Huguley v. Crooms
| Decision Date | 16 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | HDSP180339 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Marjorie E. Huguley v. Kenneth W. Crooms |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This memorandum of decision addresses issues raised in the summary process complaint brought by the plaintiff Marjorie E Huguley (Huguley) seeking possession of premises formerly occupied by the defendant Kenneth W. Crooms (Crooms) alleging that his original right or privilege to occupy such premises has terminated.[1] The memorandum further addresses the special defenses filed by Crooms.
The matter was tried to the court on December 7, 2015. Each party was self-represented, testified, and was subject to cross examination. Huguley submitted several documents in evidence.
As the plaintiff, Huguley bears the burden of proving the allegations of her complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence; Crooms bears like burden as to his special defenses.[2] The court concludes that Huguley has proved each essential allegation of her cause of action and that Crooms has not met his burden of proving any aspect of his special defense. Accordingly, the court enters judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff Huguley.
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law.[3] The facts set forth throughout this decision have been proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Starting in 2010, Huguley and Crooms were involved in an intimate domestic partnership, residing together at various locations from time to time. On or about November 16, 2012, Huguley secured a mortgage loan in preparation for her purchase of the property known as 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford Connecticut (the premises), expressing her intention to use the property for her own investment purposes.[4] Soon thereafter, Huguley acquired title to and became the sole owner of the premises. Huguley then extended to Crooms the privilege or right of residing there with her as her romantic partner. Although no lease agreement, oral or written, ever existed between the parties, Crooms occasionally assisted in and/or performed some general home improvement services at the premises including; on occasion he worked with Huguley to perform plumbing repairs or modifications.[5] Whether he had agreed to do so on Huguley's behalf or not, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Crooms ever made payments related to the loan upon property, either in July 2014 or at any time.[6]
While Crooms resided with Huguley at the premises, their relationship deteriorated. On or about June 13, 2014, Crooms engaged in acts of domestic violence against Huguley. On that date, Huguley expressly and unequivocally informed Crooms that he had to leave the property immediately and that he could not live there any more; through this conduct, Huguley effectively notified Crooms that she was terminating his privilege or right to occupy or reside at the premises she owned. Crooms discontinued his occupancy and residence at the premises on or about that date; he has not lived at or occupied the premises since June 13, 2014.
As a result of Crooms' domestic violence against her, Huguley received hospital care and in mid-July 2014, the state of Connecticut commenced criminal prosecution charges against Crooms.[7] In the course of that prosecution, the criminal court (Geathers, J.) issued a Family Violence Order of Protection identifying Crooms as the defendant and Huguley as the protected person. This criminal protective order was issued more than a month after Huguley's clear declaration informing Crooms that he was no longer privileged to occupy or reside at her premises and that he had no right to do so; Crooms's awareness that his right or privilege had been terminated is evident from the fact that upon the criminal protective order, Crooms' residence is listed at 901 Tower Avenue in Hartford, not 77 Blue Hills Avenue. The criminal protective order identified Huguley as Crooms' " [i]ntimate cohabitant], prohibited Crooms from contacting Huguley " in any manner", and required Crooms to " [s]tay 100 yards away from the protected person", to " [s]tay away from the home of the protected person and wherever the protected person shall reside, " and to " stay 2500 feet away from the Protected Person's residence at all times.[8] (Ex. 4.)
Accompanied by a police escort, Crooms came to the premises on one occasion during the summer of 2014 while the criminal protective order was in effect. Given a reasonable opportunity to remove all of his belongings at the time, through his election to leave some undesignated property at the premises he knew he no longer had a right or privilege to occupy, Crooms effectively surrendered or abandoned those items to Huguley.[9]
Despite his absence from the premises, Crooms continued to assert a claim of possession. Accordingly, on August 7, 2015, Huguley caused a valid Notice to Quit to be duly served upon Crooms as a predicate to bringing a summary process action against him.[10] The Notice to Quit clearly and unequivocally informed Crooms that while he once had the right or privilege to occupy and that right or privilege no longer exists, using words of similar import. On August 24, 2015, Huguley caused a Summary Process (Eviction) Writ, Summons and Complaint to be duly served upon Crooms, alleging that right or privilege of occupancy had terminated, but " the defendant still continues in possession and, as relief, claiming a judgment for immediate possession of the premises." (Complaint, 8/25/15.)
On August 31, 2015, Crooms appeared, answered the complaint and filed the following special defense: (Special Defense, 8/31/15.) Through this pleading, Crooms has effectively asserted that he has a right or privilege to continue in possession of the premises and to occupy them in accordance with that right or privilege of continued possession. Orally, he has further asserted a right to possession of personalty he claims to have left upon the premises.
For equitable purposes, the court finds that Crooms has not occupied or resided at the premises since June 13, 2014; that Huguley has had full use of the premises since that date; that the obligation to make payments on the loan used to purchase the premises belonged to Huguley alone; that Crooms never paid rent to Huguley when he lived at the premises; that Crooms never paid any money toward the purchase of the premises or toward reduction of the outstanding loan upon the premises, and never invested any money or services of articulable value toward the improving or repairing the premises; and that any property Crooms left upon the premises has no ascertainable financial or even sentimental value. (Tes. Huguley, Crooms.)
Occupancy of premises " when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated" is a lawful basis upon which an owner of property may pursue summary process.[11] § 47a-23(a)(3). To prevail on this ground as alleged against Crooms under the circumstances of this case, Huguley must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence: that she alone is the owner of the premises, with standing to bring the action; that she once had extended to Crooms the privilege or right of occupancy; that she took clear and unequivocal action to terminate his privilege or right of occupancy; that she caused a sufficient notice to quit to be served upon him that the time for possession indicated in the notice to quit has passed; that she caused the summary process writ, summons, complaint and attachments to be served upon Crooms; that after the expiration of the time indicated in the notice to quit Crooms had no privilege or right to occupy or possess the premises; and that despite the expiration of the time indicated in the notice to quit, even if he has not been in actual possession of the premises due to operation of a criminal protective order, Crooms continues to be a lawful possessor of the premises or continues to have a privilege or rights to occupy the premises.[12] Having considered facts, the law, and the applicable equities, the court finds that Huguley has met her burden of proving the essential allegations of the complaint while Crooms has not proved any of his special defense. As such, Huguley is entitled to a judgment of possession.
The court's conclusion is supported by any aspects of the facts proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. As found in Part I, in November 2012, Huguley alone secured a loan with which she purchased and became the sole legal and actual owner of the premises known 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, CT. As such, Huguley, alone, has the right to extend to others the right or privilege to occupy the premises. On some date after she became the sole owner of the premises, Huguley extended to Crooms an invitation to use and occupy the premises; Crooms moved into the premises where he and Huguley lived as intimate cohabitants, using and occupying the premises as his residence and storing his personalty there. As further found in Part I, on or about June 13, 2014, Crooms engaged in domestic...
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