Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Civil Action No. 93-2771.

Citation960 F.Supp. 844
Decision Date11 March 1997
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 93-2771.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey
PartiesRobert T. HULMES, Plaintiff, v. HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., Honda Research and Development Group, Ltd., Honda R & D North America, Inc., and American Honda Motor Company, Inc., Defendants. and HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., et al., Third Party Plaintiffs, v. Nicholas J. HULMES, Third Party Defendant. Sherry HERTLEIN, Plaintiff, v. HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., et al., Defendants. and HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., et al., Third Party Plaintiffs, v. Nicholas J. HULMES, Third Party Defendant.

Lewis M. Levin, Joseph Viola, Lewis M. Levin & Associates, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff, Robert T. Hulmes.

David Bross, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Plaintiff, Sherry Hertlein.

Robert St.L. Goggin, Brian C. Dareff, Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Marlton, NJ, Paul G. Cereghini, Bowman & Brooke, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants, Honda Motor Company, Ltd., Honda Research and Development Group, Ltd., Honda R & D North America, Inc., and American Honda Motor Company, Inc.

OPINION

ORLOFSKY, District Judge.

This product liability lawsuit against defendants, Honda Motor Company, Ltd., Honda Research and Development Group, Ltd., Honda R & D North America, Inc., and American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Honda") was tried before this court and a jury from September 24, 1996, through October 31, 1996. The jury returned a special verdict in which it found no design defect in the subject All Terrain Vehicle ("ATV"). However, the jury found the ATV defective by reason of a failure to warn. In response to special interrogatories requesting an allocation of comparative fault, the jury found the plaintiff, Robert Hulmes ("Hulmes" or the "plaintiff"), sixty-six (66) percent at fault for his injuries. On October 31, 1996, the court entered judgment in favor of defendants on all counts pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:15-5.1 and 15-5.2. Judgment was also entered against Sherry Hertlein, Hulmes's former spouse, on her derivative per quod action.

Plaintiff now moves to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), or, alternatively, for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a).1 Plaintiff's motions require this court to revisit and plumb once again the murky depths of New Jersey's Product Liability Law. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motions will be denied.

I. Standards Governing Rule 59 Motions

The decision whether to grant a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) lies within the district court's sound discretion. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190-91, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir.1995). Errors in judicial rulings or in the conduct of the court warrant a new trial where the error or conduct was prejudicial. 6A James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 59.08(2) (2d ed.1996). However, even if the court determines that an error was made, it should not grant a new trial unless it also determines that the error was so prejudicial that "refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. See also Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 709 F.Supp. 600, 601 (E.D.Pa.1989), aff'd, 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.1990).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a district court may alter or amend a judgment: (1) when there has been an intervening change in the law; (2) when new evidence becomes available only after trial; (3) if the court has committed clear legal error; or (4) if the judgment without amendment would create a manifest injustice. North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.1995). Hulmes offers no new evidence, nor does he claim that there has been a change in the controlling law. Rather, plaintiff contends that this court has committed clear legal error.

Courts should not lightly disturb jury verdicts. "In reviewing the propriety of a jury verdict, [this Court's] obligation is to uphold the jury's award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so." Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir.1989). See also Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325 F.2d 2, 21 (3d Cir.1963). This court must defer to the jury whenever its findings are reasonably supported by the record, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict winner. Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir.1987) (citing Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 117 (3d Cir.1983)).

II. Discussion

Because plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment and his motion for a new trial are both, in part, based on his assertion that this court misapplied the comparative fault provisions of New Jersey's product liability law, I will briefly discuss this issue before turning to plaintiff's other contentions.

The product liability law of New Jersey recognizes that accidental injuries are often the result of a combination of causes. However, the doctrine of strict liability strikes a balance in favor of plaintiffs by requiring a defendant to produce evidence that the plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known danger, before the jury is allowed to compare the plaintiff's conduct with the alleged product defect on the question of causation. Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 562-63, 410 A.2d 674 (1980). This balance advances the overall purpose of New Jersey's product liability law by stressing the manufacturer's primary responsibility to design and market safe products. Nevertheless, when the evidence points to a voluntary assumption of a known risk, it is proper to instruct the jury on comparative fault. Ladner v. Mercedes-Benz, 266 N.J.Super. 481, 495, 630 A.2d 308 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 302, 639 A.2d 301 (1994).

Hulmes asks this court to amend the judgment so as to award him damages based upon the jury's finding that the ATV was defective by reason of a failure to warn, notwithstanding the jury's finding as to his comparative fault, which Hulmes argues is "irrelevant" to his failure to warn claim. Alternatively, plaintiff seeks a new trial based upon his contention that his is not a case to which comparative fault properly applies.

A. Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

Hulmes first contends that he is entitled to judgment in his favor based upon the jury's finding of a failure to warn, and asks this court to enter judgment in the full amount of the jury's verdict. Plaintiff argues that the jury's assignment of comparative fault is irrelevant on the question of defendants' failure to warn.2

At trial, Hulmes claimed not to have received certain warnings which were distributed by Honda some years after he had purchased his ATV. Hulmes testified that, had he received these warnings concerning the ATV's safety, he "would have got rid of it." Tr. of Oct. 1, 1996, part A, at 42. The jury found that the ATV was defective by reason of Honda's failure to warn of the danger of severe injury which could result from roll-over or tip-over accidents in which the rider is jettisoned. Plaintiff argues that comparative fault is inapplicable "where the harm incurred is the very risk about which defendant had a duty to warn." Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 248 N.J.Super. 540, 565, 591 A.2d 966 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 385, 599 A.2d 162 (1991).

In Crispin, the trial court declined to reduce the jury's award by the 25 percent by which the jury had found the plaintiff at fault. Id. at 549, 591 A.2d 966. The trial court based its decision upon the fact that the jury had found the defendant liable on a failure to warn theory. Id. The Appellate Division affirmed, while stressing that the case was "unique" because it presented a pure "second collision" scenario. Id. at 564, 567, 591 A.2d 966. In a "crashworthiness," or "second collision" case, the jury is only concerned with the incremental injuries suffered as the result of the defect. In Crispin, the jury found that Volkswagen failed to warn the plaintiff that the use of a seat belt was especially necessary "in light of the collapsing seat, a feature built into the automobile by design." Id. at 565, 591 A.2d 966. The Appellate Division concluded that, because the only damages at issue were those that resulted from the "second collision," the plaintiff's contributory fault "in causing the original accident was not at issue." Id. at 568, 591 A.2d 966 (emphasis added).

In the singular context of "second collision" injuries, a defendant's failure to warn a user of its product of a "special requirement," without which the product will be unsafe, may well preclude consideration of comparative fault. In Crispin, the Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff should not be penalized for failure to use a seat belt when the special importance of using a seat belt in view of the automobile's peculiar seat design was not conveyed to him. By contrast, the warning which Honda failed to deliver to Hulmes, Exhibit P-524, did not outline any specific action or steps that Hulmes should have taken to avoid the accident in question. It merely warned, albeit in some detail, that roll-over or ejection accidents were a possible result of even a minor collision. This is simply not a case in which application of comparative fault principles would, in effect, blame the plaintiff for not doing something which he was not told he should do. On the contrary, plaintiff's testimony that he would have "gotten rid" of the ATV had he been warned of its instability, belies his assertion that this case is controlled by Crispin. Hulmes's accident was not "caused" by his failure to "get rid" of the ATV, except in the most tenuous sense, nor was it shown at...

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