Hulett v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co.

Decision Date02 September 1941
Docket NumberNo. 65.,65.
Citation299 Mich. 59,299 N.W. 807
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesHULETT v. GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by Nellie E. Hulett against the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, a New Jersey corporation, for injury sustained when plaintiff slipped and fell in defendant's store and for additional injury sustained in a subsequent fall allegedly due to weakened condition produced by the fall in defendant's store. From a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a directed verdict, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Joseph A. Moynihan, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Clifford M. Toohy, of Detroit, for appellant.

Charles R. Fox, of Detroit, for appellee.

STARR, Justice.

The plaintiff, 62 years of age, was living with her unmarried daughter in the city of Detroit. The defendant conducted a retail store in Detroit. Plaintiff entered defendant's store between 10 and 11 o'clock in the forenoon on April 7, 1939, to make certain purchases. While walking from the meat to the grocery counter, plaintiff slipped and fell, injuring her left leg. She was removed to her home and was attended by a physician, who advised her to remain quiet until the swelling and soreness had subsided and then to use the injured leg in a limited way to prevent stiffness. While doing housework on June 3, 1939, plaintiff started to go down a stairway to the basement. When she reached the last step, her left leg gave way and she fell, fracturing her right shoulder and aggravating the left leg injury.

Plaintiff began suit against defendant June 27, 1939, alleging that:

‘While walking from one department of the store to another department, she slipped in a pool of oil, or a mixture of oil and dirt * * * (and)

‘That defendant was negligent in carelessly permitting an abnormal collection of grease, oil and dirt to be on said floor so that it presented a hazard which plaintiff slipped in.’

In amended declaration, filed June 20, 1940, plaintiff alleged that her injuries suffered in the accidents of April 7 and June 3, 1939: ‘Were due to the negligence of defendant company in carelessly applying oil to the floor of its store, and in carelessly permitting the oil and grease to collect on said floor in an abnormal and hazardous manner, so that plaintiff, while being in the exercise of due care, slipped and fell on the floor on April 7, 1939, and later, because of the weakened condition of said leg, and pursuant to the express directions of her physicians while walking about her home and down the stairs from the first floor to the basement, fell and received the injuries hereinbefore described.’

Defendant filed answer denying the allegations of negligence and contended that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. When the case was assigned for trial, defendant moved to strike out that portion of plaintiff's declaration which related to her accident on June 3, 1939. The trial court denied such motion to strike on the ground that plaintiff sustained her second injury while following a course of conduct prescribed by her physician at the time of her first injury on April 7. Defendant applied to this court for leave to appeal from the order denying motion to strike, which application we denied without prejudice September 5, 1940.

This case came on for jury trial, and plaintiff put in her proofs regarding both accidents and her permanent injuries. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for directed verdict on the ground plaintiff had failed to prove actionable negligence on the part of defendant and that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The court granted such motion and directed verdict for defendant. Motion for new trial was denied, and plaintiff appeals.

On this appeal from a directed verdict, we must consider plaintiff's testimony in its most favorable light. The question is: Did plaintiff's testimony, viewed most favorably to her, present a question of fact as to defendant's negligence, for submission to the jury?

Plaintiff testified regarding the condition of the floor in defendant's store as follows:

‘Q. And will you tell us just what happened after you finished buying that meat? A. I put the meat in the basket and was going across to get the groceries, and going across I slipped and fell on this, fell on my right knee, or my left knee, and rolled over.

‘Q. We can't get you here. What happened again? A. I slipped on the, the condition of the floor was such that I, my foot went out from under me so quickly and I struck on this knee and rolled over. I just can't tell you how I did it. * * * I was pretty frightened but I knew it was oil on the floor.

‘Q. I beg pardon? A. I say, it was oil on the floor because I-I was so frightened I didn't notice. My hands struck the floor also and they were soiled from the oil. It was an accumulation as dirt will settle, black dirt and oil you know. As I slipped by foot just slipped right out from under me sideways. There was a mark on the floor where I slipped. It showed about six inches. * * *

‘Q. Well, Mrs. Hulett, you had this fall and then you looked, you say, to see what it was that caused the fall? A. Yes.

‘Q. Now, tell us just exactly what it was you saw on the floor, just before getting up? A. Well, I have told the truth and I don't know what else to say.

‘Q. Well, that is all right, that is all we want Mrs. Hulett. You told the truth, but what was it you want to tell us, let us have it in your own words. A. That the floor had been oiled and I slipped on it.’

The trial court clearly erred in striking out the following testimony by plaintiff, on the ground that it was not responsive to the question:

‘Q. Tell us whether or not you looked on the floor to see what it was you slipped on? Just tell me ‘Yes' or ‘No’ on that. Did you look? A. Yes.

‘Q. Now, tell us what it was you saw? A. Well, the floor had been oiled. And there was oil on the floor with dirt in it.’

Plaintiff's daughter, Dorothy Hulett, testified that after the accident there were spots of oil and grease on plaintiff's coat, stockings, and shoes.

Plaintiff's daughter testified further that she went to defendant's store about six o'clock on the evening of April 7, 1939, the day on which plaintiff was first injured; that the floor was ‘spotty’ with pools of oil that had not been rubbed in; that there was dirt on top of the oil. Mary Davis, a roomer in plaintiff's home, who went to the store with Dorothy, testified regarding there being oil and dirt on the floor.

The trial court rejected this testimony of Dorothy Hulett and Mary Davis regarding the condition of the floor at about six o'clock as being too remote to be considered. The trial court said:

‘Keeping in mind, of course, that there is testimony in the record that the store was closed for the observation of Good Friday from twelve to three, and while the testimony of Miss Dorothy sheds some light on the matter, that testimony applies to the situation occurring some eight hours afterwards, after the accident.

‘Now, many things could have happened to that floor in the meantime. There is nothing in this record that shows that the floor was re-oiled or swept clean or some other process was applied to it. * * *

‘In the realm of law and procedure, that is too remote from the time of the accident; it permits too much to guess work.’

This ruling was proper, as the testimony was too speculative and remote to indicate the condition of the floor at the time of the accident. There was no proof that the floor was in the same condition when viewed by these witnesses at about six o'clock as at the time of the accident in the forenoon.

Plaintiff's evidence, viewed most favorably to her, on the question of defendant'snegligence is: That the floor had been oiled; that she slipped in an accumulation of oil and dirt on the floor; that her hands were soiled with oil; and that there were spots of oil and grease on her coat,...

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