Hughes v. State
Decision Date | 24 January 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 1-284A47,1-284A47 |
Citation | 473 N.E.2d 630 |
Parties | Sheila D. HUGHES and Hershel A. Hughes, Defendants-Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Joan B. Henderson, Jeffersonville, Michael T. Connelly, Louisville, Ky., for defendants-appellants.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Sheila D. Hughes and Hershel A. Hughes (Hugheses) appeal from the trial court's granting, over their objections, of the state's motion to dismiss charges against them, the denial of their petition for a transcript at public expense, and the trial court's failure to grant their motion for sanctions against the prosecuting attorney. Because we agree with the state that Hugheses have failed to present or preserve any appealable questions, we affirm.
Hugheses were charged by a three count information filed in the Clark Superior Court, Number 1, with neglect of a dependent child, 1 battery, 2 and involuntary manslaughter. 3 The information was filed April 26, 1983. After two continuances granted to the state over Hugheses' objections, trial dates of November 29 and December 13, 1983, were set. Because of the state's failure to comply with an April 26, 1983, discovery order, and an October 12
order compelling discovery, the trial court, on November 9, 1983, entered an order excluding certain state's evidence. Thereupon, on November 18, 1983, the state filed a motion to dismiss the charges for the reason it had filed the same charges in the Clark Circuit Court. Hugheses objected to the dismissal and filed a motion for sanctions against the state alleging prosecutorial misconduct. On November 28, 1983, the trial court granted the state's motion to dismiss and found it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion for sanctions. Hugheses filed a motion to correct errors and a motion for a transcript at public expense. Both motions were denied and this appeal ensued.
The issues presented in this case, which we have restated, are:
1. Is there an appealable issue before this court concerning the dismissal of the charges in Clark Superior Court, No. 1?
2. Was it error for the trial court to grant the state's motion to dismiss?
3. Did the court err in denying Hugheses' request for a transcript at public expense?
4. Did the court err in holding it had no jurisdiction to rule on the motion for sanctions?
The state asserts, and we agree, that Hugheses have presented no appealable issue concerning the court's granting of the state's motion to dismiss the charges in Clark Superior Court, No. 1. Our determination of this issue requires us to examine both the questions of what constitutes an appealable issue and the state's right to dismiss.
It is fundamental that a party cannot secure appellate review of a favorable decision unless he is in some manner aggrieved thereby. Givan v. United States (1956), 126 Ind.App. 425, 133 N.E.2d 577. Dismissal of criminal charges ordinarily is an action favorable to a defendant. Unless Hugheses were aggrieved by the dismissal no appeal can lie from that action. 4 This is in keeping with the rule that one seeking appellate review and reversal of a trial court decision must affirmatively show an erroneous ruling and resulting prejudice to the appellant. Meeker v. Robinson (1977), 175 Ind.App. 102, 370 N.E.2d 392. Reversal may be predicated only upon error which is prejudicial. Smith v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1363. Therefore, we must determine whether Hugheses were prejudiced by the dismissal which requires us to examine the state's right to dismiss.
Indiana Code section 35-34-1-13 provides:
The plain language of this statute requires the court to grant the prosecutor's motion to dismiss. The statute vests no discretion in the trial court; granting the motion to dismiss is mandatory. Swinehart v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 460, 376 N.E.2d 486; Maxey v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 244, 353 N.E.2d 457.
Hugheses argue the trial court was not required to grant the dismissal because it (1) allowed the state to circumvent the court's order excluding certain evidence because of the violation of discovery orders, (2) denied them their right to a speedy trial, and (3) denied them due process of law and equal protection of the law. They also contend the re-filing of the charges in circuit court constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we disagree.
Under the statute, the state had a right to dismiss and the court was required to order dismissal. Ind.Code Sec. 35-34-1-13; Swinehart; Maxey. Dismissal of the charges did not result in any prejudice to Hugheses. If they were prejudiced at all, it was by the re-filing of the same charges in circuit court. Such is a tenuous argument at best.
Our supreme court clearly has held that where dismissal occurs prior to jeopardy attaching, there is no bar to re-filing an information charging the same offense in identical terms. Johnson v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 79, 246 N.E.2d 181; Winters v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 48, 160 N.E. 294. However, it is also clear that for purposes of the defendant's right to a speedy trial, such dismissal and re-filing does not extend the time in which to bring the defendant to trial. The time is counted from the first filing. Maxey; Johnson. Thus, Hugheses' arguments that their rights under Indiana Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 4, or constitutional right to speedy trial, were affected by the dismissal and refiling are erroneous. 5 However, they must raise any issue of speedy trial denial in the Clark Circuit Court, the court where the charges were re-filed.
Likewise, Hugheses' arguments that the dismissal should have been disallowed because such enabled the state to circumvent the court's order depriving the state of certain evidence as a sanction for discovery order violations is unavailing. In fact, Maxey involves similar action to circumvent the alibi statute. In Maxey, the state failed to respond to the defendant's alibi notice. The information charged the wrong date. Realizing it would be unable to prove the correct date, the state dismissed and re-filed with the correct date. Our supreme court said:
265 Ind. at 251, 353 N.E.2d at 461. This language from Maxey is equally applicable here. Hugheses could seek similar sanctions from the circuit court relative to the state's non-compliance with prior discovery orders.
Finally, Hugheses contend that allowing the state to dismiss the charges and then re-file them in a different court constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness as proscribed by Cherry v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 14, 414 N.E.2d 301, cert. denied 453 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 17, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033, and State v. Selva (1983), Ind.App., 444 N.E.2d 329. To prevent such vindictiveness, they argue the dismissals should have been denied. We believe their interpretation of Cherry and Selva is faulty and disagree with their contention.
In Cherry, the defendant was charged with three separate counts. His motion for severance was granted and Counts II and III were tried resulting in a conviction on Count II and a hung jury on Count III. After sentencing on Count II, the state dismissed Counts I and III. When Cherry's motion to correct errors was granted by the trial court, the state re-filed Counts I and III. Our supreme court rejected Cherry's claim of double jeopardy but found a denial of due process because of prosecutorial vindictiveness in re-filing the previously dismissed charges.
In Selva, the defendant was charged originally under four separate informations with burglary and three thefts. The state later dismissed these four cases and filed a ten count information including the original four charges and six new ones all arising from the same incidents. The defendant moved to dismiss the ten count information on the ground it was filed vindictively. The trial court granted the motion, dismissed the ten count information, and reinstated the original four cases. This court affirmed the dismissal and reversed the reinstatement of the original four charges. In discussing prosecutorial vindictiveness, Judge Staton wrote:
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Hughes v. State
...over Hughes's motion for sanctions. Hughes then perfected an interlocutory appeal, which was unsuccessful. See Hughes v. State (1985), Ind.App., 473 N.E.2d 630, trans. denied. Also on November 28, 1983, the Clark Circuit Court held Hughes's initial hearing, set January 29, 1984 as the omnib......
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...charged. A court must grant a prosecutor's motion to dismiss. Holifield v. State (1991), Ind., 572 N.E.2d 490, 496; Hughes v. State (1985), Ind.App., 473 N.E.2d 630, 632. Following dismissal, the second information was not, as Willoughby asserts, an "amended" information. Rather, the inform......
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Schiro v. State
...if the presumption does not arise, a defendant may prevail by presenting direct evidence of actual vindictiveness. Hughes v. State, 473 N.E.2d 630, 634 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied. The prosecution bears a heavy burden of proving that any increase in the number or severity of charges wa......
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Burdine v. State
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