Hughes v. Quarterman

• Decision Date: 05 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 04-70022.,04-70022.
• Citation: 530 F.3d 336
• Parties: Preston HUGHES, III, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

530 F.3d 336

Preston HUGHES, III, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-70022.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 5, 2008.

Patrick F. McCann, Law Offices of Patrick F. McCann, Rosa Alexander Eliades, Eliades Law, PLLC, Houston, TX, for Hughes.

Fredericka Searle Sargent, Austin, TX, for Quarterman.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Preston Hughes, III was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the 1988 murders of fifteen-year-old Shandra Charles and her three-year-old cousin, Marcell Taylor. Hughes sought federal habeas relief as to both his conviction and sentence. We granted a COA authorizing Hughes to appeal the district court's denial of federal habeas relief as to three claims arising from the sentencing trial. Hughes v. Dretke, 160 Fed.Appx. 431 (5th Cir.2006) (unpublished). We now AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

At Hughes's 1989 trial, the State presented evidence that Hughes stabbed both of the victims in the neck and chest, severing their aortas and jugular veins. When the police arrived at the scene, Shandra Charles was still alive. She told a police officer that a man named "Preston" had stabbed her after trying to rape her. The police officers went to an apartment complex near the vacant field in which the victims were found. The manager of the complex gave them a list of tenants. The only tenant named "Preston" was the petitioner. The police officers went to Hughes's apartment around 2:30 a.m. He agreed to accompany the officers to the police station, where he later gave two written statements in which he admitted that he had stabbed both of the victims.

In the first statement, Hughes said that he had been carrying a knife with him because some people had been talking about trying to kill him. He said that, as he was walking home through the vacant field, someone came up behind him and touched him on the shoulder. He said he turned and "just started sticking with the knife." It was dark, and he could not tell who was there, but after he "stuck the first two times," he saw that it was Shandra Charles (Hughes called her "Shawn"). He said, "I was `f***ed up and I just got scared and kept sticking.'"

In the second statement, Hughes said "Shawn" did not come up behind him and tap him on the shoulder, as he had said in his first statement. Instead, he said that he saw her walking with a little boy. He said that when they met in the middle of the trail through the field, she told him that she was on her way to his apartment to borrow his contact lenses. When he told her that she was not going to wear his contacts, he said that she kissed him, and then started rubbing his crotch. He described in detail the events that occurred next. Suffice it to report that he said heavy sexual activity followed, which became unsatisfactory to Hughes. When "Shawn" demanded money, he refused. She threatened to accuse him of rape and when she hit him, he pulled his knife and began stabbing her. The little boy with "Shawn" looked up at him and started crying. When the boy ran between Hughes and "Shawn," Hughes stabbed him several times.

At the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, Hughes took the stand in his own defense. He denied that he killed the victims, claimed that he was framed by the police, and testified that he confessed to the crimes only because the police officers struck him and threatened him, causing him to fear for his life. The jury found him guilty of capital murder.

At the punishment phase, the State called Tracy Heggar. She testified that Hughes had raped her in 1985, when she was thirteen years old. She testified further that Hughes had threatened her with a gun in an attempt to prevent her from testifying against him about the rape. The State also presented evidence that, at the time of the murders, Hughes was serving two ten-year probated terms for the aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault of Heggar.

The defense called several witnesses. Six of Hughes's friends and his mother testified that he was a good-natured, non-violent person. Hughes also testified in his own behalf at the punishment phase. He denied that he raped or threatened Tracy Heggar. He professed sorrow for the deaths of the victims, but denied that he committed the murders. He promised the jury that he would not be violent in the future and asked the jury to spare his life. The jury gave affirmative answers to the special issues on deliberateness and future danger, and, accordingly, the trial court sentenced Hughes to death.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Hughes's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1152, 114 S.Ct. 2184, 128 L.Ed.2d 902 (1994). On October 21, 1996, Hughes filed an application for state habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application based on the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ex parte Hughes, No. 45,876-01 (Tex.Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2000). On April 24, 2001, Hughes filed a second state habeas application. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the application as an abuse of the writ under Article 11.071, Section 5 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ex parte Hughes, No. 45,876-02 (Tex. Crim.App. Nov. 14, 2001).

The district court denied Hughes's petition for federal habeas relief and denied a COA.

II.

A.

Based on our limited, threshold inquiry and general assessment of the merits of Hughes's claims, we granted a COA authorizing Hughes to appeal the denial of habeas relief for the following claims:

(1) Whether the claim is procedurally barred that the jury instructions at the punishment phase of the trial gave the jury no means for considering and giving effect to Hughes's mitigating evidence and, if not, whether the claim has merit;

(2) Whether, at the punishment phase, the jury was improperly allowed to consider a prior conviction that was later overturned on appeal; and

(3) Whether, at the punishment phase, the prosecutor violated Hughes's Fourteenth Amendment rights by suggesting to the jury that Hughes's counsel was callous and morally wrong to put Tracy Heggar, the rape victim who testified as a witness for the State, through the rigors of cross-examination.

The parties filed supplemental briefs on the merits, as well as letter briefs addressing cases decided by our court and the Supreme Court of the United States.

B.

With respect to the claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, Hughes is not entitled to federal habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of his claims

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state court's factual determinations "shall be presumed to be correct", and the petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The AEDPA standards of review cited above do not apply when we review the denial of a claim on procedural grounds, because there has not been an "adjudication on the merits" by the state court with respect to such a claim. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946-47 (5th Cir.2001). We review the district court's conclusions of law de novo. Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2974, 168 L.Ed.2d 719 (2007).

We now turn to consider the claims for which we granted a COA.

C.

1.

Hughes argues that the jury instructions at the punishment phase of his trial did not give the jury a means for considering and giving full effect to the mitigating evidence that he presented. The district court held that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Hughes raised it for the first time in his second state habeas application, which was dismissed by the state court as an abuse of the writ, and that Hughes had not shown cause for the default or actual prejudice, nor could he demonstrate that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Alternatively, it denied relief on the merits. Because we agree with the district court that the claim is procedurally defaulted, and that Hughes has failed to establish cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, we do not address the merits of the claim.

A federal habeas claim is procedurally defaulted when the state court has based its rejection of the claim on a state procedural rule that provides an adequate basis for relief, independent of the merits of the claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-32, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). To be "adequate" to support the judgment, the state law ground must be both "firmly established and regularly followed" by the state courts. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There is a presumption "that there is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the [state court] opinion." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred "unless the...