Huguley v. Trolinger, 22207

Decision Date07 April 1969
Docket NumberNo. 22207,22207
Citation452 P.2d 1006,169 Colo. 1
PartiesMable E. HUGULEY, Plaintiff in Error, v. Vaughn TROLINGER and Josephine Trolinger, Defendants in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Williams, Taussig & Trine, John G. Taussig, Jr., Joel H. Greenstein, Boulder, for plaintiff in error.

Sheldon & Nordmark, Richard C. McLean, Denver, for defendants in error.

GROVES, Justice.

The plaintiff in error brought action against the defendants in error to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she fell upon a public sidewalk in the city of Boulder. The jury's verdict awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in damages. The trial court set the verdict aside and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. We reverse the judgment and, by reason of inadequacy of the instructions in one particular, remand for a new trial.

In 1954 the defendants purchased a lot known and designated as 1418 Walnut Street. This is in downtown Boulder across the street from the post office and near a bus stop. They leased the improvements on the lot to tenants, for whose use they constructed a driveway from Walnut Street into the lot. The sidewalk at this location extended from the front property line to the curb and was about 14 feet in width. The public sidewalk portion of the driveway consisted of a concrete slab, 15 feet in width which commenced at a curb cut and terminated 2 or 3 feet inside the front lot line. The rest of the driveway was unsurfaced. The sidewalk portion of the driveway was constructed in accordance with city specifications and was not defective. The concrete slab sloped upward from the street level to the approximate sidewalk level at a distance of 8 or 10 feet, and the remainder was nearly the same as the sidewalk level. At the curb, the sides of the driveway graduated from street to sidewalk level in about two feet at a grade judged from the photographs in evidence to be between 25 and 30 .

In 1961, and possibly prior thereto, the defendants had gravel placed upon the unsurfaced portion of the driveway. Traffic in the driveway caused gravel to be diffused and deposited on the slab. If the gravel were cleared from the concrete, traffic would cause it to be replaced on the concrete within three hours or less. Other driveways in this part of the city were similarly constructed with the same result of gravel on the sidewalk portions.

On the morning of July 10, 1964, the plaintiff, then 69 years of age, approached this driveway on foot while on her way to the bus stop. She was carrying a shopping bag of groceries with her right hand and a sack of groceries on her left arm. She testified that the driveway was covered with gravel and stones, which she noticed; that she 'walked out around toward the street, on the outer edge, because there were less stones out there'; that, when she reached a point near the edge of the street (being near the curb and where the driveway slants at a 25 or 30 angle), she stepped on a stone, causing her to fall and sustain fractures of her wrist, foot, and toe.

The plaintiff further testified that the stones on the driveway were anywhere from the size of a quarter to a fifty cent piece; that the day was bright and clear; that her vision when wearing her glasses was good; that she was very familiar with the area; that frequently she had walked on each side of the street at this location; and that at times the other side of the street was even more hazardous. A portion of her testimony was as follows:

'Q Mrs. Huguley, when you arrived at this driveway on July 10, 1964, what did you observe with regard to the condition of the sidewalk?

A I noticed the stones--the gravel and stones--all over the sidewalk, but the outer side was less gravel and stones than in next to the driveway.

Q On that particular day?

A On that particular day.

Q I see. Now, can you describe the gravel and stones that you referred to?

A I would say it was all the way from small stones up to a quarter or something like that; irregular stones.

Q Did you have your glasses on at that time?

A Yes, I did.

Q As you were proceeding to cross this alley, where were you looking?

A I was looking down and then forward as I was walking.

Q And can you describe how you crossed this driveway sidewalk portion; this portion of the sidewalk?

A I walked along, picking my way * * *'

The defendants did not reside at these premises, and, while they placed the gravel originally on the unsurfaced portion of the driveway, it was their tenants and others who caused this gravel to become relocated on the concrete. They had made no attempt to keep the driveway clear of gravel nor to install any type of hump or other device to keep gravel from gathering there.

A tenant of the defendants' testified that the photographs in evidence depicted an average amount of gravel as it existed on the driveway. The plaintiff testified that at the time of the accident 'there was much more gravel and stones' than shown in the photographs.

Each side moved for a directed verdict, which motions were denied. The findings preceding the court's judgment read as follows:

'1. The evidence adduced failed to prove a prima facie case of negligence against the defendants Trolinger. The sidewalk on which the plaintiff fell was not owned by the Trolingers, but by the City of Boulder. With respect to such sidewalk, the Trolingers' duty was only to do no affirmative act which would create a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. There was no evidence that they had committed such an act. Moreover, the condition was open and obvious and the duty of an abutting owner in this respect cannot be higher than that owed by a landowner to an invitee, namely, to give warning of hazardous conditions he has no reason to believe will be discovered by the invitee. The condition of the sidewalk did not pose an appreciable risk of harm. Finally, such condition was transitory in nature, changing from day to day and even from hour to hour. There was no evidence of actual or constructive notice to the Trolingers of the condition which existed at the time of the plaintiff's fall.

'2. The evidence conclusively proved the plaintiff to have been guilty of negligence which contributed to her injuries. She knew of the condition of the sidewalk generally. There was nothing to obstruct her view of the particular object which caused her fall. To fail to see what must have been plainly visible constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law.'

I

The evidence was sufficient to show that the defendants had notice that gravel in varying amounts existed on the driveway. While they did not place the gravel on the concrete, they dumped it on the remainder of the driveway in the first instance and allowed vehicular traffic to traverse the driveway with the known result of displacement of the gravel. If at any time the amount of gravel constituted a hazardous condition, we regard Sill v. Lewis, 140 Colo. 436, 344 P.2d 972 as authority for the proposition that this can be the basis for liability. The duty of the defendants is as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 350, which reads as follows:

'A possessor of land over which there is a public highway is subject to liability for physical harm caused to travelers thereon by a failure to exercise reasonable care in creating or maintaining in reasonably...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Woods v. Delgar Ltd., No. 08CA1288.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • July 23, 2009
    ...188 P.2d 881, 884 (1948); Belcaro Realty Inv. Co. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 489, 87 P.2d 1114, 1116 (1939). In Huguley v. Trolinger, 169 Colo. 1, 6, 452 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1969), the defendants placed gravel on a driveway adjacent to a sidewalk, and, with the defendants' knowledge, cars drivi......
  • Brown v. Kreuser
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • January 27, 1977
    ...doctrines might be overlapping and unnecessary. Eisenhart v. Loveland Skiing Corp., 33 Colo.App. 120, 517 P.2d 466. See Huguley v. Trolinger, 169 Colo. 1, 452 P.2d 1006; Bennett v. Gitzen, 29 Colo.App. 271, 484 P.2d 811. We find this principle to be even more compelling under comparative ne......
  • Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • February 15, 1978
    ...both definitions to the jury. Cited were Eisenhart v. Loveland Skiing Corp., 33 Colo.App. 120, 517 P.2d 466 (1973); Huguley v. Trolinger, 169 Colo. 1, 452 P.2d 1006 (1969); Bennett v. Gitzen, 29 Colo.App. 271, 484 P.2d 811 (1971). To the same effect is the Court of Appeals decision in Stefa......
  • Eisenhart v. Loveland Skiing Corp.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 1973
    ...the risk are closely akin to one another and instructions as to both doctrines may be overlapping and unnecessary. See Huguley v. Trolinger, 169 Colo. 1, 452 P.2d 1006; Bennett v. Gitzen, 29 Colo.App. 271, 484 P.2d 811. In Boulder Valley Coal Co. v. Jernberg, 118 Colo. 486, 197 P.2d 155, th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT