Hughes v. Grant Parish School Board
| Decision Date | 06 February 1933 |
| Docket Number | 4420 |
| Citation | 145 So. 794 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | HUGHES v. GRANT PARISH SCHOOL BOARD |
Harry Fuller, of Winnfield, for appellant.
Joel L Fletcher, of Colfax, for appellee.
Petitioner alleges that on the 14th day of September, 1929, she entered into a contract with the Grant parish school board to teach and act as principal at the Eureka School for a term of nine months at a salary of $ 60 per month. While it is alleged that the contract is attached to the petition, an examination shows that it is not.
She alleges that she performed her duties for three months and was paid for that period; that during this time the schoolhouse was destroyed by fire, the pupils transferred to Montgomery, and, without fault on her part, her services were discontinued, she receiving no further salary, though ready and willing to perform her part of the contract.
She alleges that the school board is indebted to her in the sum of $ 360, being six months' salary, with legal interest from January 14, 1930. The prayer of the petition, however, asks for interest only from January 14, 1932.
Defendant filed and abandoned an exception to the citation, then interposed an exception of no cause or right of action, which, over defendant's objection, was referred to the merits.
On the day of trial, defendant pleaded the prescription of one and two years.
Answer was filed, and the case tried June 21, 1932.
The answer, first reserving all rights under the exception of no cause or right of action, admits most of the allegations contained in the petition. It sets up and attaches the written contract which reads:
An examination of the contract discloses that it is for eight months instead of nine; that it contains the provision "unless sooner discharged"; that the salary is for "actual employment" for "services properly rendered" in harmony with the school laws. The term is "to begin" September 16th instead of the 14th.
The answer alleges that the discharge of the plaintiff was caused by the burning of the school, and the transfer of the pupils was due to the fact that no suitable and available building could be obtained wherein the remainder of the session of the Eureka School could be held; the school board being without funds to erect a new one. It alleges that the destruction of the school by fire was a fortuitous event for which defendant was in no way responsible, that the contract was so drawn that payment for actual services rendered was contemplated, and that its continuance was at the will of defendant, because of the proviso "unless sooner discharged."
There was very little testimony taken. It shows that there was a church building near the site of the burned school which had formerly been used as a school; that its use was mentioned, but some of the congregation objected to its being partitioned into the two rooms required for the school; that the school board had no funds and made no efforts to procure any to put up a new building; that, after the fire and before the discharge of the teachers, a meeting of the citizens was held at which it was decided "it would be undesirable" to try to run the school at Eureka; that it was best to transfer the pupils to Montgomery.
In the lower court, plaintiff obtained judgment for $ 300, with legal interest from judicial demand. The exception of no cause or right of action and the plea of prescription were overruled.
Both parties appealed to this court, plaintiff from that part of the judgment only which allowed her interest from judicial demand instead of from maturity.
Opinion.Defendant, having objected to the reference to the merits of its exception of no cause or right of action, was entitled to have it passed upon before further proceedings were had. From defendant's brief we learn that the exception is based upon the terms of the written contract not set out in the petition. Though alleged to be, the written contract is not attached to the petition. As the exception, at the time it was filed, was triable on the face of the petition alone, it was correctly overruled.
Plea of Prescription.
Plaintiff was paid up to and discharged December 16, 1929. Her discharge matured any unpaid salary due her. Suit was filed April 12, 1932. The prescription pleaded is one and two years. We can find, and have been referred to, no two years' prescription which is in any way applicable to salaries of school teachers.
Article 3534 of the Civil Code provides: "The following actions are prescribed by one year: * * * That of masters and instructors in the arts and sciences, for lessons which they give by the month."
Article 3538...
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...outside source such as an epidemic or fire. Phelps v. School District No. 109, 302 Ill. 193, 134 N.E. 312 (1922); Hughes v. Grant Parish School Board, 145 So. 794 (La.App.1933); Board of Education v. Couch, 63 Okl. 65, 162 P. 485, 6 A.L.R. 740 (Okl.1917); 68 Am.Jur.2d Schools § 145 (1973); ......
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