Hulahan v. United States, 15000.

• Decision Date: 20 July 1954
• Docket Number: No. 15000.,15000.
• Citation: 214 F.2d 441
• Parties: HULAHAN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

214 F.2d 441 (1954)

HULAHAN v. UNITED STATES.

No. 15000.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

July 20, 1954.

C. Arthur Anderson, St. Louis, Mo. (Charles M. Shaw and Wayne C. Smith, Jr., Clayton, Mo., filed a separate reply brief), for appellant.

Forrest Boecker, Sp. Asst. to the U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo. (Harry Richards, U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., and Tom DeWolfo, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN, JOHNSEN and COLLET, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

Paul H. Hulahan, upon his plea of not guilty to an indictment containing eight counts, was tried by a jury and convicted. The statute upon which each of the counts was based is § 1951, Title 18 U.S.C. That statute, so far as pertinent, provides:

"Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by * * * extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, * * * shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."

The statute defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." "Commerce," as defined in the statute, "means * * * all commerce between any point in a State * * * and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction."

The jury found Hulahan guilty upon each of the eight counts of the indictment. The District Court imposed a sentence of twelve years imprisonment and a fine of $1,000 upon each count, the sentences of imprisonment to be served concurrently. Hulahan has appealed. He contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal made before, and renewed after, verdict. He also contends that there was error in the court's charge to the jury.

It is elementary that in reviewing the question of the adequacy of the evidentiary basis for a verdict of guilty, this Court must take that view of the evidence which is most favorable to the Government and give to the Government the benefit of all inferences which reasonably can be drawn from such evidence. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Neal v. United States, 8 Cir., 114 F.2d 1000, 1002; Hansbrough v. United States, 8 Cir., 156 F.2d 327. This is saying no more than that a jury verdict, whether factually right or wrong, is conclusive upon this Court if sustained by substantial evidence or by permissible inference drawn therefrom. Elzig v. Gudwangen, 8 Cir., 91 F.2d 434, 444. With the credibility of witnesses or weight of evidence this Court can have no concern. Glasser v. United States, supra, at page 80 of 315 U.S., at page 469 of 62 S.Ct.; United States v. Compagna, 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 524, 526.

When the defendant in a criminal case is convicted upon several counts of an indictment, the judgment will be sustained if he was properly convicted under any count which is good and is sufficient in itself to support the judgment. Gantz v. United States, 8 Cir., 127 F.2d 498, 501; Bowen v. United States, 8 Cir., 153 F.2d 747, 748-749; Hansbrough v. United States, 8 Cir., 156 F.2d 327, 328. A lawful conviction under a single count of the indictment in this case will sustain the judgment appealed from.

Hulahan, however, contends that the evidence of the Government was insufficient to sustain his conviction under any count of the indictment because the evidence failed to show that he was, within the meaning of the statute, guilty of extortion or of any attempt or conspiracy to extort, and that the evidence also failed to prove that what he was shown to have done had affected, or could have affected, interstate commerce.

Is is unnecessary to state in detail the charges contained in each of the counts of the indictment, or the evidence adduced in support of each of them.

Stated generally and briefly, the charges against Hulahan, a representative of a local labor union, were, in substance, that, contrary to the statute, he conspired to extort, attempted to extort or extorted, by threats of labor trouble and other threats, money for his own personal use from representatives of three different companies engaged in construction work in St. Louis County, Missouri, two of which companies were dependent, for the continuation of the work undertaken by them, upon local labor represented in part by Hulahan, and upon equipment, supplies and materials shipped into Missouri from points in other states. One of the companies, M. H. Carpenter, Inc., was engaged in constructing a home development project known as Glasgow Village. The second company was constructing a flour packaging and storage building for the Valier and Spies Milling Company, which used the instrumentalities of interstate commerce for obtaining grain and distributing the company's products. The third construction company was doing the grading in connection with the construction of new runways and the improvement of old runways for the St. Louis Municipal Airport, in order more adequately to serve interstate commerce by air.

We shall refer to the first and second counts of the indictment. The first count charged Hulahan with having conspired with Gribbler, who was also a labor union representative (since deceased), to obstruct, delay and affect commerce, as defined in § 1951, Title 18 U.S.C., and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce, by extortion, and alleged that, in furtherance of such conspiracy, Hulahan and Gribbler attempted to obtain, by threats, $50,000, for their personal use and profit, from Miles H. Carpenter, representing M. H. Carpenter, Inc., which was constructing the project known as Glasgow Village. The second count of the indictment charged Hulahan with attempting to obstruct, delay and affect commerce, as defined in § 1951, Title 18 U.S.C., by extortion in seeking to obtain, by threats, $50,000 for his personal use and profit from Miles H. Carpenter, representing M. H. Carpenter, Inc.

In support of these charges, Miles H. Carpenter testified that Hulahan and Gribbler represented all the white laborers on the project; that the lumber for constructing the project came from the west coast and was shipped to Bissell Station adjoining the project and was trucked to the job site from that Station; that about a carload a week was scheduled for delivery; that the order for lumber was under Carpenter's control, and deliveries could be delayed or accelerated according to what was needed; that yellow pine was purchased in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and Tennessee, and delivered by truck from the mills to the job site; and that bath tubs and other fixtures were shipped in from Alliance, Ohio. Carpenter in his testimony told of his conversations with Hulahan and Gribbler at a time when there were 128 houses under construction on the project, to be finished within a year. He testified that Hulahan, after stating that he and Gribbler could be "of a lot of help," said: "You pay us $2,000 apiece and $2,000 a month and we will see that you never have any labor trouble out here. The job will run smoothly and you will not have any trouble." Carpenter also told of Hulahan's intimation that it would not run smoothly otherwise. Carpenter testified that he told Hulahan and Gribbler that he must have a few days to think their proposition over, and that this was the first time he had ever been approached by a labor representative for a "shakedown." Carpenter testified that he then employed his counsel, Selden Blumenfeld, "to call up...