Hultz v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 07 June 1947
• Docket Number: 36731.
• Citation: 181 P.2d 515,163 Kan. 180
• Parties: HULTZ et al. v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

181 P.2d 515

163 Kan. 180

HULTZ et al. v. TAYLOR et al.

No. 36731.

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 7, 1947

Appeal from District Court, Douglas County; Hugh Means, Judge.

Action by Caleb Hultz and another against John Taylor and others to obtain a conveyance of one-half of a certain 30-acre tract of land wherein defendants, by their answer, requested that title to all of the tract be quieted against the plaintiffs in the defendant Hugh Taylor. From a judgment against plaintiffs for costs and from order overruling motion for new trial, plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed with directions.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A trial court in a suit in equity should not enter a partial or incomplete final decree.

2. In such a suit it was error for the trial court to close the case by holding only that none of the contesting litigants had sustained the burden of proof and render a judgment for costs.

George K. Melvin, of Lawrence, for appellants.

Richard B. Stevens, of Lawrence (John W. Brand, of Lawrence, on the brief), for appellees.

BURCH Justice.

This appeal presents a peculiar equity case in which the trial court denied the contesting parties any relief by holding that none of them had sustained the burden of proof. As a result, all of the litigants have been left lingering in legal incertitude. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial and so did the defendants. The district court denied both of such motions and entered judgment against the plaintiffs for costs. The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment and from the order overruling their motion for a new trial. Better comprehension of the legal problems presented develops from a compendium of the facts. It follows.

The findings of fact and the admissions of the parties disclose that the plaintiffs, who were husband and wife, owned a 30-acre farm, upon which a house and some other improvements had been constructed. The plaintiffs were about to lose the property because a mortgage thereon had been foreclosed and the period of the equity of redemption was about to expire. The plaintiffs alleged that before such expiration they entered into an oral agreement with the defendants relative to the redemption of the land. According to the allegations the agreement was, in substance, that the plaintiffs and the defendants would accumulate the necessary redemption money in the amount of $2,852.11. The court's findings of fact disclose that the parties acquired the redemption money by the plaintiff, Caleb Hultz, contributing $276.36, and the defendant, Hugh Taylor, contributing $125.75, and his father, John Taylor, who is also named as a defendant, contributing $2,450. In order for the defendant John Taylor, to contribute such sum it was necessary for him to borrow the money from a bank and in order for him to do so it was necessary for him to give the bank a mortgage upon the involved property and also upon some other property which he owned and which is not involved in the action. Obviously before John Taylor could give the bank a mortgage upon the involved property, the title to which would have remained in the plaintiffs until the redemption period expired, it was necessary for John Taylor to acquire title thereto. In furtherance of such purpose, the plaintiffs executed a warranty deed conveying the property to the defendant, John Taylor, and he immediately mortgaged it and the other property to the bank. With the money thus acquired the involved property was redeemed from the mortgage foreclosure sale and thereafter the title thereto remained in John Taylor until he executed a quit-claim deed conveying his interest in the property to his son, the defendant, Hugh Taylor. According to the court's findings, John Taylor knew that some understanding existed between his son, Hugh Taylor, and the plaintiff, Caleb Hultz, relative to the property but he did not know anything about the details thereof. The plaintiffs no longer contend that they had any agreement whatever with the defendant, John Taylor, but they alleged, and introduced testimony in support thereof, that Hugh Taylor had agreed with them that if they would pay him one-half of the amount of money which had been accumulated for the purpose of redeeming the land and one-half of the interest accruing on the loan from the bank, together with one-half of the taxes, insurance and other incidental expenses subsequently accruing, that the defendant, Hugh Taylor, would pay off the loan to the bank and thereafter execute a deed to the plaintiffs conveying to them the south 15 acres of the 30-acre tract. The plaintiffs further alleged that they were to continue to live in the house on the premises and that in furtherance of the agreement the plaintiffs paid to Hugh Taylor certain sums of money. The court found that the plaintiffs continued to live in the house, paid no rent for the same, and that 'After the redemption, the plaintiffs paid to Hugh Taylor various sums of money which were receipted by Taylor, the receipt describing the payments as being for principal and interest, and taxes, amounting in all to about $1,145.45.' It was stipulated by the parties in the trial that if the plaintiff, Caleb Hultz, would pay to the defendant Hugh Taylor, an additional sum of $646.80 that the plaintiff would thereby have paid exactly one-half of the redemption cost of the property and also one-half of the taxes, interest and other items of expense. As a consequence, the plaintiffs offered to pay such amount into court provided the court decided to require the defendant, Hugh Taylor, to deed to the plaintiffs the south 15 acres of the property. The plaintiffs sought only a decree to such effect and did not ask for alternative relief in the nature of a judgment for the amount of money they had paid to the defendant, Hugh Taylor.

The answer filed by the defendants, John Taylor, his wife, Arvilla and their son, Hugh Taylor, admitted that the plaintiffs had given John Taylor a warranty deed; that he and his wife had mortgaged the property to the bank for the aforestated amount; admitted that John Taylor redeemed the property from mortgage foreclosure sale, and alleged that on May 20, 1943 John Taylor and his wife executed to the defendant, Hugh Taylor, a quit-claim deed to all of the 30 acres, together with the improvements thereon, and further alleged that Hugh Taylor was in possession of the entire property. A general denial of all facts not admitted was set forth in the answer and the prayer thereto requested that the title to all the property be quieted against the plaintiffs in the defendant, Hugh Taylor, and that the plaintiffs and all persons claiming through or under them be excluded from having any interest in the property and enjoined from asserting any claims to a lien upon the premises.

The defendant, Hugh Taylor, in his testimony disagreed entirely with the contentions of the plaintiffs as to the terms of the oral contract or agreement into which the parties had entered. Hugh Taylor's testimony as to the agreement was to the effect that the plaintiff, Caleb Hultz, had agreed to sell the land to Hugh Taylor for $3,000 with the understanding that the redemption cost was to apply upon the consideration, leaving a balance of approximately $200 due the plaintiff, Caleb Hultz, and that Hultz also agreed to help provide the money necessary to pay off the mortgage to the bank with the understanding that Hugh Taylor was to pay back all money paid him by Caleb Hultz, with interest thereon, after the expiration of a five-year period during which the plaintiffs were to be permitted to live in the house without paying any rent therefor. The defendant, Hugh Taylor, further testified that he was to have the farm in its entirety, subject only to the right of the plaintiffs to live in the house and that he had farmed practically all of the land and made improvements thereon without paying any rent since February, 1940. The trial court found only that Hugh Taylor had farmed practically all the land and made some improvements thereon with out paying any rent therefor.

The trial court filed conclusions of law in which the court held that the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden upon them to establish their cause of action and that the defendant and cross-petitioner, Hugh Taylor, had not sustained the burden of proof upon him to establish his cause of action. Such court further held that it had jurisdiction to partition the real estate but that it would not adjudge partition unless one or both of the parties, within three days, would request such an order. The court's holding in such respect was further qualified by a provision that in the event of partition, the proceeds, from the election or a sale should be distributed among the parties in the proportion which each party had contributed to the costs, redemption, taxes, interest and incidental expenses. The plaintiffs did not want the property partitioned and neither did the defendant, Hugh Taylor, and as a consequence no one filed a request for partition. Therefore, the trial court did not adjudge partition. All parties filed motions for a new trial, which were overruled by the court and judgment was entered against the plaintiffs for costs. Plaintiffs also filed a second motion for a new trial following the entry of the judgment for costs but it was likewise overruled.

From...