Hull v. Chevron USA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. C83-0407-B.,C83-0407-B.
• Citation: 602 F. Supp. 75
• Parties: John C. HULL, Plaintiff, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. CHASE DRILLING COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming

602 F. Supp. 75

John C. HULL, Plaintiff, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. CHASE DRILLING COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant.

No. C83-0407-B.

United States District Court, D. Wyoming.

February 12, 1985.

Jack R. Gage, James E. Burke, Cheyenne, Wyo., for plaintiff.

Michael J. Sullivan, Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyo., for defendant/third-party plaintiff.

Wes W. Reeves, Casper, Wyo., for third-party defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL INDEMNITY

BRIMMER, District Judge.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to defendant Chevron's third-party claim against third-party defendant Chase Drilling for partial indemnity. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and the evidence offered, and being fully advised in the premises, FINDS and ORDERS as follows:

Plaintiff Hull sued defendant Chevron for negligence involving an accident at Chevron's drill site. Chase Drilling, plaintiff's employer, had been hired by Chevron to do the actual drilling. Plaintiff was injured when a drill collar rolled off a forklift and crushed his leg. The jury found that while plaintiff himself had been 30 percent negligent, Chevron and Chase were each 35 percent negligent. The jury also found that Chevron had retained the right to control Chase's operation, and that Chase was not an independent contractor. Therefore, Chevron was found liable, under respondeat superior theory, for Chase's negligence as well as its own. Judgment was entered for plaintiff against Chevron for $420,000 (the $600,000 jury award reduced by plaintiff's 30 percent negligence). Chevron now asks the Court to order Chase to indemnify it for one-half of this judgment, based on the following provision of their contract:

Contractor (Chase) agrees to protect, indemnify, and save Operator (Chevron) harmless from and against all claims, demands and causes of action of every kind and character arising in favor of Contractor's employees, ... on account of bodily injuries, ... in any way resulting from the, ... negligent acts or omissions of Contractor and/or Contractor's, ... employees, ... (identity of parties added).

Chase contends that this indemnity clause is void under Section 30-1-131 of the Wyoming Statutes of 1977. That statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) All agreements, covenants or promises contained in, collateral to or affecting any agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral, which purport to indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages for:

(i) Death or bodily injury to persons;

(ii) Injury to property; or

(iii) Any other loss, damage, or expense arising under either (i) or (ii) from:

(A) The sole or concurrent negligence of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the indemnitee or any independent contractor who is directly responsible to such indemnitee; or

(B) From any accident which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under the supervision of the indemnitee or any employee or representative of the indemnitee or in accordance with methods and means specified by the indemnitee or employees or representatives of the indemnitee, are against public policy and are void and unenforceable to the extent that such contract of indemnity by its terms purports to relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own negligence.

The Court does not agree that the indemnity clause is void under this language. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated in Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Wyo.1978):

Although the parties' agreement may be void to the extent that it attempted to indemnify (the indemnitee) from its own negligence, this is not to say that the agreement is void to the extent it implicitly sought to indemnify (the indemnitee) from (the indemnitor's) own negligence. Such an agreement is not prohibited.

Since Chevron only seeks to be indemnified for the 35 percent of the negligence apportioned to Chase by the jury, it is not seeking indemnification for its own negligence. Rather, Chevron asks for indemnification only for that portion of the judgment which was based upon its vicarious liability. In Heckart v. Viking Exploration, Inc., 673 F.2d 309 (10th Cir.1982), the court remanded the case for decision as to whether the indemnitee could show it was potentially liable under the respondeat superior doctrine. The Tenth Circuit held that:

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