
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10 cases
  • Jacobs v. Jacobs
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 19 Enero 1926
    ...Strong v. International B. L. & I. Union et al., 82 Ill. App. 426, and cases cited; Hughes v. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Invest. Co. (C. C.) 21 F. 169; Mann v. Bradshaw, 136 Va. 351, 118 S. E. 326. In Virginia, as shown by the last case cited, there is a statute inhibiting courts from making a......
  • Hasbrook v. Wingate
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 22 Junio 1949
    ...originally as a gratuity, cannot subsequently be made the basis of an obligation. Hughes v. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Investment Co., C.C., 21 F. 169, affirmed, [87 N.E.2d 92]Dundee Mortgage & Trust Investment Co. v. Hughes, 124 U.S. 157, 8 S.Ct. 377, 31 L.Ed. 357. In the case of Potter v. Ja......
  • Jacobs v. Jacobs
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 19 Enero 1926
    ... ... as attorney for the plaintiff, in other words, upon a trust ... fund brought into court in a suit begun and prosecuted ... 426, and cases cited; ... Hughes v. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Invest. Co. (C ... C.) 21 F ... ...
  • Duggan v. Davey
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 9 Febrero 1886
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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