Hughes v. Hughes, 48A05-9111-CV-389
| Decision Date | 26 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 48A05-9111-CV-389,48A05-9111-CV-389 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Donald P. HUGHES, Appellant-Respondent, v. Mary L. HUGHES, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Franklin I. Miroff, Monty K. Woolsey, Miroff Cross & Ruppert, Indianapolis, for appellant-respondent.
James A. Reed, Indianapolis, Brenda S. Farrell, Anderson, for appellee-petitioner.
Appellant-Respondent Donald P. Hughes appeals the trial court's division of marital property. Donald questions the inclusion of an early retirement benefit as marital property.
The evidence relevant to the appeal discloses that the parties were married in June 1959. Mary filed for a dissolution of marriage on October 31, 1990.
During the marriage, Mary worked for a period of five years prior to the birth of the parties' only child, a son. Mary did not return to the work force until their son began school. Mary worked at a bank for twelve years, until their son began college in North Carolina. Because their son was active in theatrical productions for the school, Mary terminated her employment with the bank so that she and Donald could attend their son's productions.
Next, she obtained a job with a savings and loan which was taken over by FSLIC. Mary was offered a position in Chicago after the takeover. Mary declined the position because of Donald's long-term employment with General Motors. Mary returned to a secretarial position which she had previously held at a heating and cooling company. Because of the seasonal nature of the company's work, Mary often worked only four days per week.
At the time of the dissolution proceedings, Mary had no work-related benefits other than a disability policy for which she paid $8.80 per month. Mary was ineligible for her employer's health insurance coverage because she was diagnosed with malignant melanoma in 1988. Under Donald's General Motors Health Insurance, Mary's medication cost $18.00 per month. Without the benefit of insurance, Mary's medication will cost $179.00 per month.
During the proceedings, Donald described his job at General Motors, insuring acceptable standards in the production of manufactured parts, as one growing within the manufacturing industry. At the time of the final hearing on April 26, 1991, Donald was 55 years old. He had accrued 36.2 years of credited service with General Motors entitling him to General Motors Hourly Pension Plan benefits which were included as marital property and which are not at issue on appeal. At issue are benefits available to Donald pursuant to an early retirement supplement which is an incentive to retire prior to age 62.
Pursuant to Donald's request, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 31, 1991. The following findings are pertinent to Donald's pension benefits:
"6. Respondent, as a result of his employment with General Motors, has a vested interest in the General Motors Hourly Pension Plan. If Respondent had terminated his employment as of the date of filing in this matter, he would have been entitled to draw $1,600.00 per month (lifetime and early retirement benefits) until October 1, 1991, then $1,700.00 per month until October 1, 1992, the[n] $1,800.00 per month until his age sixty-two. Thereafter, he would draw $1,026.74 per month (which may change in the future as a result of contract changes providing for cost of living or other changes).
* * * * * *
PENSION
The Court concludes that as of the time of filing, Respondent had a right to receive pension or retirement benefits as a result of his employment with General Motors through the General Motors Hourly Pension Plan that are not forfeited upon termination of his employment. The Court also concludes that Respondent cannot be required to retire at the present time nor, in fact, is there any assurance that he will retire by age sixty-two or any other age. Respondent's retirement benefits have been accrued during the marriage by the efforts of both parties, including the contribution of Petitioner through her subordination of her employment opportunities to the employment of Respondent, and also through her child-rearing and family responsibilities. As a result, it would be unfair for Respondent to have total control of whether, if ever, Petitioner would enjoy any portion of this retirement benefit, which was earned during the marriage.
The Court, therefore, concludes that the entire early retirement supplement portion of Respondent's General Motors Hourly Pension Plan Retirement Benefit should be set over to Respondent as his sole and separate property, said benefit having a value of $65,499.21. The Court also concludes that so long as Respondent continues to be employed, he shall pay to Petitioner the sum of $800 each month, effective the first of the month following the entry of Decree in this matter. This sum represents one-half of the basic or lifetime benefit presently available to Respondent until his age sixty-two, together with one-half of his early retirement supplement.
If the Respondent continues employment after age sixty-two, he shall pay Petitioner $513.37 per month, effective the first of the month following his sixty-second birthday. It is the Court's intention by this order that each month Respondent purchase from Petitioner her interest in this asset...."
Due to the relative disparity in earning potential, the fact that Mary has always subordinated her employment to Donald's for familial reasons, Mary's lack of employment-related benefits, and Mary's health, the trial court determined that an unequal division of assets would be just and reasonable. This appeal ensued.
As restated, Donald raises two issues for review:
(1) whether the early retirement supplement constitutes marital property subject to division where Donald has not expressed any intention to retire; and
(2) whether the trial court erred by entering, as an alternative, an order assigning a portion of the pension benefits to Mary by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
IND.CODE Sec. 31-1-11.5-2 (1988 Ed.) defines "property" in the dissolution context. In pertinent part,...
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