Hughes v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Local 683

• Decision Date: 19 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75-3310,75-3310
• Citation: Hughes v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977)
• Parties: 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2652, 81 Lab.Cas. P 13,257 James H. HUGHES, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 683, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 365

554 F.2d 365

95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2652, 81 Lab.Cas. P 13,257

James H. HUGHES, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 683, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 75-3310.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 19, 1977.

Edwin C. Martin, Los Angeles, Cal., Gerald U. B. Kane, Redondo Beach, Cal., argued, for plaintiff-appellant.

Ronald Domnitz, argued, Domnitz & Prochazka, San Diego, Cal., Coyle & Dunford, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before HUFSTEDLER, GOODWIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Only one issue is presented by this appeal: Was summary judgment appropriate in appellant's suit alleging that appellee breached its duty of fair representation? We hold that it was not and reverse.

Appellant, James H. Hughes, Jr., was employed as a truck driver by Shoreline Beverage Company ("Shoreline") to transport beer. Appellee, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 683 ("Local 683"), represented Shoreline's employees in signing a collective bargaining agreement with Shoreline. Prior to April 1971, Shoreline only required its drivers to deliver beer. But after April 1971, Shoreline's drivers were also required to sell beer; thus they had to keep invoices, rotate stock and maintain a record of each customer's needs. Drivers were given the choice whether to become driver-salesmen and appellant chose to do so.

Appellant alleges that while he was employed by Shoreline, Shoreline violated the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to pay overtime for employee time spent at Shoreline's meetings with its employees, by making employees load excess cases without the aid of a helper, and by not paying drivers agreed-to premiums for selling greater than 250 cases per day. Furthermore, when appellant or his fellow workers would complain to Local 683 about these violations, they were told to keep quiet. Because he was particularly ardent in his insistence on the strict letter of the collective bargaining agreement, appellant alleges, Shoreline wanted to fire him. In April 1971, Shoreline tried to fire appellant ostensibly for his repeated invoice errors, failure to keep his inventory well stocked, failure to report to the office twice a day and for his derogatory comments to Shoreline customers about Shoreline's service. Without investigating the merits of Shoreline's charges, appellee persuaded Shoreline to change its termination decision to a five-day disciplinary lay-off.

Appellant returned to work in June 1971, after recovering from a work-related injury. He alleges that Shoreline assigned him to the lowest paying and most arduous tasks with the hope that he would resign. On June 25, 1971, Shoreline met with appellant, representatives from Local 683 and the shop steward in order to inform appellant that he was being terminated because of his deficient performance. Upon hearing that he was fired appellant shouted a profanity at Shoreline's manager. Appellee persuaded appellant to agree to resign whereupon he would receive severance and vacation pay benefits. Appellant, though, withdrew his resignation and demanded arbitration on the last day that appellee could have filed such a demand under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

After appellee served the demand for arbitration upon Shoreline, appellee arranged a meeting with appellant and Local 683's business agent and secretary-treasurer to investigate the possibilities for arbitration. Appellant claims that the interview only lasted thirty minutes and that the union's attorney, Mr. Prochazka, was hostile to him. Shortly after this interview, Prochazka recommended that the union not proceed with any arbitration of appellant's discharge. Basically, Mr. Prochazka viewed appellant's case as one where appellant could not adapt to the demands of a new job and that his use of profanity at the June 25th termination meeting made a successful outcome upon arbitration highly unlikely. Appellee relied on Prochazka's recommendation in refusing to bring appellant's discharge to arbitration.

The district court found that appellant presented no evidence that appellee acted "in an arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory manner or in bad faith toward Plaintiff." It therefore granted summary judgment in favor of appellee and noted that appellee had:

"acted solely on the basis of relevant considerations and did not act with any arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory motivation in refusing to process the Plaintiff's grievance to arbitration and, in relying upon advice of counsel, acted in good faith toward Plaintiff at all times material hereto."

In order to state a claim for breach of fair representation an employee need only show "arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on the part of the Union in processing his grievance." (Vaca v. Sipes (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 193, 87 S.Ct. 903, 918, 17 L.Ed.2d 842.) He does not have to allege that the union participated in fraud or deceitful conduct. (See Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (9th Cir. 1974) 501 F.2d 258, 264 ("(M)ere arbitrary conduct by the union in representing those within a particular bargaining unit constitutes a breach of that union's duty."); Duggan v. International Assoc. of Machinists (9th Cir. 1975) 510 F.2d 1086, 1088; N.L.R.B. v. General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, Helpers and Automotive Employees, Local 315 (9th Cir. 1976)545 F.2d 1173, 1175.) Appellant argues that the district court erred in finding that "no genuine issue as to any material fact" (see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)) exists as to appellant's claim that appellee acted "arbitrarily" in processing his grievance. Although the issue is a close one, we must agree with appellant.

Upon review of a summary judgment order, we are obligated to view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (See Melancon v. Ins. Co. of North America (5th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 1057, 1059.) Although appellant raised several meritless arguments in contesting the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee, ¹ appellant raised an inference of complicity between appellee and Shoreline in the lower court proceedings sufficient to withstand the motion for...