Humbert v. O'Malley
| Decision Date | 21 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.: WDQ-11-0440 |
| Parties | MARLOW HUMBERT, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Marlow Humbert sued 25 Baltimore City police officers1 and others2 for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. ECF No. 1. Pending are the Inactive Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, ECF No. 238, and Humbert's unopposed motion to waive transcript fees, ECF No. 247. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the following reasons, the motions will be granted.
This case arises from the April 30, 2008 rape of a woman in her home in Baltimore's Charles Village neighborhood, Humbert's arrest and pre-trial detention on rape charges, and his release--15 months later--when the assigned prosecutor, former Assistant State's Attorney Joakim Tarn, chose to nolle prosequi the case. On February 17, 2011, Humbert filed a 19-count complaint alleging federal3 and state4 claims. ECF No. 1. On November 29, 2011, the Court dismissed counts four to six against the Inactive Defendants, all state claims against Dixon, and all state claims against Bealefeld except count seventeen. ECF No.36; see also ECF No. 52 at 2 n.5. On March 27, 2012, the Court bifurcated the case and stayed discovery on all claims against the Inactive Defendants. ECF Nos. 52-53.
On March 25, 2014, the Court granted the Police Defendants' motion for summary judgment on counts two, seven to ten, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and nineteen. ECF No. 139. From April 14-20, 2015, the parties tried counts three, eleven,5 fifteen, and eighteen against the Police Defendants, and the Police Defendants' qualified immunity defense. ECF No. 234 at 13-14.6
On April 20, 2015, the jury returned a verdict for Humbert against all three police defendants on count three (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and count fifteen (negligence). The jury also made factual findings on the qualified immunity determination relevant to count three, and on count eighteen (Maryland malicious prosecution)."7 On June 22, 2015, the Courtfound that the Police Defendants had established the defense of qualified immunity and were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count three, and were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count fifteen. ECF Nos. 234 at 43, 46 n.63, 48; 235. The Court further found that because Humbert had failed to establish the lack of probable cause as required on count eighteen, the Police Defendants were also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that count. ECF Nos. 234 at 46; 235. Humbert appealed. ECF No. 236.8
On July 13, 2015, the Inactive Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law. ECF No. 238. On July 30, 2015, Humbert opposed the motion. ECF No. 241. On August 12, 2015,the Inactive Defendants replied. ECF No. 244. On September 2, 2015, Humbert moved to waive transcript fees. ECF No. 247.9
The Inactive Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment in their favor on all § 1983 claims because the Court has found that the Police Defendants had probable cause to arrest Humbert; thus, there was no constitutional deprivation. ECF Nos. 238 at 2 ¶ 5; 238-1 at 2-3.10 Humbert asserts--without supporting authority--that his appeal has "divested" the Court of its "ability to evaluate the Inactive Defendants' motion on the merits." ECF No. 241 at 3.
Humbert is incorrect. An appeal only "divests a trial court of jurisdiction over "those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.'" Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 890 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Griggs v. Provident ConsumerDiscount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S. Ct. 400, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1982)).11 Humbert's claims against the Inactive Defendants are not "involved in the appeal"; thus, this Court may decide whether the Inactive Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor. See id.12
It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot prevail against supervisors13 or municipalities absent a constitutional violation by an employee or a subordinate. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S. Ct. 1571, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986) (per curiam) (); Int'l Ground Transp. v. Mayor And City Council Of Ocean City, MD, 475 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Caldwell Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 524 F. App'x 854, 862 (4th Cir. 2013) ().15
Because the Court has not found a constitutional violation by the Police Defendants,16 none of the § 1983 claims against the Inactive Defendants can survive. See, e.g., Heller, 475 U.S. at 799, 106 S. Ct. 1571. Accordingly, the Inactive Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all remaining § 1983 claims; the Court will grant their motion.17
Humbert asserts that he is entitled to waiver of the preparation of trial transcript fees because he is proceeding in forma pauperis on his appeal, and his appeal presents substantial questions. ECF No. 247 at 5.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)(2012), "[f]ees for transcripts furnished in other proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall . . . be paid by the United States if thetrial judge . . . certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question)." A "substantial question" is one that is "reasonably debatable." Gary v. Prof'l Div., Alberto-Culver Co., 862 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1988); Ortiz v. Greyhound Corp., 192 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D. Md. 1959).
Humbert's appeal raises several issues about the manner of trying federal and state malicious prosecution claims when different fact-finders are involved and when the qualified immunity determination is reserved for trial. See ECF No. 247 at 5-6.18 Some of these issues are not frivolous and present a substantial question for the Fourth Circuit to consider. Accordingly, Humbert's motion will be granted.
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant the Inactive Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and Humbert's unopposed motion to waive transcript fees, and will dismiss count seventeen without prejudice.
Date
/s/_________
William D. Quarles, Jr.
1. Chris Jones, Keith Merryman, Caprice Smith, Dominick Griffin, Michael Brassell, and John and Jane Does 1-20. The Court granted summary judgment on all claims against Merryman and Brassel. See ECF No. 139. Hereinafter, Jones, Smith, and Griffin will be referred to as the "Police Defendants."
2. Humbert also sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City (the "City"), the Baltimore City Police Department (the "Police Department"), former Police Commissioner Frederick H. Bealefeld, and former mayor Sheila Dixon (collectively, the "Inactive Defendants"), former Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley, and Baltimore City Police Department Laboratory Technician Cinese Caldwell. The Court dismissed all claims against O'Malley and Caldwell. See ECF No. 36.
3. Humbert asserted the following federal claims against the Inactive Defendants (unless otherwise indicated, Humbert asserted the claims against all Inactive Defendants):
(1) count one: § 1983 Monell claim (City only); (2) count two: § 1983 supervisory liability (all Inactive Defendants except the City); (3) count three: § 1983 malicious prosecution; (4) count four: § 1983 obstructing justice; (5) count five: § 1985 witness tampering; (6) count six: § 198 5 conspiracy; (7) count seven: § 1983 suggestive identification procedures; (8) count eight: § 1983 failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; (9) count nine: § 1983 failure to investigate; and (10) count ten: § 1983 failure to investigate. ECF No. 1 at 41-58.
4. Humbert asserted the following state law claims against Dixon and Bealefeld (no state law claims were asserted against the City or the Police Department):
(1) count eleven: Articles 24 and 26 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights; (2) count twelve: battery; (3) count thirteen: false arrest; (4) count fourteen: abuse of process; (5) count fifteen: negligence; (6) count sixteen: negligent failure to warn; (7) count seventeen: negligent hiring and supervision; (8) count eighteen: malicious prosecution; and (9) count nineteen: intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 59-74.
5. Because Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights is similar to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 26 is similar to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Humbert proposed--and the police defendants did not oppose--submitting the issues together on the verdict sheet. See ECF Nos. 189 at 4; 234 at 14 n.30.
6. Humbert abandoned count sixteen (negligent failure to warn) at trial when he failed to provide authority for the claim. ECF No. 234 at 14 n.31.
7. See ECF Nos. 221, 223, 227. Because material factual disputes prevented a ruling at the summary judgment stage on whether the police defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, those issues were resolved by the Court based on the jury's factual findings. See, e.g., Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005). Further, Under Maryland law of malicious prosecution, jurors do not decide whether Humbert has shown the requisite absence of probable cause (that is a legal question); instead, they decide the facts that would underlie that determination. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 716, 664 A.2d 916, 923 (1995); Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 507, 471 A.2d 297, 309 (1984).
8. Humbert has not...
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