Hultberg v. Hultberg

• Decision Date: 11 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 9346-A,9346-A
• Citation: 281 N.W.2d 569
• Parties: June R. HULTBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Henning W. HULTBERG, Defendant and Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 569

281 N.W.2d 569

June R. HULTBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Henning W. HULTBERG, Defendant and Appellee.

Civ. No. 9346-A.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

July 11, 1979.

Kenneth M. Knutson, Minot, for plaintiff and appellant.

Robert H. Lundberg, of Lundberg, Conmy, Nodland, Rosenberg, Lucas & Schulz, Bismarck, for defendant and appellee.

VANDE WALLE, Justice.

June R. Hultberg appeals from the district court's judgment that granted her a divorce from Henning W. Hultberg and divided the property belonging to them, and from the district court's denial of her motion to amend its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. We affirm.

We face this case on appeal for the second time. A statement of the facts can be found in Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41 (N.D.1977). In that case we reversed the district court, holding that it had misinterpreted certain rules of law and erred by using a report of a court-appointed appraiser as a basis for dividing the parties' real property without having that report formally introduced into evidence and without allowing the parties to cross-examine the court-appointed appraiser. We remanded the case to the district court and instructed it to make an equitable division of the parties' property. On remand, the district court divided the parties' personal property found in their home and divided the remainder of their property as follows: Mrs. Hultberg was allowed to retain her separately held property, appraised at a value of approximately $200,000; Mrs. Hultberg was awarded jointly held property valued at one-fourth of the total value of such property and appraised at a value of approximately $110,000; and Mr. Hultberg was awarded the remaining jointly held property, valued at three-fourths of the total value of such property, and certain other property, appraised together at a value of approximately $332,500. In dividing the jointly held property the district court awarded specific property to Mr. Hultberg and authorized him to select from the remaining jointly held property enough property to bring the value of the property he received in the property division to 75 percent of the value of all the property jointly held by the couple.

Mrs. Hultberg appeals to this court the district court's order dividing the couple's property. From her brief we have gleaned four issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in considering certain factors when dividing the Hultbergs' property.

2. Whether the district court erred, in allowing Mr. Hultberg to choose part of the couple's jointly held property, after determining the percentage of jointly held property to be awarded to each party.

3. Whether the conclusions of law made by the district court were supported by its findings of fact.

4. Whether the district court's division of the Hultbergs' property was clearly erroneous.

I

In reaching its decision, the district court noted that the Hultbergs owned little property when they began their marriage, but during the marriage they jointly and separately accumulated assets valued at approximately $642,500. Their treatment of these assets, however, was termed by the district court as "somewhat out of the ordinary." Mrs. Hultberg received gifts and inheritances, including parcels of land, during the marriage. She initially held and continues to hold this property separately in her own name. Mrs. Hultberg rented part of the property she inherited to Mr. Hultberg on a share-crop basis. She deposited the rental income received from this land in her separate savings account. Mrs. Hultberg expended almost none of her own inherited or accumulated property on Mr. Hultberg, herself, or their children. Currently, her separately held property is valued at approximately $200,000.

During the marriage, the needs of Mr. Hultberg, Mrs. Hultberg, and their children were satisfied almost entirely with funds that Mr. Hultberg inherited or, with Mrs. Hultberg's assistance, earned through farming. All of the property accumulated through the Hultbergs' farming efforts, with some exceptions, was held jointly by Mr. and Mrs. Hultberg.

From the district court's memorandum of decision, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, it is clear that, in making its property division although not expressly so stating the district court applied the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. ¹

Mrs. Hultberg argues that even though the district court applied the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, it improperly considered additional factors when dividing their property. These factors included the payment of familial obligations during the marriage solely out of the joint assets of the parties, and never out of the separate assets of Mrs. Hultberg; Mrs. Hultberg's receipt of support during the marriage as partial compensation for her services; and, despite her status as a farm wife, Mrs. Hultberg's accumulation of separate asserts that, had she been single, she would have had to deplete for her own maintenance.

The district court's consideration of these factors, necessitated by the Hultbergs' unusual treatment of their property, was proper because the factors relate to at least three of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Each of the factors reflects upon the conduct of the parties during their marriage. Each relates to the issue whether the separately or jointly held income-producing property belonging to the parties was acquired before or after the marriage. And, in light of the couple's unique treatment of their property, even if the factors that Mrs. Hultberg alleges were improperly considered did not fall within the above Ruff-Fischer Guidelines, these factors certainly constituted "such other matters as may be material." Fischer v. Fischer, supra, 139 N.W.2d at 847, Syllabus P 7. The district court, then, properly considered these factors to effectuate, pursuant to Section 14-05-24, N.D.C.C., an "equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper, . . ." ²

II

Mrs. Hultberg contends that, by allowing Mr. Hultberg to select jointly held property equal in value to 75 percent of the value of all jointly held property, the district court failed to satisfy its statutory directive to make an equitable distribution of their property. See Sec. 14-05-24, N.D.C.C. We disagree. The district court determined the percentage of the jointly held property that it would award to each party and left only the designation of specific pieces of property to be resolved by Mr. Hultberg. Mrs. Hultberg contends neither that the appraised value of the jointly held property was erroneous nor that the property she received was less desirable than the property selected by Mr. Hultberg. Moreover, she has failed to show us how this method of distribution has led to an inequitable, unjust, or improper property division. Such a method of distribution might not be appropriate in all cases, but we find no error in its implementation here.

III

Mrs. Hultberg attacks various conclusions of law made by the district court, arguing that they are not supported by adequate findings of fact.

First, she notes that although the district court stated in a conclusion of law that, ". . . the cost of the appraiser, H. A. Swenson, appointed by the Court in the first trial of the action(,) in the amount of $497.28 shall be borne equally by the parties," the findings of fact make no mention of the appraiser's fee. Mrs. Hultberg has forgotten, however, that the parties were ordered to pay the appraiser's fee at the conclusion of the first trial in this matter. Even though this court reversed part of the district court's first decision in Hultberg v. Hultberg, supra, the part of the first district court decision addressing the issue of the appraiser's fee was not reversed and therefore remained in effect. Its inclusion in the conclusions of law of the district court after retrial of the property-division issue on remand undoubtedly was unnecessary, but at most repetitive, and by no means constituted reversible error under Rule 61, N.D.R.Civ.P.

Next, Mrs. Hultberg argues that the district court erred in concluding, in its conclusions of law, that the parties were entitled to an absolute divorce, and that Mr. Hultberg "shall deliver to the nearest grain elevator to the credit of the plaintiff one-third (1/3) of all grain raised in the year 1978 upon the real property passing to the plaintiff by the Judgment herein." She argues that the district court failed to make findings of fact relating to...