Hughes v. Westmoreland Coal Co.

• Citation: 104 Pa. 207
• Parties: Hughes <I>versus</I> The Westmoreland Coal Company.
• Decision Date: 12 November 1883
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

104 Pa. 207

Hughes versus The Westmoreland Coal Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 5, 1883.

November 12, 1883.

October 5th 1883.

Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ. PAXSON and CLARK, JJ., absent

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county: Of October and November Term 1883, No. 51.

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Lucien W. Doty and Winfield S. Wilson (with whom was James C. Doty), for plaintiff in error.—The rule is well settled that the cross-examination should be confined to matters in regard to which the witness has been examined in chief, and to such questions as may tend to show the bias and interest of the witness. To permit the defendant, under the guise of a cross-examination, to give evidence in chief, is not only disorderly, but unfair to the plaintiff: Hopkinson v. Leeds, 28 Sm. 396; Fulton et al. v. Central Bank of Pittsburgh, 11 N. 112; Floyd v. Bovard, 6 W. & S. 75. Where an instrument, sealed or unsealed, is unambiguous in its terms, but it is made doubtful by parol evidence, what was the subject about which the parties contracted, it is exclusively the province of the jury to determine, as a question of fact, the identity and locality of the subject: Watson v. Blaine, 12 S. & R. 131, 136; Lycoming Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sailer, 17 Sm. 108; Richardson v. Stewart, 2 S. & R. 84; Bertsch v. Lehigh Coal, &c. Co., 4 Rawle 130; Nourse v. Lloyd, 1 Barr 229; Watson v. Blaine, 12 S. & R. 131. An ambiguity on the face of a document is for the judge to explain; but if it arise from extrinsic evidence, it must be solved by the jury: Brownfield v. Brownfield, 2 Jones 136; Beatty v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 2 P. F. S. 456; Lycoming Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sailer, 17 P. F. S. 108. It follows, therefore, in view of the evidence, that it was a question of fact for the jury to determine which one of the ravines was intended to mark the division line between the two kinds of coal. It was for the court to decide the meaning of the instrument, if there had been any doubt as to its meaning; but on the authority of Beatty v. Lycoming County Insurance Co., 2 Sm. 456, the application of the meaning to the subject about which the parties contracted was a question of fact for the jury.

H. P. Laird and Moorhead (with whom were Head and J. A. Marchand), for defendants in error.—The first two assignments of error cannot be sustained, because the questions asked were distinctly as to the res gestæ of the direct examination, and therefore permissible: Markley v. Swartzlander, 8 W. & S. 172; Covanhovan v. Hart, 21 Pa. St. 495. Where a witness has stated a fact, he may be asked by the other party to detail all circumstances within his knowledge which qualify it, even though they may constitute new matter and form part of his own case: Jackson v. Litch, 12 P. F. S. 455; see also Bank v. Fordyce, 9 Barr 277. If a latent ambiguity is pretended or set up, and the extrinsic evidence shows that none exists, then the question is for the court: Harvey v. Vandegrift, 8 Norris 346; Brown v. Willey, 6 Wr. 205.

Mr. Justice TRUNKEY delivered the opinion of the court, November 12th 1883.

Although the objection to the question set forth in the first specification of error might well have been sustained, its allowance was harmless. The location of the ravine therein referred to was not in dispute, and it was proved and uncontroverted that there was a ravine on a part of the Fullerton tract, formed by the confluence of two smaller ones, each well-marked upon the ground. Which of these two ravines was intended by the parties to the contract, is the most important inquiry in this action. It arises under the following clause: "For each acre of good merchantable coal contained in that portion of the land which lies along the west side of the ravine on the east side of the Sowash property, the sum of $140 per acre, and for the merchantable coal upon the remainder, the sum of $70 per acre."

There is no patent ambiguity; if there were but one ravine the meaning would be unmistakable. Because there are two, in absence of any evidence of the intention, except as appears in the writing, the plaintiff contends there is a latent ambiguity and that the jury must determine which is the line. It is settled that where there is a latent ambiguity in an instrument which requires the aid of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the subject of the contract, or where a contract is partly in writing and partly in parol, or where a contract cannot be understood without reference to facts dehors the writing, the question is for the jury. If a written contract relates to a house or a tract of land, and it be proved by parol evidence that there are two houses, or two tracts, alike within the description, the fact must be determined by the jury. But when the location of the land described in the deed is certain, it needs not a jury to distinguish it from another tract. If it be admitted that the boundaries of a tract of...