Hulett v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. in Clinton

Citation956 P.2d 879
Decision Date17 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 87868,87868
PartiesMary Ellen HULETT, as Guardian of the Person and Estate of Jason Kyle Hulett, a Minor, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY IN CLINTON, a corporation, as trustee of Dorothy Louis Engers testamentary trust; Laura Jo Jones, formerly Laura Jo Engers, Appellees, and Egon Engers II, also known as Mark Egon Engers, Jr., and as Mark Egon Engers, Defendant.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

James R. Wright, Jr., Clinton, for Appellant.

Jill C. Weedon of Cornell & Tisdal, Clinton, for Appellee, First National Bank and Trust Company in Clinton.

Ellis Cabaniss and C.B. Graft of Graft & Cabaniss, Clinton, for Appellee, Laura Jo Jones.

LAVENDER, Justice.

¶1 Egon Engers II murdered his mother, Dorothy Engers. Dorothy died testate and her Last Will and Testament, left specified personalty to her two children, Egon and a daughter, appellee, Laura Jo Jones (formerly Engers), and the estate residue to a testamentary trust. In that Egon murdered his mother he is disqualified from taking any interest in her estate by Oklahoma's slayer statute, 84 O.S.Supp.1994, § 231. 1 This appeal is brought, as was the trial court proceeding, on Jason Kyle Hulett's behalf--alleged minor son of Egon and grandson of Dorothy--by appellant, Mary Ellen Hulett, his mother and guardian, who collaterally seek to vacate or modify the final decree entered in the probate of Dorothy's estate, which awarded the personalty bequeathed to Egon and his conditional trust share to Laura.

¶2 Rejecting the collateral attack, the trial court granted summary judgment to Laura. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. If Jason is, in fact, Egon's child and, thus, Dorothy's grandchild, he is entitled to share in Dorothy's estate as an heir under her will and the probate decree is subject to his collateral attack because he received no notice of, or representation in, the probate case. 2

PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

¶3 The appellate standard of review governing a grant of summary judgment is de novo. In such regard, we said in Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, 914 P.2d 1051:

Although a trial court in making a decision on whether summary judgment is appropriate considers factual matters, the ultimate decision turns on purely legal determinations, i.e. whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no material disputed factual questions. Therefore, as the decision involves purely legal determinations, the appellate standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. [This Court], like the trial court, will examine the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Further, all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidentiary materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (citations omitted)

Id. at 1053. Also, if the materials subject to consideration on a motion for summary judgment either disclose controverted material facts, or, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions even if the material facts are undisputed, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Perry v. Green, 1970 OK 70, 468 P.2d 483, 488-489. With these standards in mind we turn to a review of the matter.

PART II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

¶4 Dorothy died in March 1987. In November 1987 Egon was sentenced in the District Court of Custer County to life imprisonment after his conviction for the first degree murder of his mother. By virtue of Oklahoma's slayer statute, Egon became disqualified from taking any part of Dorothy's estate. Section 231 provides in relevant part:

No person who is convicted of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, or manslaughter in the first degree, as defined by the laws of this state, or the laws of any other state or foreign country, of having taken, caused, or procured another to take, the life of an individual, shall inherit from the victim, or receive any interest in the estate of the victim, or take by devise or legacy, or as a designated beneficiary of an account or security which is a POD or TOD designation, or as a surviving joint tenant, or by descent or distribution, from the victim, any portion of the victim's estate; and no beneficiary of any policy of insurance or certificate of membership issued by any benevolent association or organization, payable upon the death ... of any person, who in like manner takes, causes, or procures to be taken, the life upon which such policy or certificate is issued ... shall take the proceeds of such policy or certificate; but in every instance mentioned in this section all benefits that would accrue to any such person upon the death ... of the person whose life is thus taken ... shall become subject to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased person according to the laws of descent and distribution.... 3

¶5 Dorothy died testate, her will being executed in 1984. Aside from certain specified personalty bequeathed to Laura or Egon, the remainder of her estate was devised and bequeathed under the will's residuary clause to appellee, the First National Bank and Trust Company in Clinton, as trustee of the Dorothy Louise Engers' testamentary trust. The trust's terms are in the will. The pertinent parts of the will's dispositive clauses are as follows:

SECOND: I hereby give and bequeath to my daughter, Laura Jo Engers, my sterling silver set and all jewelry which I own at the time of my death.

THIRD: I hereby give and bequeath to my son, Egon Engers, II, my JFK coin set and any other coin collection or coin sets that I own at the time of my death.

FOURTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my property; real, personal and mixed, of every kind and nature, vested or contingent, and wheresoever situate, of which I may die seized or possessed, I hereby give, devise and bequeath to the First National Bank and Trust Company in Clinton, Oklahoma, as Trustee under the terms and conditions of the Trust hereinafter defined.

* * *

The income and principal of the trust estate herein created shall be administered and distributed as follows:

A. It is my specific intent that this Trust shall continue until my daughter, Laura Jo Engers, attains the age of thirty-five (35) years. During the term of this Trust, I hereby direct the Trustee to accumulate all income of the Trust Estate which shall be accumulated and added to the principal of this Trust. Upon Laura Jo Engers attaining the age of 35 years, I hereby direct the Trustee to distribute the rest, residue and remainder of said Trust Estate, including any accumulated income, to my children, Laura Jo Engers and Egon Engers, II, in equal shares, share and share alike, but if any of said children die prior to distribution of this Trust Estate, leaving issue who survive, such issue shall take the share of their deceased parent by representation.

¶6 Dorothy's will was admitted to probate and a final probate decree was entered in the District Court of Custer County, Case No. P-87-38 in March 1989. Jason was a little over two years old at such time, having been born in December 1986. The record in Case No. P-87-38 facially shows that no notice of the probate case was given to Jason or anyone representing him, nor did he or a representative participate in it. Thus, without any participation from Jason or his representative, the final probate decree determined: Dorothy's sole heirs-at-law were Laura and Egon; Egon was disqualified under § 231 from taking any share of Dorothy's estate because he murdered her; Laura was entitled to the personalty bequeathed to Egon; approximately $105,000.00 should be transferred to trustee bank to serve per the trust's terms; and, essentially, any trust share Egon might have been entitled to, "shall be set over to Laura [ ]". We note that the heirs-at-law of a decedent are limited to those persons who are determined under the law of intestate succession. All other persons, although relatives, are not considered heirs-at-law. R. ROBERT HUFF, OKLAHOMA PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE 21 (3d ed. 1995).

¶7 Six and one-half years after the final decree--in October 1995--Jason, by his guardian, filed an action in the District Court of Custer County seeking to vacate or modify the decree. Laura, trustee bank and Egon were named defendants. Jason claimed he was the natural out-of-wedlock son of Egon and Mary Ellen and, therefore, entitled to the coin set(s) bequeathed to Egon and to one-half of the residue of Dorothy's estate, which he asserted by virtue of the trust's terms should be held for him by the trustee bank until March 1999, the month Laura will turn 35 years old. Laura was born in March 1964 and Egon in September 1961.

¶8 Laura filed a motion for summary judgment, essentially arguing pursuant to § 231 (slayer statute) and 84 O.S.Supp.1994, § 213 (our descent and distribution statute) 4, she was properly awarded any share of Dorothy's estate that would have gone to Egon because she is Dorothy's only other heir-at-law. She asserts Jason is not an heir-at-law because, although Egon is disqualified from taking because of the slayer statute, he is still alive, and under § 213(B)(2)(a) a grandchild is only considered his grandparent's heir-at-law, when the grandchild's parent is deceased.

¶9 Jason opposed Laura's motion and also sought summary judgment, claiming his collateral attack on the final probate decree was meritorious. His basic argument on why he is entitled to take a share of Dorothy's estate is that he is entitled to take under the will, not as an heir-at-law, and that § 231 was not intended to mandate a murderer's share of his victim's estate go to decedent's other heirs-at-law in the situation where such a distribution is contrary to the victim's intent, as expressed in a will. He asserts Dorothy's will expresses such a...

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