Hughes v. Sw. Airlines Co.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 C 5315,18 C 5315 |
| Parties | BRIAN HUGHES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
OPINION AND ORDER
After running out of de-icer fluid, Defendant Southwest Airlines Co. ("Southwest") cancelled a number of flights in and out of Midway airport in Chicago, Illinois on February 11, 2018, including Plaintiff Brian Hughes' flight from Phoenix to Midway. Hughes then brought this class action lawsuit against Southwest for breach of contract and negligence for its failure to keep sufficient amounts of de-icer on hand on that date, as well as on December 8, 24, and 28, 2017, and January 12 and 15, 2018. Southwest moves to dismiss on the basis that both the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), and Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq., preempt Hughes' claims, and on the basis that Hughes has failed to state a claim for breach of contract or negligence. Because Hughes has failed to state a claim for breach of contract and concedes that Texas' economic loss rule bars his negligence claim, the Court grants Southwest's motion to dismiss. In addition, because the ADA clearly preempts his negligence claim and amendment would be futile, the Court dismisses Hughes' negligence claim with prejudice.
Hughes purchased a ticket to fly from Phoenix to Midway airport on February 11, 2018. Shortly before boarding, Southwest cancelled his flight and blamed the weather for the cancellation. However, Hughes discovered the next day that his flight was cancelled because Southwest ran out of de-icer, causing the airline to cancel 250 flights in and out of Midway on February 11, 2018. No other airlines ran out of de-icer that day. For the same reasons, Southwest cancelled flights on December 8, 24, and 28, 2017, and January 12 and 15, 2018.
Hughes' flight is governed by Southwest's contract of carriage, which provides:
Doc. 17-1 § 6(a). In § 9(a), the contract provides that "[i]n the event Carrier cancels or fails to operate any flight according to Carrier's published schedule, or changes the schedule of any flight, Carrier will, at the request of a Passenger with a confirmed Ticket on such flight" either (1) "[t]ransport the Passenger at no additional charge on Carrier's next flight(s) on which space is available to the Passenger's intended destination" or (2) "[r]efund the unused portion of the Passenger's fare." Id. § 9(a)(1). The contract also has a clause for "limitation of liability," providing that, except to the extent provided in § 9(a), Southwest "shall not be liable for any failure or delay in operating any flight, with or without notice for reasons of aviation safety or when advisable, in its sole discretion, due to Force Majeure Events." Id. § 9(a)(4).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Southwest argues that Hughes' breach of contract claim fails because he does not cite the specific portion of the contract that he alleges Southwest violated and Southwest was permitted under the contract to cancel flights under the circumstances alleged (and thus Hughes does not successfully plead a breach). Hughes responds that he has satisfied his pleading burden under Rule 12(b)(6). The parties agree that Texas law governs their contract. Under Texas law, a party must allege facts sufficient to establish: "(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from that breach." Wells v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 2018).
This district is split regarding whether a plaintiff must identify the specific provisions of the contract that it alleges the defendant breached.3 See Peerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc'n Servs., Inc., No. 14 C 7417, 2015 WL 2455128, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2015) (citing cases). A majority favor allowing the case to move forward if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish a breach. Id. "What matters is whether [Hughes] 'alleged enough facts to put [Southwest] on fair notice of the contractual duty it breached.'" Bortz v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 16-cv-5338, 2016 WL 7104288, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2016) (quoting Peerless, 2015 WL 2455128, at *7). Here, Hughes has not provided sufficient detail in his complaint to put Southwest or the Court on notice of the contractual duty that it breached. Looking to the contract, it specifically provides the actions that Southwest must take if it cancels a flight—at the passenger's request, it will either provide the passenger with a refund or transport the passenger on the next available flight. Doc. 17-1 § 9(a)(1). Hughes does not allege that Southwest failed to provide a refund or transport him on the next available flight, and so it is not clear what contractual duty Southwest breached when it cancelled his flight due to insufficient amounts of de-icer. Rather than seeking to enforce the contract, Hughes' complaint seeks reimbursement for the inconvenience and additional expenses caused by the cancellation, obligations that the contract of carriage does not appear to contain. The specific portions of the contract that Hughes points to in his response do not save him—in § 4(a)(1), the contract of carriage provides that Hughes' ticket entitles him to transportation, subject to the contract's other provisions. See Doc.22 at 6-7. As discussed above, however, the contract is clear regarding what would happen if Southwest cancelled a flight, and Hughes does not allege that the airline breached those obligations. The Court grants Southwest's motion to dismiss Hughes' breach of contract claim.
Hughes concedes that Texas' economic loss rule bars his negligence claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim.
Southwest also argues that the ADA preempts Hughes' claims. The ADA contains an explicit preemption clause "[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992). It prohibits states from enacting any "law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b). The ADA preempts state law causes of action when "(1) a state seeks to enact or enforce a law that (2) relates to airline rates, routes, or services, either by expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic effect upon them." Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 11 C 00782, 2012 WL 5342709, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2012) (). State common law qualifies under this clause. United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2000).
However, the Supreme Court noted an exception to the ADA's preemption in American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 115 S. Ct. 817, 130 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1995). Wolens held that the ADA does...
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