Hughes v. State
| Decision Date | 23 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 45964,45964 |
| Citation | 479 P.2d 850,206 Kan. 515 |
| Parties | Harold E. HUGHES, Appellee, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The guilt or innocence of a convicted person is not properly justiciable in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding.
2. A voluntary plea of guilty admits all well pleaded facts of the crime charged, and a judgment and sentence imposed after such plea is not subject to collateral attack in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding on the ground there was no factual basis for the plea.
Frank D. Menghini, County Atty., argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Atty. Gen., and Nick Tomasic, Asst. County Atty., were with him on the brief for the appellant.
William M. Cook, Kansas City, argued the cause, and J. H. Dickens, Kansas City, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
This appeal grows out of a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding in which the district court vacated petitioner's conviction and sentence and ordered a new trial.
On May 12, 1967, petitioner, while represented by retained counsel, William Yockey, entered a plea of guilty to the offense of robbery in the first degree (K.S.A. 21-527). Before accepting petitioner's plea, the district court carefully inquired of him whether: (1) any threats or promises had been made to induce a guilty plea, (2) he had freely counseled with his attorney and had been advised of his rights, (3) he understood it was incumbent on the state to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) he wanted a jury trial. In response to further questioning, petitioner recounted 'what happened' the night of the alleged robbery. Following this rather lengthy colloquy, the court concluded:
'It is apparent to the Court that this defendant is pleading guilty entirely because he is guilty, and no threats, promises or duress have been made upon this man to force or induce him to make this plea, and he has had advice of counsel he understands his right to a trial by jury, and expressly waives his right to trial by jury; and therefore this plea, as a voluntary plea, will be accepted. * * *'
At allocution, petitioner stated there was no legal reason why sentence should not be pronounced. Thereupon, he was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term oif not less than ten nor more than twenty-one years (K.S.A. 21-530).
Petitioner filed a 60-1507 motion on November 6, 1969, alleging, in substance, there was no factual basis for his plea of guilty to the offense charged, and the only crime committed was that of larceny. Counsel was appointed and at the evidentiary hearing the court heard testimony from the petitioner and the victim, Margaret Essig, relating to the facts surrounding the offense. The journal entry reflects the following:
'Findings of Fact'
* * *
'Conclusion of Law'
The state contends the judgment and sentence imposed after petitioner's plea of guilty were not subject to collateral attack on the ground there was no factual basis for the plea. We believe, under the circumstances disclosed by this record, that the contention has considerable merit and must be upheld.
A fundamental principle of law in this state is that a plea of guilty, in order to be valid, must be freely, knowingly, and understandingly made. (White v. State, 203 Kan. 587, 455 P.2d 562; Webb v. State, 195 Kan. 728, 408 P.2d 662; Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 195 P.2d 147.) Petitioner concedes his plea of guilty was voluntarily entered. We further note the district court's order was not in any way buttressed on incompetency or ineffective assistance of counsel, nor was it premised on the plea not being knowingly or understandingly made.
The net effect of the distrcit court's action on petitioner's motion was that it heard evidence and resolved the question of guilt or innocence. Such action clearly exceeded the scope of the remedy afforded for post-conviction relief. This court has held many times that the guilt or innocence of a convicted person is not properly justiciable in a 60-1507 proceeding. (Wood v. State (No. 46,104, this day decided) 206 Kan. -- , 479 P.2d...
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Bellamy v. State
...It is a fundamental principle that a guilty plea must be freely, knowingly, and understandingly made to be valid. Hughes v. State, 206 Kan. 515, 516, 479 P.2d 850 (1971). Bellamy argues that his plea was not knowingly or understandingly made because his counsel was ineffective. To establish......
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...plea of guilty is admission of the truth of the charge and every material fact alleged therein.” K.S.A. 22–3209(1) ; Hughes v. State , 206 Kan. 515, 517, 479 P.2d 850 (1971) (“A voluntary plea of guilty is a confession of guilt of the crime and every fact alleged therein.”). By entering a p......
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