Hulin v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 06 March 1884
• Citation: 18 N.W. 569,53 Mich. 93
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: HULIN v. STEVENS.

18 N.W. 569

53 Mich. 93

HULIN v. STEVENS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 6, 1884

Evidence of a party's not having paid taxes on land to which he has a deed, is admissible as tending to rebut his claim of ownership, and to show that the deed was given as a mortgage.

Evidence in rebuttal, having no tendency to disprove the defense claimed, is not admissible.

The simple continuance of the occupancy of land after sale raises no implied contract to pay rent, and the burden of proving such a contract is upon the claimant under it.

The continued possession of land by the grantor long after the recording of the deed to the grantee raises a presumption that the right to the same has been retained.

Error from Montcalm.

Webster & Steere, for plaintiff.

T.F Shield, for defendant and appellant

SHERWOOD J.

Edwin H. Stevens in 1866 owned, occupied, and carried on a farm of 200 acres in Bushnell, Montcalm county, and continued to do so until he died, in 1879. After his death administration was had upon his estate by Moses H. Hulin, who was duly appointed administrator. Commissioners to examine and adjust claims against the estate were duly appointed, and upon the last day for presenting claims against the estate, William H. Stevens presented a claim of something over $600 for the use of land and a load of hay. The commissioners allowed the claim at the sum of $611.25. From this decision the administrator appealed to the circuit court, where a trial was had by jury, and the appellee's claim was reduced to $19.20. From this allowance the claimant appeals to this court, and the case is now before us on error.

From the record it appears that the deceased conveyed to claimant by warranty deed, 100 acres of his farm on the sixth day of April, 1866, but that the grantor remained in the occupancy and use of the same in connection with other portions of his farm, cultivating and cropping it, and taking the benefit thereof, the same after as before the making of the deed until he died, and in no other manner. The rent claimed was for the last six years of such use before the death of the intestate. The exceptions all relate to the rulings in admitting testimony, and to the instructions of the court to the jury. One of the main questions in the case was whether or not the conveyance from deceased to W.H. Stevens was a deed, or intended as a mortgage. For the purpose of showing that it was the former, appellant offered in evidence the deed referred to, and then to show that the deceased regarded the sale as absolute, and that the claimant was therefore entitled to rent, he offered the statement of deceased to the effect that he intended, the year he died, to pay the claimant $500. After the appellant had put in this testimony and rested, and the estate had put in its proofs the claimant proposed to show in rebuttal that the deceased in his life-time, said that he had sold the property to claimant. This...