Hughes v. Tom Green Cnty., 17-0409

Citation573 S.W.3d 212
Decision Date08 March 2019
Docket NumberNo. 17-0409,17-0409
Parties Charles J. HUGHES, Petitioner, v. TOM GREEN COUNTY, Respondent
CourtSupreme Court of Texas

David H. Smith, Daniel J. Harper Davis, Gerald & Cremer, P.C., Midland TX, Charles R. ‘Skip’ Watson, Jr., Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Ryan D. Clinton, Shannon H. Ratliff, Davis, Gerald & Cremer, P.C., Austin TX, for Petitioner.

James D. Walker, Attorney at Law, Milano TX, for Respondent.

Justice Devine delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Guzman, and Justice Blacklock joined.

This interlocutory appeal arises from a dispute in probate over title to property bequeathed in a will. Two beneficiaries under the will and the decedent's heirs each claimed the property. During the litigation, the heirs and one of the beneficiaries, a county, agreed to combine forces against the other beneficiary, a private university. The county and heirs agreed to share equally in any recovery each or either of them obtained in the proceedings. The university subsequently agreed to settle the litigation by paying $ 1 million to the other parties collectively in return for the release of their claims and the confirmation of title in the university. The settlement was divided between the county and the heirs under their agreement.

Later, one of the heirs sued the county, alleging among other things that the county breached a material term of their agreement. The county responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that governmental immunity barred the heir's suit on the agreement. The trial court agreed and dismissed the heir's claim. On appeal, the heir complained that the trial court's order was erroneous because it conflicted with Texas A & M University–Kingsville v. Lawson , 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.). That decision holds that a governmental entity that settles a suit in which it lacks immunity cannot claim immunity in a subsequent suit to enforce the settlement. Id . at 522-23.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order, concluding that Lawson did not apply for two reasons: (1) the agreement between the heirs and the county in the probate proceeding was not a settlement agreement, and (2) even if it was, the agreement "did not settle claims for which the County's immunity was waived." 553 S.W.3d 1, 6-8 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017). We disagree because the county did not have immunity for the claims raised by its intervention in the probate proceeding and because the agreement between the county and the heirs in that proceeding settled their existing adversity. Following the analysis in Lawson , we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

I

In his Last Will and Testament, Duwain E. Hughes, Jr., of San Angelo, left "all of [his] interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in what is known as the DUWAIN E. HUGHES RANCHLANDS in Reagan and Irion Counties" to Southern Methodist University (SMU) for the purpose of establishing an endowed chair in the English Department. Hughes also left his home and all its contents, including his rare book and music collections, to Tom Green County. He directed that his home should be used as a branch library to be known as the "Duwain Hughes Branch of the Tom Green County Library." He provided further that the Library Board could sell the house and use the proceeds to buy new books and materials for the county library if that were a more beneficial use. Finally, Hughes devised the residue of his estate to the Tom Green County Library so that "some funds [might be] available for paying off any indebtedness against [his] home and for upkeep and for the purchase of new books."

By 1991, SMU's proceeds from the Ranchlands' oil and gas production exceeded $ 1.5 million, the highest level of funding for an English Department chair at the university. In an action styled In re the Will of Duwain E. Hughes, Jr. , in Tom Green County, SMU's Board of Trustees filed an application to release the restriction on the use of the bequest, seeking authority to use the excess funds for other purposes in SMU's English Department (the SMU Litigation). Tom Green County intervened, alleging that the testator's intent to establish and fund a single endowed chair at SMU had been accomplished. The County claimed it was therefore entitled to "all excess proceeds" under the will's residuary clause for the Tom Green County Library.

Later, Charles Hughes, the testator's nephew, intervened in the SMU Litigation on behalf of the testator's heirs at law, seeking title to the mineral interests claimed both by SMU and the County and praying for judgment against them both. He alleged that the will's grant to SMU of a vested remainder for the specific purpose of endowing a single chair was defeated once the chair was funded, resulting in "title to the remaining properties immediately rever[ting] to Hughes's heirs at law." Charles Hughes also alleged the County Library's sale of the testator's home and its contents caused the limited purpose of the will's residuary clause to lapse, creating a partial intestacy, entitling the heirs at law, not the County, to the disputed mineral interests and proceeds. The heirs thus turned the County's lapsed bequest theory back against the County.

The probate court directed the parties to mediate their competing claims. Before mediating with SMU, however, the County and heirs entered into a Mutual Partial Assignment (MPA) agreement to present a unified defense to SMU's request to lift the restrictions on its bequest. In this agreement, the County and heirs agreed to share equally in any recovery in the lawsuit by assigning each other an undivided 50% of their respective interests in the contested minerals and proceeds. The parties "control over prosecution and/or settlement of the litigation" was also shared jointly. The agreement additionally provided that the heirs would "retain and/or be assigned herein all executive rights" should the respective claims of either party to the minerals and proceeds succeed. The MPA agreement thus resolved the parties' claims against each other for purposes of the SMU Litigation. The agreement also contained a conditional provision that is at the heart of the present dispute. That provision stated the County would name the main library in honor of Duwain E. Hughes, Jr., "if the commissioners consider the County's ultimate recovery in the cause to be substantial enough for such recognition."

At the mediation ordered by the probate court, Hughes and the County collectively settled their title claims against SMU for $ 1 million and agreed to release their adverse claims to the minerals. The SMU Litigation concluded with the probate court rendering judgment on the releases, which vested title to the disputed minerals in SMU. Under the MPA's terms, the heirs and the County each received $ 500,000.

With its part of the settlement, the County began planning for a new library. The plans were beset by financial challenges, however, and the project languished for more than a decade. In 2006, Steve and Pollyanna Stephens initiated a new fundraising effort. This effort ultimately raised $ 16 million for the library, which included a $ 3 million donation from the Stephens Family.

The County decided to recognize the Stephenses' generosity and efforts by attaching their family name to the new library. The County also decided to honor Duwain E. Hughes by putting his name on the library's Audio Visual Department. Mindful of the MPA agreement with Hughes's heirs, the commissioners court also resolved that the $ 500,000 recovery from SMU was "not substantial enough" to name the library for Hughes.

Charles Hughes thought the recovery in the SMU Litigation substantial enough to warrant this honor for his uncle, however, and sued the County for the slight. The suit sought money damages and a declaration that the commissioners' vote to put the Stephens' name on the library was void because it did not comply with the Texas Open Meetings Act.

The County responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that governmental immunity barred Hughes's damages claim. The trial court granted the County's plea, dismissing all claims pertaining to the parties' MPA agreement. Hughes appealed. The appeal was interlocutory, however, because the order did not dispose of Hughes's open-meetings claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (authorizing appeal from certain interlocutory orders). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order, concluding the County indeed could not be sued for allegedly breaching its agreement in the prior probate proceeding. 553 S.W.3d at 7-8. Hughes appealed again.

II

As a preliminary matter, the County challenges our jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order underlying this appeal. The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes the appeal of an interlocutory order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit" such as the County here. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(8). When the trial court signed the interlocutory order in this case, however, our jurisdiction over the ensuing interlocutory appeal depended on the existence of a dissent in the court of appeals or a conflict with a prior appellate decision. See Pidgeon v. Turner , 538 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Tex. 2017) (citing provisions of the Texas Government Code now repealed). But in 2017, the 85th Texas Legislature greatly simplified the byzantine statutes that previously governed this Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Act of May 19, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 150, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 291. Part of that simplification was to grant the Court general appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.001(a) (authorizing appellate review "of an appealable order or judgment" presenting "a question of law that is important to the jurisprudence...

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    ...to defend lawsuits and pay judgments instead of providing public services, leading to "governmental paralysis." Hughes v. Tom Green County , 573 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex. 2019). Relatedly, immunity "preserves separation-of-powers principles by preventing the judiciary from interfering with the ......
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