Hull v. Central Transport, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. F 85-147.
• Citation: 628 F. Supp. 784
• Parties: Kenneth A. HULL, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC. and Charles Garavaglia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

628 F. Supp. 784

Kenneth A. HULL, Plaintiff, v.CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC. and Charles Garavaglia, Defendants.

Civ. No. F 85-147.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

February 18, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

S. Sargent Visher and Fergus Kear, Choate, Visher & Haith, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

Thomas M. Kimbrough, Barrett, Barrett & McNagny, Fort Wayne, Ind., Timothy K. Carroll, Dykema, Gossett, Spenser, Goodnow & Trigg, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendantsCentral Transport, Inc.("Central") and Charles Garavaglia("Garavaglia").The plaintiff("Hull") has responded to the motion, and the defendants have filed a reply.For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.

This cause arises out of events surrounding the termination of Hull from his job with Central in March, 1983.Hull's complaint alleges five causes of action: breach of the collective bargaining agreement between Central and Hull's union; defamation by Garavaglia during grievance proceedings under the agreement; violation of an Indiana statute requiring an employer to provide written reasons for discharge; violation of the Indiana Blacklisting statute; and failure to pay Hull's wages upon termination on time.Central and Garavaglia now move for summary judgment.

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).Thus, summary judgment serves as a vehicle with which the court"can determine whether further exploration of the facts is necessary."Hahn v. Sargent,523 F.2d 461, 464(1st Cir.1975).

In making this determination, the court must keep in mind that the entry of summary judgment terminates the litigation, or an aspect thereof, and must draw all inferences from the established or asserted facts in favor of the non-moving party.Munson v. Friske,754 F.2d 683, 690(7th Cir.1985).The non-moving party's reasonable allegations are to be accepted as true for purposes of summary judgment.Yorger v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,733 F.2d 1215, 1218-19(7th Cir.1984).A party may not rest on the mere allegations of the pleadings or the bare contention that an issue of fact exists.Posey v. Skyline Corp.,702 F.2d 102, 105(7th Cir.), cert. denied,464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336(1983).SeeAdickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142(1970).See alsoAtchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union,734 F.2d 317(7th Cir.1984);Korf v. Ball State University,726 F.2d 1222(7th Cir.1983).See generallyC. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 99 (4th ed. 1983);6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.15 (2d ed. 1984).

Thus, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Even if there are some disputed facts, where the undisputed facts are the material facts involved and those facts show one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.Egger v. Phillips,710 F.2d 292, 296-97(7th Cir.1983);Collins v. American Optometric Assn.,693 F.2d 636, 639(7th Cir.1982).See alsoBishop v. Wood,426 U.S. 341, 348, 348 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 2079 n. 11, 48 L.Ed.2d 684(1976).

Under these principles, the relevant facts of this case appear to be as follows.In March 1983, Central was a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") with Local 414 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers ("Union").Hull was a member of the Union, and was employed by Central as an over-the-road truck driver.On March 11, 1983, Hull got into a fight with another driver over who would get to haul an empty trailer from a Michigan plant, and Hull suffered injuries as a result.On March 14, 1983, Garavaglia, Central's Vice President for Labor Relations, sent Hull a telegram saying that Hull was being terminated for assaulting another employee.

Hull filed a grievance pursuant to the grievance mechanisms under the Agreement.The grievance was denied at the first level, and the Union appealed to the Motor Carriers Labor Advisory Grievance Committee("MCLAGC"), which is a Joint Committee within the meaning of the National Freight Master Agreement under which the Agreement had been negotiated.At a hearing before the MCLAGC on March 30, 1983, Garavaglia made statements about Hull's work history which Hull claims were defamatory.The MCLAGC denied Hull's grievance, and Hull's grievance opportunities were exhausted at that point.

Hull also claims that Garavaglia made false statements to Detroit Police Detective Raymond Trautz, who was investigating the fight, and to the Michigan Employment Security Commission during hearings on Hull's application for unemployment benefits.

In March 1984, Hull filed suit against the Union for breach of its duty of fair representation, and against Central for breach of the Agreement, in violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 185.This court held that the suit was barred by the six month statute of limitations for § 301 suits.Hull v. Local 414 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters,601 F.Supp. 869(N.D.Ind.1985).

On March 18, 1985, Hull filed this action against Central and Garavaglia in the Allen Superior Court, which was removed to this court.Count I of the complaint alleges that several provisions of the Agreement relating to notice and warnings prior to termination, as well as the appropriate body to hear an appeal of a first level denial of a grievance, were breached by Central.Count II alleges that Garavaglia's statements to MCLAGC, the Detroit police officer and the Michigan Employment Security Commission were defamatory.Count III alleges a violation of I.C. 22-6-3-1, which requires an employer to issue a signed letter setting forth a statement of the cause for discharge of a former employee.Count IV asserts a violation of I.C. 22-5-3-1, the Indiana Blacklisting Statute, which prohibits employers from preventing former employees from obtaining employment.Count V claims a violation of I.C. 22-2-9-2, which requires payment of wages of a discharged employee on the pay day for the last pay period the employee worked.

Central and Garavaglia move for summary judgment.They argue that Hull's state law claims are preempted by federal labor law, in effect leaving only Count I.On the merits of the claims, they argue that the grievance proceedings are binding on Hull, and thus Count I mandates judgment for the defendants.As for the merits of Count II, Garavaglia asserts privileges for making his statements.The defendants argue that Count III must fail both because Hull received written notice in the telegram and because I.C. 22-6-3-1 is a penal statute.They contend that the allegations of the complaint do not support a claim under the blacklisting statute, and argue that Hull was in fact paid his final wages on April 14, 1983 so as to satisfy the provisions of I.C. 22-2-9-2.

The court begins with the defendants' preemption argument.

I.PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CAUSES OF ACTION

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....

The Supreme Court has recently made clear that the "dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute so that issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 are to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy."Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,471 U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206(1985), quotingTeamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576, 7 L.Ed.2d 593(1962).The doctrine is motivated by concern for uniformity in the law applied to labor contracts.Id.Thus, this doctrine of preemption requires that suits alleging breach of a collectively bargained contract be brought under § 301 and decided by reference to federal labor law.

The scope of the preemption doctrine extends beyond actions alleging breaches of the collective bargaining agreement; actions which relate to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed upon, or the legal consequences which were to flow from what was agreed upon, must be decided by reference to uniform federal law.Lueck,471 U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1911.However,

not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301 or other provisions of federal labor law ... In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.

Id. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1912.The Lueck Court has described the proper methodology for analyzing whether a state tort claim is preempted: the court must look to see whether the state law claim

confers non-negotiable state law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.If the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted.

Id.

The court begins its...