Hughes v. State

Decision Date05 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. 63S00-8806-CR-560,63S00-8806-CR-560
Citation546 N.E.2d 1203
PartiesDavid B. HUGHES, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Steven E. Ripstra, Lytton and Ripstra, Jasper, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Webster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Justice.

A jury trial resulted in appellant's conviction of two counts of Murder, for which he received two sixty (60) year sentences, and two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, Class A felonies, for which he received two fifty (50) year sentences, his sentences to be served concurrently.

The facts are: In February of 1986, fifteen-year-old Teana Ruppel began dating appellant. In the spring of 1986, Teana told her friend Shawna Willis that she was having problems with her parents because they would not let her marry appellant. She said that because her parents would not let her get married and because her mother chewed her out all the time, she would like to kill both of her parents, and appellant was going to do it.

Shawna testified that she had another conversation with Teana at school in which Teana asked her what she thought she ought to do about killing her parents, and she indicated that appellant was going to do it. Shawna advised her to not do it because she would regret it. A few days before Christmas in 1986 Shawna and Teana were conversing with several other girls and Teana said that her parents would not be around after Christmas.

Toni Bowens testified that Teana told her at school that she was not happy with her parents because they would not let her marry appellant, but one way or another, she was going to marry him.

Fifteen-year-old Jackie Rowe testified that Teana told her that her parents would not let her marry appellant and her father molested her. She stated that she wanted to kill them. In November of 1986, Teana asked her to help in their murders by spending the night with her, leaving the house, then returning to act surprised that they were dead. Teana told Jackie that appellant was going to come from the woods behind their house and shoot her mother in the head, then they would wait for her father and shoot him in the head also. Jackie said they planned to steal some of her mother's jewelry to make it look like a robbery.

On the evening of Sunday, December 28, 1986, Teana and appellant visited the home of the minister of their church and asked him whether he had seen Teana's parents, who had been missing since the previous Friday night, December 26. After discussing the problem with her minister, Teana and appellant left. The minister then decided to conduct a search around the Ruppel home, and his wife called the police. She also called the Ruppel residence to inform Teana that her husband was on his way. When they arrived at the Ruppel home, appellant was outside on the deck holding a flashlight as though he was looking for something; Teana was inside wiping something off the floor in the foyer.

Police arrived and they began an investigation. Teana told police that she had not seen her parents since she left on a date with appellant the previous Friday at 7:45 p.m. She stated that she returned home from her date Saturday at 3:00 a.m., and her parents were gone and had left no note. She spent the weekend with appellant at his house, periodically checking in at home to see if her parents had returned. Teana and appellant reported that the only items missing from the Ruppel home were three guns.

Brenda Bolin, Teana's mother's best friend, testified that the Ruppels were very strict with Teana, and it would be very unusual for Teana to be allowed to stay out until 3:00 a.m. She also stated that they kept their doors locked at all times. There were no signs of forced entry into the home.

Police conducted a search of appellant's van and found inside a bag a black plastic wristwatch which had belonged to Teana's father, Mike. They found a stain on the tailgate of Mike Ruppel's truck which testing revealed was human blood. Due to the fact that Mike Ruppel had moved the truck's ignition switch to a position under the dash which could not be seen from the driver's seat, the truck was difficult to start unless the driver was familiar with it.

Several statements were taken from Teana and appellant. They were inconsistent both with themselves and between each other concerning where they were during Friday, December 26, and Saturday, December 27. In his statement to police, appellant admitted that Teana had asked him to kill her parents on one occasion, and on another, she suggested that appellant either would do it himself or pay to have it done. Appellant stated that he refused to do either.

On December 29, 1986, Bobby McGowan was looking for scrap metal in an abandoned coal-mining pit in which people had thrown debris. He found the bodies of Teana's parents. The coroner testified that they died from several gunshot wounds to their heads.

The tires on Ruppel's truck matched the tire impressions left at the top of the cliff from which the bodies were dumped.

Officer Lynch testified that when appellant and Teana were in the Pike County Jail filling out a missing persons report, they were informed that two bodies had been found in rural Pike county. Upon learning that information, appellant asked Officer Lynch whether he and Teana could get married if something had happened to the Ruppels.

Teana's uncle testified that while he was seated next to Teana and appellant at the funeral home, Teana told appellant that they now had $85,000 in life insurance, a new car to drive, a motorcycle, and a nice home to live in.

In their investigation, police collected various fibers. A chemist employed by the Indiana State Police testified that the fibers were very unusual, and they came from a blanket found in the Ruppel home or one exactly like it. The blanket fibers were found on the deck outside the Ruppel home, on the clothing of both victims, on a rope found at the top of the cliff from which the victims' bodies were dumped, and on a lint-trap screen in the dryer of the Ruppel home. The fact that the fibers were found in the lint trap indicated to the expert that the blanket had been washed recently.

Appellant argues his recorded statements and the diagrams and maps he made which illustrated his statements were erroneously admitted at trial. He first contends they were erroneously admitted because they were hearsay and contained material prejudicial to him, such as his admission that he had consumed drugs and alcohol and that he had sex with Teana knowing it was a crime due to her age.

Also in appellant's statement to police he admitted that Teana had asked him to kill her parents and the following conversation occurred:

"Police: Would you kill her parents if you were under a state of intoxication? To the point that you might not remember everything?"

Appellant: I don't think so."

. . . . .

"Police: ... In your mind you don't know whether you killed them or not.

Appellant: I think I didn't.

Police: But you don't know. You don't know for sure ...

Appellant: I think I didn't.

Police: But you don't know for sure ...

Appellant: As far as I know, I didn't. Teana said I didn't.

Police: Did she?

Appellant: Not that I know of, no."

. . . . .

Appellant: Well, as far as I know, I didn't.

Police: ... But you don't know for sure? How sure are you? You're not a hundred percent. Are you fifty percent sure?

Appellant: Bout ... ninety percent sure.

Police: About ninety. See, we want to know about that other ten."

Appellant believes his statements should have been excluded.

Silence or an equivocal response to an assertion made by another, which would ordinarily be expected to be denied, is a tacit admission. Moredock v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1372. A defendant's objection to hearsay testimony is properly overruled when the hearsay is an admission previously made by that defendant. Jethroe v. State (1975), 262 Ind. 505, 319 N.E.2d 133. Additionally, he is not denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when the out-of-court declarant was himself. Id.

If a defendant participates in a conversation implicating himself, the whole of the conversation is admissible. Smith v. State (1980), Ind., 400 N.E.2d 1137; McFarland v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 657, 336 N.E.2d 824.

Appellant's statements, when compared with themselves and those of Teana, demonstrated several inconsistencies in appellant's whereabouts near the time of the murders. In his later statements, he changed his version of the facts to explain inconsistencies in prior statements. Any testimony tending to show an accused's attempt to conceal implicating evidence or to manufacture exculpatory evidence may be considered by the trier of fact as relevant because it reveals a consciousness of guilt. Grimes v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 512. We find no error in admitting appellant's statements.

Appellant also argues his statements should not have been admitted into evidence because they contained information about his involvement in other criminal activity, such as his illegal use of alcohol and his sexual relations with Teana. He believes the information was irrelevant and prejudicial.

In its final instructions to the jury, the trial court admonished them to disregard any references to other offenses which the appellant may have committed which were not relevant to the matter before the court.

We have held that when the jury is properly instructed to disregard testimony about the defendant's prior unrelated criminal activity, we presume the jury followed the instructions. Duncanson v. State (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 182. We find no reversible error.

Appellant argues the trial court erroneously admitted other hearsay evidence. State's Exhibit No. 176 was a handwritten note which stated: "Dad's clean out The wood Berner ang start a frir Mom's in Bed". A witness, who was an...

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