Hulsh v. Hulsh
Decision Date | 03 May 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 81-1299,81-1299 |
Citation | 431 So.2d 658 |
Parties | Marcella Brosilow HULSH and Fred Brosilow, Appellants, v. Rea R. HULSH, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Lapidus & Stettin, Herbert Stettin and Robert P. Frankel, Miami, for appellants.
Louis Schwarzkopf, Miami Beach, Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Mallory H. Horton, Miami, for appellee.
Before HENDRY, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
The issues in this case are (1) whether the language of a post-will antenuptial agreement between the decedent and the widow was effective to waive the widow's right to take under the will; and, if so, does the widow's disqualification affect the rights of her son to take under the will; (2) whether the widow was barred by the Deadman's Statute from showing that the antenuptial agreement was destroyed by the decedent and her; and (3) whether a provision in the will giving the widow and decedent's mother life estates in a residuary trust was so incompatible with a later provision giving the decedent's stepson (the widow's son) the corpus of the residuary trust when he attains a certain age as to justify the nullification of the latter provision.
The essential facts are these. In 1971, when Sheldon Hulsh executed the will in question, his close friend was Marcella Brosilow, a woman he later married. Sheldon's will made certain specific bequests, following which it established a testamentary trust in the residuary. The trust was to be distributed in accordance with the following numbered paragraphs of Article V D):
In 1976, Sheldon married Marcella Brosilow. Three days before the marriage they executed an antenuptial agreement, which provided in pertinent part that it was being made:
"In consideration of the premises and of the marriage, and consideration of each relinquishing any interest each has in the estate of the other, including dower, courtesy [sic], or any statutory shares ...."
and that the parties:
"expressly waive all rights which they might otherwise have or claim under the laws of the State of Florida, or any other jurisdiction, to the property of the other, including any such rights which might be claimed under the laws of dower, courtesy [sic], or the elective share of a spouse, or in any other manner by operation of law, and each hereby releases all marital property rights, including but not limited to homestead rights under the laws of the State of Florida or any other jurisdiction."
Sheldon died in 1980. After his will was admitted to probate, his mother petitioned to determine the beneficiaries of the estate. After a non-jury trial, the lower court found in pertinent part:
....
The ensuing judgment of the trial court nullified all bequests to Marcella Brosilow Hulsh and Fred Brosilow, declared the residuary trust void, and awarded the residuary estate to the decedent's mother as the sole surviving ascendant beneficiary under the laws of descent and distribution. Marcella and Fred have appealed.
We have no difficulty in deciding that the language of the antenuptial agreement was sufficient to waive Marcella's rights to take under the provisions of Sheldon Hulsh's will. 1 Section 731.005(1), Florida Statutes (1975) (currently § 732.702(1), Fla.Stat. (1981)), provides:
The antenuptial agreement explicitly waives "all rights" to the "property of the other," which waiver, by virtue of the statute, constitutes "a renunciation by each of all benefits that would otherwise pass to either from the other ... by the provisions of any will executed before the waiver ...." The agreement contains as well the equivalent language "relinquishing any interest each has in the estate of the other," and has no provision which diminishes the breadth of the waiver. Thus, if still in existence at Sheldon's death, the agreement was fully effective to waive Marcella's rights. 2
During the trial, Marcella attempted to prove that the antenuptial agreement had been rescinded. However, the trial court refused to admit the testimony of Marcella that on November 8, 1978, she and the decedent went to Sheldon's lawyer's office, obtained a bond copy original of the antenuptial agreement and tore it up. The heart of the proffered testimony was this:
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