Humble Pipe Line Co v. Waggonner Natural Gas and Oil Corporation v. Waggonner

• Citation: 11 L.Ed.2d 782,376 U.S. 369,84 S.Ct. 857
• Decision Date: 23 March 1964
• Docket Number: Nos. 329,354,s. 329
• Parties: HUMBLE PIPE LINE CO., Petitioner, v. W. E. WAGGONNER, Sheriff, etc. NATURAL GAS AND OIL CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. W. E. WAGGONNER, Sher ff, etc
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

376 U.S. 369

84 S.Ct. 857

11 L.Ed.2d 782

HUMBLE PIPE LINE CO., Petitioner,

v W. E. WAGGONNER, Sheriff, etc.

NATURAL GAS AND OIL CORPORATION et al., Petitioners,

v. W. E. WAGGONNER, Sher ff, etc.

Nos. 329, 354.

Argued March 4, 1964.

Decided March 23, 1964.

Clarence L. Yancey and Leon O'Quin, Shreveport, La., for petitioners.

Ferdinand A. Cashio, Shreveport, La., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

The common question these cases present is whether the United States has such exclusive jurisdiction over a 22,000-acre tract of land in Louisiana on which the Barksdale Air Force Base is located that Louisiana is without jurisdiction to levy an ad valorem tax on privately owned property situated on the tract. The District Court and Court of Appeal of Louisiana upheld such a tax laid on certain oil drilling equipment and pipelines owned, used and kept by the petitioners on this federal enclave. La.App., 151 So.2d 575. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied review. 244 La. 463, 467, 152 So.2d 561, 562. We granted certiorari to consider this federal question important to the United States. 375 U.S. 878, 84 S.Ct. 148, 11 L.Ed.2d 110.¹

The United States acquired a fee simple title to the entire tract in 1930 by donations from the State of Louisiana,² the City of Shreveport, and the Bossier Levee District, a state agency, for the purpose of using the land as a military base. The Government has spent huge amounts of money in creating and operating at Barksdale Field one of its most important military posts. When the State and its agencies gave the land to the United States, Louisiana law provided that the United States should have 'the right of exclusive jurisdiction' over any land it 'purchased or condemned, or otherwise acquired * * * for all purposes, except the administration of the criminal laws * * * and the service of civil process of said State therein * * *.'³ All of the pipelines or equipment in question upon which the State's ad valorem tax has been imposed are, as the Louisiana District Court stated, 'situated on the United States Military Reservation known as 'Barksdale Air Force Base'. * * *'

Article I, § 8, cl. 17, of the United States Constitution permits the United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over lands within a State. It provides:

'The Congress shall have Power * * * To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever * * * over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings * * *.'

Louisiana contends that the United States cannot 'exercise exclusive Legislation' here because the land for the military base was donated, not 'purchased' within the meaning of the constitutional provision. We cannot agree to such a constricted reading of that provision. Louisiana concedes that, as we pointed out in our recent holding in Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 83 S.Ct. 426, 437, 9 L.Ed.2d 292, the Government could, with the State's consent, have acquired exclusive jurisdiction by condemning the land. See also James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141 142, 58 S.Ct. 208, 212, 82 L.Ed. 155. This common-sense reading of the constitutional provision simply follows the interpretation given it long ago in Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 538, 5 S.Ct. 995, 1002, 29 L.Ed. 264:

'The e sence of that provision is that the state shall freely cede the particular place to the United States for one of the specific and enumerated objects.'

In accordance with this construction the Court in that case went on to emphasize that although the United States had not 'purchased' Fort Leavenworth in the narrow trading sense of the term, the crucial question was whether Kansas had ceded exclusive jurisdiction over the fort. Likewise, we hold here that under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction when the land was ceded to it with consent of the State (except for the State's express reservation as to civil and criminal process) just as if the United States had acquired its title by negotiation and payment of a money consideration.

Relying on the fact that the United States has leased the right to exploit parts of the reservation for oil and gas and for an oil pipeline, Louisiana contends that the Federal Government has thereby lost its power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over those parts of the area. We cannot agree. We did hold in S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851, that where the United States, while retaining what was in substance a mortgage, had sold land and buildings formerly used for governmental purposes it thereby in effect surrendered its former exclusive jurisdiction, leaving that property taxable by the State. But that case does not control the present situation, for here the Government continues to hold all the land subject to its primary jurisdiction and control.⁴ This Court has previously held that exclusive federal jurisdiction was not lost either by lease of property for commercial purposes within an enclave, Arlington Hotel Co....