Hull v. Detroit Equipment Installation, Inc., Docket No. 2866

• Decision Date: 26 July 1968
• Docket Number: Docket No. 2866,No. 2,2
• Citation: 163 N.W.2d 271,12 Mich.App. 532
• Parties: Josephine B. HULL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and City of Keego Harbor and Board of Public Works of Oakland County, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 271

163 N.W.2d 271

12 Mich.App. 532

Josephine B. HULL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DETROIT EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant and City of Keego Harbor and Board of Public Works of Oakland County, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 2866.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

July 26, 1968.

Released for Publication Jan. 3, 1969.

Robert D. Anspach, Detroit, for appellant.

Joseph K. Kosik, Pontiac, for J. B. Hull.

Bond & Dillon, Pontiac, for City of Keego Harbor.

Hayward Whitlock, Pontiac, Walter Shapero, Detroit, for Bd. of Public Works.

Before QUINN, P.J., and GILLIS and HOLBROOK, JJ.

GILLIS, Judge.

Defendant-lessee appeals the granting of a summary judgment to plaintiff-lessor. The litigation centered on the liability for the increased sewage charges occasioned by defendant's use of the leased premises as a laundromat and dry cleaning establishment.

The trial court correctly held that the interpretation of the lease agreement was a question of law properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. At a hearing on the motion brought pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3) both parties asserted the lack of any material issue of fact on the lease agreement. In fact, defendant-lessee's counsel advised the court, 'There is absolutely no factual question involved.' While each of the parties assert that there is no factual dispute, this does not of necessity give the trial court Carte blanche authority to resolve ultimate factual issues on the motion. The court's role is to determine from the pleadings, affidavits ond other evidence on the record whether there are genuine issues of fact. See Zamler v. Smith (1965), 375 Mich. 675, 135 N.W.2d 349.

When a lease is unambiguous in its terms, what the parties intended by the language employed in the lease is a matter of law for the court's determination and not a question for the consideration of the fact finder. See Brown v. Schiappacasse (1897), 115 Mich. 47, 72 N.W. 1096. Although the parties here refer to other provisions of the lease as implying who is to pay the sewage charge, it is hardly disputable that the lease was silent as to this provision and the trial court was correct in so ruling.

The narrow issue presented for our determination is: In the absence of any specific provision in a lease, who is to pay for added sewage charges occasioned by the lessee's use of the premises?

In Wycoff v. Gavriloff Motors, Inc. (1961), 362 Mich. 582, 107 N.W.2d 820, 86 A.L.R.2d 663, the Court was called upon to decide an issue similar to that now before us. The lessee in Wycoff had made improvements upon the leased property (allowable under the lease) which led to an increased tax assessment against the property. As in the present case, the lease was silent as to who would pay the increased taxes. In citing the general rule that where the lease is silent the lessor is obliged to pay the taxes, the Court went on to state what to our minds is the controlling exception to that rule:

'As between the lessor and lessee, where the lease is silent as to the payment of taxes, that the burden of Taxes upon improvements removable by the tenant must fall upon him.' 362 Mich. 582, 587, 107 N.W.2d 820, 823. (Emphasis supplied.)

And, at 362 Mich. 582, 590, 591, 107 N.W.2d 820,...