Hughes v. State

• Decision Date: 26 February 1901
• Citation: 85 N.W. 333,109 Wis. 397
• Parties: HUGHES v. STATE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

109 Wis. 397

85 N.W. 333

HUGHES

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 26, 1901.

Error to circuit court, Douglas county; James O'Neil, Judge.

William Hughes was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of the murder of May Bolz, and sentenced to imprisonment for life, and prosecutes this writ of error to reverse the judgment. The evidence showed that the accused was a young man 25 years of age, unmarried, and had been engaged about the railroad business, living in Superior, in what is known as the “Allouez Bay District,” at the east end of that town; that for about a year and a half prior to October 3, 1899, he had been intimate with the deceased, who was an inmate of a house of ill fame in the city of Superior, in the Allouez Bay district, and that they had talked of being married; that the accused was out of work, and contemplated going to West Superior to obtain work in the railroad business, and, if he could not obtain employment there, talked of going West for that purpose; that the deceased knew of his plans with regard to leaving Superior; that the accused stayed with the deceased on the night of October 2d, and on the following day met her at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon at the saloon of one Barry, in the said district, and had some conversation with her about his plans, and whether she would accompany him. This conversation was held in a private wine room in the rear of the saloon, and, after it, the deceased came out, and joined some friends in another wine room, and a few minutes afterwards Hughes again called the deceased alone into another wine room, and, immediately after they had passed in, a number of shots were heard, and it was found that the deceased had been shot twice,--once in the right arm and once in the back, the last shot entering the sheath of the spinal cord, completely paralyzing the body from that point down; and that Hughes had then shot himself four times. The evidence tended further to show that Hughes was accustomed to carry a rusty revolver, and that the deceased knew it, and that Hughes had oiled and loaded the revolver that day; but Hughes claimed upon the trial that the shooting was accidental; that as they passed into the wine room the deceased felt the revolver in his coat pocket, and told him he was careless; and he said, “There's nothing in it,” and, not remembering that he had oiled and loaded it, pulled it out, pulled the trigger, and it went off, and she fell back, saying she was dying; and he then said, “If you are, you will not die alone,” and turned it on himself. The deceased lived until October 11th, when she died, having made an ante-mortem statement on Sunday, October 8th. The plaintiff in error recovered from his wounds. There was little, if any, evidence of ill will between the parties, but some evidence that she refused to go to West Superior with the accused, as he wanted her to do.John H. Vaughn, for plaintiff in error.

The Attorney General, for the State.

WINSLOW, J. (after stating the facts).

A claim is made on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence, but we consider the claim so palpably unfounded that we shall not undertake to discuss it at length. It is sufficient to say that, in our judgment, there was ample evidence to sustain the verdict. The specific errors claimed will be considered under three heads.

1. Error in the selection and impaneling of the jury. Under this head a number of points are made. A juror named Sanow, when examined on the voir dire, stated that he lived about two blocks from the Barry saloon in October, 1899; that he knew something of the matter from reading about it in the papers, and from hearing some discussion of it, but had not formed an opinion, and thought he could try the case fairly. The juror was accepted, and the trial proceeded. During the progress of the trial, Mr. Vaughn, the prisoner's attorney, informed the court that he had just been informed that Sanow was at Barry's saloon soon after the shooting, and was very much excited and affected when he heard of it. Thereupon the court examined Sanow, and he testified that he was in the saloon shortly after the shooting, but did not learn anything particular about the case, and formed no opinion. The question whether he was in the saloon had not been put to him on the voir dire. The court then proceeded with the trial, Sanow remaining upon the jury. After the verdict, upon motion for a new trial, a number of affidavits of various persons were introduced tending to show, among other things, that Sanow was a frequenter of the house of ill fame where May Bolz lived, and that he knew and was intimate with her; that he had been heard to say, soon after the shooting, that the fellow who did it ought to be sent over the road; and that Sanow was in the wine room where the shooting took place 15 or 20 minutes afterwards, and while the body of the deceased still lay on the floor. Sanow's testimony was taken, in which he denied substantially all of the facts alleged except that he admitted that he was in the saloon building, but not in the wine room, and admitted that he had been twice in the house where deceased lived, but denied knowing her. The court concluded on this evidence that Sanow's testimony was true, and that he was a competent juror. Upon a state of facts quite similar, a like ruling was sustained by this court in the case of Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, 49 N. W. 30. The same case also disposes of another exception as to the juror Sanow. He was asked on cross-examination what he went to the sheriff's room for after the verdict was rendered, and an objection to the question was sustained. As held in the Schuster Case, the verdict cannot be impeached by anything which the juror said or did after the verdict was rendered.

Another juror, named Healy, was objected to as incompetent because he had served on the regular panel of the superior court within the year, and because he stated that he had formed an opinion in the case. Neither of the points is well taken. Healy was summoned as a talesman, and the very section which disqualifies a person from serving as juryman twice within a year excepts from the rule the case where a person is summoned as a talesman. Rev. St. 1898, § 2525. As to his knowledge of the case, he said he had read of it in the newspapers, and that, assuming the facts stated in the papers were true, he had formed an opinion, which would require evidence to remove; that notwithstanding this, he thought he could dismiss the impression, and stand perfectly fair to the accused upon the evidence. The situation is substantially the same as that presented in Baker v. State, 88 Wis. 140, 59 N. W. 570, and for the reason there stated we hold that no error was committed.

Several jurors were asked whether, in case of a reasonable doubt in their minds as to the guilt of the accused, they would give him the benefit of such doubt, and whether they would give the accused the benefit of such a doubt as quickly as if the accused were a highly respectable gentleman; also whether they would be prejudiced against the accused if it developed that he was living with a woman not his wife, and whether they would follow their consciences or the judge's instructions; and other similar questions were put, all of which the court finally ruled out. There was no error in these...