Hughes v. Eisner

• Decision Date: 22 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. A--784,A--784
• Citation: 81 A.2d 394,14 N.J.Super. 58
• Parties: HUGHES v. EISNER. . Appellate Division
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 58

14 N.J.Super. 58

81 A.2d 394

HUGHES v. EISNER.

No. A--784.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued April 23, 1951.

Decided May 22, 1951.

Armand F. Jones, Toms River, argued the cause for the respondent (Dorothy V. Reeve, Toms River, attorney).

Rudolph Eisner, Trenton, argued the cause pro se.

Before Judges EASTWOOD, BIGELOW and FREUND.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BIGELOW, J.A.D.

Plaintiff-respondent instituted this action in the Chancery Division to annul an agreement for fees to be paid to his attorney, the defendant-appellant, and also to recapture part of the fees that had already been paid. An answer was filed, evidence was presented, and a judgment rendered that appellant forego any additional charge against respondent over and above the sum already received by him. Hughes v. Eisner, 8 N.J.Super. 351, 72 A.2d 901 (Ch.Div.1950).

Briefly the facts are as follows: Respondent had been in the employ of the Eureka Flint & Spar Company for nearly 20 years. On August 5, 1938, ten days after the termination of the employment, he retained the appellant to represent him in connection with a claim against the Eureka Company for damages due to silicosis contracted by him while employed by that company. He agreed to pay appellant 'out of the proceeds of any recovery, whether by settlement, suit or otherwise, reasonable compensation for his services.' Appellant forthwith looked into the facts and began negotiations with the former employer. By Fall it was evident that a satisfactory settlement could not be obtained in this manner, and that the institution of an action at law was advisable. Under date of November 21, 1938, the parties entered into a new contract, by which respondent agreed to pay appellant 50 percent of whatever might be recovered from the Eureka Company over and above taxed costs and disbursements. The suit was instituted in the Mercer Circuit Court and the company promptly interposed the statute of limitations among other defenses. This defense was struck late in 1939. Hughes v. Eureka Flint & Spar Inc., 26 A.2d 567, 20 N.J.Misc. 314 (Cir.Ct.1939). Judge Jayne comments in his conclusions in the present action that 'The defendant (appellant) thus achieved an eventful and most advantageous legal victory for his client. The plaintiff's employer evidently became alarmed and peace overtures were consequently forthcoming.' (8 N.J.Super. 351, 72 A.2d 904.) The litigation was settled by an agreement executed July 2, 1940. The company paid Hughes $2,500 and agreed to pay him $30 a week more so long as he might live, and also to keep in force at its own expense $2,000 of life insurance, payable to respondent's wife and family. At the same time, respondent and his attorney, the appellant, revised the fee contract. Appellant relinquished his right to repayment of disbursements, and consented to reduce his share of the weekly payments from one-half to one-third of each payment, and lastly he waived any interest in the proceeds of the insurance policy. At the time the action was begun in the Chancery Division, the respondent had received, pursuant to his settlement with the Eureka Company, $17,620, out of which appellant had been paid $6,290 for his services and disbursements.

The appellant argues that the complaint against him should have been dismissed pursuant to the principles referred to by the maxim, He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The respondent, in his testimony, denied that he had signed the agreement with the defendant, dated November 21, 1938. His denial was material to the issues. Judge Jayne found that it was false; he characterized it as a deliberate falsehood.

The clean hands maxim seems to have been first mentioned in our reports in 1870. Derby v. Derby, 21 N.J.Eq. 36, 40 (Ch.1870, Runyon, C.). For 50 years thereafter, references to it were infrequent but they can be read in almost every volume of the New Jersey Equity Reports published after the first World War. In Clickner v. Clickner, 95 N.J.Eq. 479, 123 A. 373, 375 (Ch.1924), where the petitioner had attempted to impose upon the court by false testimony, the court said that denial of relief might well be rested upon that ground 'somewhat akin to the ordinary application of the equitable principles which require a suitor for equitable relief to do equity and to come into court with clean hands.' This was reiterated in Pfender v. Pfender, 104 N.J.Eq. 107, 144 A. 333, affirmed 105 N.J.Eq. 247, 147 A. 911 (E. & A.1929); Meyer v. Blacker, 120 N.J.Eq. 35, 184 A. 191 (Ch.1936), and Clark v. Watts, 10 N.J.Super. 283, 77 A.2d 188 (Ch.1950). These cases, or some of them, were cited in A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 247, 66 A.2d 319, 324 (1949), but the court cautioned, 'The doctrine, however, is not so rigid nor should it be so construed as to allow or permit an unconscionable gain to the wrongdoer at the complainant's expense.' The discretionary nature of the whole clean hands doctrine was stressed by Judge Jacobs in Medical Fabrics Co. v. D.C. McLintock Co., 12 N.J.Super. 177, 79 A.2d 313 (App.Div.1951). We may add that the extension of the doctrine so as to lead to the dismissal of a suit on the ground of perjury, regardless of the injury done to the plaintiff by the defendant, seems to be peculiar to our State. We consider that the refusal of Judge Jayne to dismiss respondent's case on the grounds that we have been considering, was well within his discretionary power and should not be disturbed by us.

Many years ago, Chancellor Green said that where an attoney takes from his client a bond or other security as compensation for his services, 'the transaction is regarded as constructively fraudulent, in consequence of the confidential relations between the parties and the means of undue influence which the attorney may exert over his client. The bond or other security will not be set aside as void, but it will be suffered to stand as a security for the amount justly due upon it, and the burthen will be thrown upon the attorney of showing its perfect fairness, adequacy and propriety.' Brown v. Bulkley, 14 N.J.Eq. 451, at page 458 (Ch.1862). This principle was applied by our court of last resort, in a case where the client had transferred land to his attorney as security for the amount due him. The court made a radical reduction in the fee, saying, 'Even if it be conceded that the complainant agreed to the charge, yet a court of equity would not sanction it except upon proof of its perfect fairness.' Porter v. Bergen, 54 N.J.Eq. 405, 34 A. 1067 (E. & A.1896). See also Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J.Eq. 736, 52 A. 694, 58 L.R.A. 471 (E. & A.1902). In Colgan v. Jones, 44 N.J.Eq. 274, 18 A. 55, 56 (E. & A.1888), it was said that an...