Hughey v. Drummond
| Decision Date | 15 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-00037-TLN-AC,2:14-cv-00037-TLN-AC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | KEVIN HUGHEY & JESSICA HUGHEY, Plaintiffs, v. DAN DRUMMOND, THOMAS McDONALD, WEST SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF WEST SACRAMENTO, CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, KENNETH FELLOWS, TOD SOCKMAN, GERRIT MARKUS, TRENT TYLER, TOM MAGGIANO, NATHAN STEELE, & DAVID DELAINI, Defendants. |
The matter is before the Court on Defendants Dan Drummond ("Drummond"), Thomas McDonald ("McDonald"), West Sacramento Police Department ("WSPD") and City of West Sacramento (collectively the "City"1), Christopher Wright ("Wright"), Kenneth Fellows ("Fellows"), Tod Sockman ("Sockman"), Gerrit Markus ("Markus"), Trent Tyler ("Tyler"), Tom Maggiano ("Maggiano"), Nathan Steele ("Steele"), and David Delaini's ("Delaini") (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Kevin Hughey ("Mr. Hughey") and Jessica Hughey's ("Mrs. Hughey") (collectively "Plaintiffs") First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (ECF Nos. 35 &34.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court incorporates by reference the more detailed allegations contained in the prior order. (ECF No. 33, November 6, 2014.) In summary, Plaintiffs allege that WSPD officers Wright, Markus, and Tyler arrived at the Hughey residence on the night of July 9, 2012, in response to a 9-1-1 call regarding a domestic disturbance at Plaintiffs' residence. Upon arrival, Wright kicked in the door to the home and shot Mr. Hughey in the abdomen without provocation. Immediately after the shooting and during the course of the investigation afterwards, Wright fabricated a false version of the events that occurred in order to minimize his culpability. (FAC ¶¶ 10-23.)
Following the shooting, Mr. Hughey was taken to the hospital and underwent surgery. He was arraigned without his presence and posted bond on July 13, 2012; until then, Mr. Hughey remained in the custody of the WSPD and was confined to his hospital room.2 While hospitalized, Mr. Hughey missed the birth of Plaintiffs' son. Mr. Hughey was discharged from the hospital on July 15, 2012. (FAC ¶¶ 30-48.)
Immediately following the shooting and later that night, WSPD officers entered the Hughey residence and seized two laptops and a cellphone, for which they later obtained a warrant to search. (FAC ¶ 29.) On July 10, 2012, the WSPD falsely reported to Sacramento media sources that an officer had shot a man who was reaching for the officer's gun. (FAC ¶ 32.)
Defendant Fellows, the lead detective investigating the matter, engaged in harassing and defamatory behavior toward Plaintiffs throughout the course of the investigation. As a result of the shooting and investigation, Mrs. Hughey lost custody of her other toddler son, with whom she shared custody with her ex-husband. (FAC ¶¶ 52-57, 91.)
The Yolo County district attorney eventually brought felony charges against Mr. Hughey, based on the events occurring the night of July 9, 2012. At the preliminary hearing in March,2013, officers present on the night of the shooting testified falsely as to what prompted the shooting. Plaintiffs allege generally that the WSPD delayed in investigating the incident and attempted to cover up the true events that occurred. In May, 2013, the WSPD issue a written determination of excessive force against Wright. Wright was subsequently terminated. In December, 2013, the Yolo County Superior Court dismissed with prejudice the criminal charges related to the shooting against Mr. Hughey.3 (FAC ¶¶ 58-91.)
Pursuant to these allegations, the FAC brings the following causes of action:
On January 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter. (ECF No. 1.) On November 6, 2014, this Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiffs filed the instant FAC on November 20, 2014. (ECF No. 34.) Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on December 10, 2014.4 (ECF No. 35.) Also on December 10, 2014, Defendants filed a supporting request for judicial notice.5 (ECF Nos. 35-2 and 35-3.) On December 31, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 37.) On January 8, 2015, Defendants filed a Reply to the Opposition. (ECF No. 38.) The matter was submitted without oral argument on January 9, 2015. (ECF No. 39.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true.Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Nevertheless, a court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged[.]" Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to "nudge[] [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]" is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule ofEvidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, "'[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.'" Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (). Although a district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), "the court's discretion to deny such leave is 'particularly broad' where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint[.]" Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).
The Court notes three preliminary matters. First, in their Opposition, Plaintiffs seek...
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