Humbles v. Steele

Decision Date20 July 2011
Docket NumberCase No. 4:10CV1072 JCH
PartiesDEMETRIUS A. HUMBLES, Petitioner, v. TROY STEELE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Missouri State prisoner Demetrius A. Humbles' pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1).

On March 7, 2008, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of assault in the first degree and one count of armed criminal action. (Resp. Exh. C, P. 6). Pursuant to the plea agreement and recommendation by the prosecutor, Petitioner was given a fifteen-year sentence for the first degree assault charge and a concurrent three-year sentence for the armed criminal action charge. (Id., P. 47).

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing. (Resp. Exh. C, P. 96). The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Petitioner's post-conviction motion. Humbles v. State, 303 S.W.3d 652 (Mo. App. 2010).

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri. In the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner raises the following four claims for relief:

(1) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that plea counsel induced Petitioner to plea involuntarily by threatening Petitioner with "certain conviction and a life sentence" if the case went to trial;(2) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that plea counsel failed to investigate three defense witnesses who would have testified in support of Petitioner's self-defense assertion;
(3) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that plea counsel failed to investigate physical evidence in support of Petitioner's self-defense assertion; and
(4) That the motion court erred in denying Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 24.035 motion.

(Doc. No. 1, PP. 5-11). The Court will address the claims in turn.

DISCUSSION
I. Procedural Default

As stated above, in Ground 3 of his petition, Petitioner asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that plea counsel failed to investigate physical evidence that would have supported his assertion of self-defense. (Doc. No. 1, PP. 8-9). Although Petitioner raised the claim asserted in Ground 3 in his pro se post-conviction motion, a review of the record shows that Petitioner failed to pursue this claim either in his amended motion, or on appeal of the denial of the motion.

A claim must be presented at each step of the judicial process in state court to avoid procedural default. Jolly v. Gammon, 28 F.3d 51, 53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 983 (1994). "Failure to raise a claim on appeal from the denial of a post-conviction motion erects a procedural bar to federal habeas review." Id. (citing Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1988). Because Petitioner failed to raise the claim stated in Ground 3 of the instant petition on appeal of the denial of his post-conviction motion, the federal court cannot reach the merits of the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or a demonstration "that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Forest v. Delo, 52 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 1995). Petitioner has not shown cause for his failure toraise the claim in state court.1 In addition, because Petitioner makes no claim of actual innocence, he cannot satisfy the narrow "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the required showing of cause and prejudice. Washington v. Delo, 51 F.3d 756, 760-61 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995).

Accordingly, the claim raised in Ground 3 of the instant petition is procedurally barred and must be denied.

II. Non-Cognizable Claim

As stated above, in Ground 4 of his petition for relief, Petitioner claims that the motion court erred in denying Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 24.035 motion. Federal habeas relief is available to a state prisoner only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 936 (1990). Claims that do not reach constitutional magnitude cannot be addressed in a petition for habeas corpus. Carter v. Armontrout, 929 F.2d 1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1991).

"Section 2254 only authorizes federal courts to review the constitutionality of a state criminal conviction, not infirmities in a state post-conviction relief proceeding." Williams-Bey, 894 F.2d at 317. See also Bell-Bey v. Roper, 499 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987)) ("the Constitution does not guarantee the existence of state postconviction proceedings"), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008). Petitioner's claim that the post-conviction motion court failed to hold a hearing on his Rule 24.035 motion is collateral to hisconviction and detention, and therefore is not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. Williams-Bey, 894 F.2d at 317. Accordingly, Ground 4 of Petitioner's § 2254 petition for relief is denied.

III. Claims Addressed On The Merits

As stated above, in Ground 1 of his petition for relief Petitioner claims that plea counsel was ineffective for threatening Petitioner with certain conviction and a life sentence if he went to trial. (Doc. No. 1, PP. 5-6). In Ground 2, Petitioner claims plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate three witnesses in support of his alleged self-defense claim. (Id., PP. 6-8). Petitioner raised these claims in his Rule 24.035 motion in the St. Louis County Circuit Court, as well as on direct appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District.

The right to effective assistance of counsel is protected under the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Under federal law, in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must show that his attorney's performance was "deficient," and that the deficient performance was "prejudicial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel is "strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. To overcome this presumption against deficient assistance of counsel, Petitioner must prove that, "in the light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id.

Even if Petitioner satisfies the deficient performance component, he is not entitled to relief unless he can prove the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 691. The prejudice component requires the Petitioner to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. In the context of a guilty plea, to demonstrate prejudice the Petitioner must show that, but for counsel's error, hewould not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).

The post-conviction motion court reviewed Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and denied them as follows:

When a conviction results from a guilty plea, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent it impinges upon the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made. Mayberry v. State, 137 S.W.3d 543 (Mo. App. 2004).
Generally, the entry of a plea of guilty waives any future complaints a Defendant may have regarding counsel's failure to investigate. Yoakum v. State, 849 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Mo. App. 1993). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate, a Defendant must specifically describe the information counsel failed to discover, allege that a reasonable investigation would lead to the discovery of the information, and prove that the information would have aided his defense. Id. A Defendant who repeatedly assures the Court at his guilty plea and sentencing hearings that he is satisfied with his counsel's performance is barred from obtaining post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hamilton v. State, 865 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. App. 1993). If the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is refuted by the record, the Defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction motion. Id.
Movant's2 allegations are refuted by the evidence preserved at the plea hearing. Movant testified the [sic] he was aware of the charges against him, that he discussed the charges with Trial Counsel and that he fully understood the charges and consequences of his pleas of guilty. (Plea transcript, hereinafter "p.t." p.4-11). Movant stated that no one made any promises or threats in order to get him to plead guilty. (p.t. p.24 and p. 34). Movant testified he understood the State's recommendation and the plea bargain. (p.t. p. 12-14). Movant admitted that he was in fact guilty of both crimes charged. (p.t. p. 25). The record clearly refutes Movant's claim that he felt coerced into entering his pleas of guilty.
[... ]
Movant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail to state any facts, which, if true, would warrant relief. Movant testified he had sufficient opportunity to discuss his case with Trial Counsel. (p.t. p. 18-19). Movanttestified that Trial Counsel fully advised him as to all aspects of his case (p.t. p. 18). Movant testified that Trial Counsel did everything of significance he had asked of her prior to the guilty pleas. (p.t. p. 18-19, p.t. p. 32). Movant's only complaint of Trial Counsel was that Trial Counsel and Movant argued. Movant unequivocally stated that he was satisfied with the services
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