Hukill v. Maysville & B.S.R. Co.

Decision Date01 January 1896
PartiesHUKILL v. MAYSVILLE & B.S.R. CO. et al.
CourtUnited States Circuit Court, District of Kentucky

On the 12th day of January, 1895, the plaintiff filed his petition in the Kenton circuit court, at Independence, Ky., against the Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, C. E. Acra, George Shumate, Henry Thien John Shappart, and W. W. Gaynor, defendants, in the following words:

'Defendant the Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company is, and at the time hereinafter stated was, a corporation owning a railroad extending into the county of Kenton, and railway tracks, workshops, roundhouse, railway yard, and other appurtenances in said county. Defendant the Chesapeake &amp Ohio Railway Company is, and at the times hereinafter stated was, a foreign corporation, and possessed, used, and operated said railroad, railway tracks, workshops roundhouse, railway yard, and other appurtenances under a lease from said the Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, which lease was made without legislative or other authority; and said the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company now so operates said railway. On the night of April 28, 1894, L. A. Hukill was the servant of said the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, employed by it as one of the crew of a switching locomotive engine in the yard of said railroad in Kenton county; and while said Hukill was then and there, as such servant, at work upon and about a train of freight cars of said the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, in said yard, and on said railway, he was, by reason of gross and wanton negligence of all the defendants, struck by a board projecting from the roof of one of another train of freight cars of said the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, then and there in the possession, custody, and control of said corporation, and on another and adjoining track of said railroad, and thereby said Hukill was violently knocked under the train of cars upon and about which he was at work, and was run upon and over by said train, and thereby, and by being so knocked from said car, he was so injured in his person that he soon thereafter died thereof. Said projecting board was part of the roof of said car, from which the same projected. Said projecting board was, and long before said decedent was injured as aforesaid had been, a defect in said car, from which it projected, that endangered the bodies and lives of said decedent and other servants of said the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. Said car, with said board so projecting therefrom, was, in said defective, unsafe, and dangerous condition, by the defendants, with gross and wanton negligence, placed where the same was when said decedent, Hukill, was struck by said board as aforesaid. With gross and wanton negligence, all the defendants permitted said defective car to remain where the same was, in its said defective, unsafe, and dangerous condition, until said decedent was injured as aforesaid; and, with gross and wanton negligence, all the defendants failed to remedy said defect in said car before said Hukill was injured thereby. The defendants Acra, Shumate, Thien, and Shappart were, at all times aforesaid, in said railway yard, which was then and there an inspecting station of said railway, servants of said the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, employed by it in said yard, and at said inspecting station, as car inspectors and repairers; and, as such servants, said Acra, Shumate, Thien, and Shappart had inspected said car, from which said board projected as aforesaid, long before said decedent was thereby knocked from his place, and under said train, as aforesaid, and before said decedent was injured as aforesaid, and for a time long enough theretofore to have, by the exercise of ordinary care, repaired said defect, and prevented said injury to said Hukill. Said Acra, Shumate, Thien, Shappart, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, and also their codefendants, well knew of said defect in said car; and, before said Hukill was injured as aforesaid, the defendants Acra, Shumate, Thien, Shappart, Gaynor, and the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, and each of them, could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have known of said defect in said car, and could, by the exercise of such care, have remedied and repaired said defect, and prevented said injury to said decedent. Defendant W. W. Gaynor was, at the times aforesaid, a brakeman upon the train in which was said defective car, and he was then and there the servant of defendant the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, and was by his said employer then and there charged with the work and duty of ascertaining and knowing the condition of said car and train, and to either repair said defect in said car, if he could do so, or, if he could not do so, then to report the same upon the arrival of said train and car in said railway yard. And all the defendants, by their joint gross and wanton negligence, failed to remedy or repair said defect; and, by their joint gross and wanton negligence, all the defendants caused said injury to and death of said decedent. Said L. A. Hukill did not, before he was injured as aforesaid, know that said board by which he was struck projected from said car, nor did he know that there was any defect in said car; and he could not, before he was injured as aforesaid, by the use of ordinary care have known that said board did project from said car, or that said car was in any wise defective. By the death of said decedent his estate was damaged in the sum of fifty thousand dollars. On the . . . day of May, 1894, plaintiff was, in and by the county court of Kenton county, Kentucky, duly appointed administrator of the estate of said decedent, and on the same day he duly qualified as such in said court, and he still is such administrator. Plaintiff prays judgment for fifty thousand dollars and costs.'

In its petition for removal the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company made the necessary averments as to the amount in controversy and the diverse citizenship of itself and the plaintiff averring that there was, in said suit, a controversy which could be fully determined as between the plaintiff and the petitioner. 'Your petitioner further says that suit upon the same cause of action hereinbefore stated was instituted in the Kenton circuit court at Independence, Kentucky, on May 16, 1894, and that, in said suit, the Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, C. E. Acra, George W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart were made joint defendants. Thereafter on the 16th day of October, 1894, at a term of Kenton circuit court, at Independence the plaintiff discontinued said action as to George W. Shumate, C. E. Acra, Henry Thien, John Shappart, and the Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company. Petitioner says that the discontinuance as to the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, C. E. Acra, George W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart was absolute and final, and without the reservation of any right on part of said plaintiff to again institute a suit upon the same cause of action against the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, C. E. Acra, George W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart, or either or any of them. And petitioner says that, by reason of the absolute discontinuance of said cause as to the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, C. E. Acra, George W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart, the plaintiff is barred from any further proceedings against them, or either of them, upon said cause of action; and that said plaintiff has no right or authority in law to now prosecute its cause of action against the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, C. E. Acra, George W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart, or either of them. Your petitioner says that, upon the discontinuance of said suit, on the 16th day of October, 1894, as to the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, and the said Acra, Shumate, Thien, and Shappart, it filed in the Kenton circuit court, at Independence, a petition and bond for removal of said case to the United States circuit court for the district of Kentucky, which said petition for removal alleged that the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, and said Acra, Shumate, Thien, and Shappart were fraudulently and improperly joined as parties defendant for the sole purpose of defeating the right of petitioner to remove said case to the United States circuit court; that said case was transferred to the United States circuit court for the district of Kentucky; and that the said plaintiff appeared in said United States circuit court, and moved the court to remand said case; and that the said United States circuit court overruled said motion to remand, and found, as a fact, that said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, C. E. Acra, George W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart were fraudulently and improperly joined for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the United States court. And thereafter the plaintiff discontinued said case in said United States circuit court, and thereafter, on January 12, 1895, filed the present suit in this court. Your petitioner says that the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company was, at the time of the institution of said suit, on May 16, 1894, and still is, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kentucky, and of no other state; and that the defendants C. E. Acra, G. W. Shumate, Henry Thien, and John Shappart were, at the time of the institution of this suit, and still are, residents and citizens of the state of Kentucky; and that the said Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad Company, and the said Acra, Shumate, Thien, and Shappart were fraudulently and improperly joined as parties defendant, because of the fact...

To continue reading

Request your trial
41 cases
  • North Side Canal Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
    • April 19, 1926
    ...Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 44 F. 456; Rivers v. Bradley (C. C.) 53 F. 305; Hukill v. Maysville, etc., Co. (C. C.) 72 F. 745; Prince v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (C. C.) 98 F. 1; Mahon v. Somers (C. C.) 112 F. 174; Loop v. Winter's Estate (C. C.) 115......
  • Royer v. Rasmussen
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • June 15, 1916
    ... ... against them." Warax v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R ... Co. 72 F. 637; Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R ... Co. 72 F. 745; Helms v. Northern P. R. Co. 120 ... F. 389; ... ...
  • Miller v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1942
    ... ... R. A. 567, 13 Am. St. Rep. 807; Williard ... v. Spartanburg U. & C. R. Co., 124 F. 796; Hukill v ... Maysville & B. S. R. Co., 72 F. 745; Hulen v ... Wheelock, 300 S.W. 479, 485. The ... ...
  • Smithson v. Chicago Great Western Railway Company
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1898
    ...205; Bacon v. Rives, 106 U.S. 99; Fergason v. Chicago, 63 F. 177; Over v. Lake Erie, 63 F. 34; Warax v. Cincinnati, 72 F. 637; Hukill v. Maysville, 72 F. 745; Hartshorn v. Atchison, 77 F. 9; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 602, 604. As the complaint stated no legal cause of action against the defen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT