Hulin v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-924 SECTION "R" (3) |
| Parties | WILLIAM HULIN v. HUNTINGTON INGALLS, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Defendants Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Albert L. Bossier, Jr., and Lamorak Insurance Company (collectively the "Avondale Interests") move for summary judgment.1 Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and London Market Companies (collectively "London Market Insurers") have joined in the Avondale Interests' motion.2 Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and because defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court grants defendants' motion.
This case arises out of plaintiff William Hulin, Sr.'s asbestos exposure. Avondale employed Hulin from January 1954 to May 1973.3 He worked primarily at Avondale's "Main Yard."4 He worked as a shipfitter, and claims to have worked as a "laborer" and "tacker."5
Hulin alleges that he was exposed to asbestos numerous times in the course of his employment with Avondale.6 He states that he worked at the Main Yard's land-based insulation shop.7 His work there consisted of, among other things, "cutting asbestos insulation templates for later installation on vessels."8 He alleges that he breathed "asbestos dust on a regular basis," even when he was not personally handling insulation.9 Hulin claims to have "sustained regular, heavy and ongoing exposures to asbestos on land prior to 1972."10 In July 2019, Hulin was diagnosed with lung cancer.
Plaintiff sued a number of defendants, including the Avondale Interests, in state court on November 12, 2019.11 The case was removed to this Court on March 17, 2020.12 Plaintiff has expressly disclaimed any strict liability claim against the Avondale Interests.13 Instead, he alleges negligence against the Avondale Interests under Louisiana law.14
Summary judgment is warranted when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but "unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth 'ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law' are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment." Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. "No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would 'entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'" Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). "[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion" by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the "existence of a genuine dispute of material fact," or by "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party." Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 .
The Avondale Interests and London Market Insurers argue that plaintiff's state-law negligence claims are preempted by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA" or the "Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. Plaintiff argues that the LHWCA does not apply to his injuries and, even if it does, the LHWCA does not preempt his negligence claims. Furthermore, Hulin argues that preemption would effectively deprive him of a vested property right, violating his constitutional right to due process.
The LHWCA is a federal statutory workers' compensation statute providing covered maritime workers with "medical, disability, and survivor benefits for work-related injuries and death." MMR Constructors, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 954 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Before 1972, the statute covered only workers on "navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)." Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (pre-1972)). But, in 1972, Congress "extend[ed] the LHWCA landward." Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719 (1980).
This case turns in large part upon whether the pre- or post-1972 version of the LHWCA applies. Plaintiff argues that the pre-1972 version of the law applies and that his land-based asbestos exposures fall outside the Act's scope.15 Defendant contends that the post-1972 Act applies.16 In making the determination of the applicable version of the LHWCA, defendant argues that a "date of manifestation" rule controls.17 Under this rule, the Court applies the Act as it existed when plaintiff's disease manifested to determine whether the alleged injuries are covered. In response, plaintiff argues that a "date of exposure" rule applies and that the Court must analyze these claims under the pre-1972 LHWCA,18 because he suffered asbestos exposure before the Act's amendments.19
Courts use the "date of injury" to determine which version of the LHWCA applies. Castorina v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 758 F.2d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985). In the context of long-latency diseases arising from asbestos exposure, the Fifth Circuit in Castorina held that manifestation, not exposure, determines the date of injury. Id. at 1031. There, plaintiff's disease, asbestosis, manifested in 1979. Id. at 1028. His exposures occurred between 1965 and 1972. Id. at 1027. The court looked to judicial authority stating that the LHWCA "is not concerned with pathology, but with industrial disability; and a disease is no disease until it manifests itself." Id. (quoting Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939)). It also inferred Congress's intent from Congress's express adoption of the manifestation rule in 1984. Id. (citing Pub.L. No. 98-426, § 28(g)(1), 98 Stat. 1639 (1984)). In the 1984 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress provided a specific definition of "injury" for occupational diseases:
[I]n the case of an occupational disease which does not immediately result in a disability or death, an injury shall be deemed to arise on the date on which the employee or claimant becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence or by reason of medical advice should have been aware, of the disease . . . .
Pub.L. No. 98-426, § 28(g)(1), 98 Stat. 1639 (1984). Under Castorina and the 1984 amendments, plaintiff's injury is deemed to arise on the date it manifested. Because plaintiff's disease manifested in 2019, the Court applies the LHWCA as it existed in 2019, the date of plaintiff's injury.
Plaintiff disputes this legal conclusion by pointing to dicta in a footnote in Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457, 466 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016), in which the Fifth Circuit stated:
Defendant's preemption defense is governed by the law at the time [plaintiff] was exposed to asbestos, which occurred before the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act was amended in 1989 to eliminate any concurrent coverage between that Act and the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. See La. Rev. Stat. 23:1035.2 ().
Id. (emphasis added).20 The Court does not find that this footnote has the import plaintiff attributes to it.
In the Savoie opinion, the court makes clear that it is discussing the applicable version of state law. For example, in the footnote upon which plaintiff relies, the Fifth Circuit noted that plaintiff's exposure "occurred before the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act was amended in 1989 to eliminate any concurrent coverage between that Act and the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." Id. (citing La. Rev. Stat. 23:1035.2). If the court were not referring to the appropriate version of state law, there would have been no need to discuss the elimination of concurrent...
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