Hume v. Farr's Coach Lines, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 08 March 2016
• Docket Number: Case # 12-CV-6378-FPG-JWF
• Parties: STEPHANIE HUME, as Administrator of the Estate of TIMOTHY HUME a/k/a TIMOTHY JAMES HUME, Deceased Plaintiff, v. FARR'S COACH LINES, LIMITED et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

STEPHANIE HUME, as Administrator of the Estate of TIMOTHY HUME a/k/a

TIMOTHY JAMES HUME, Deceased Plaintiff, v. FARR'S COACH LINES, LIMITED et al., Defendants.

Case # 12-CV-6378-FPG-JWF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 8, 2016

DECISION AND ORDER

Currently pending before the Court are three motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants in this case. Defendant Setra of North America, Inc. ("Setra") has filed a motion to dismiss the crossclaims asserted against it by two other Defendants, Farr's Coach Lines Limited ("Fair's Coach") and Rene Bisson ("Bisson"). ECF No. 73. Defendant Tarten Equipment Limited ("Tarten") has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Stephanie Hume's ("Stephanie Hume" or "Hume") Amended Complaint. ECF No. 91. Finally, Tarten has filed a motion to dismiss the crossclaims asserted against it by Farr's Coach, Bisson, and various other defendants. ECF No. 94.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a crash between a coach bus and a tractor-trailer on July 22, 2011 in Junius, New York. Based on the Amended Complaint, Bisson was driving the coach bus as an employee of Farr's Coach at the time of the crash. The bus collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Timothy Hume, who was killed in the crash. Stephanie Hume is the daughter of Timothy Hume, and she brings this suit as administrator on behalf of his estate.

Hume has asserted claims sounding in negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty against a variety of parties including Bisson, Farr's Coach, Setra, and Tarten. Hume alleges that the crash was caused by a combination of factors including Bisson's negligent driving, Farr's Coach's employment of Bisson and its failure to diligently check his qualifications, Tarten's faulty repair of the bus's transmission prior to the crash, and Setra's manufacture of the bus and its request to Tarten to repair the bus's transmission. These Defendants have in turn asserted a flurry of crossclaims against each other, some of which are at issue in the discussion below.

DISCUSSION

The Court first addresses Defendant Setra's motion to dismiss three of the crossclaims asserted against it. ECF No. 73. It then addresses Defendant Tarten's two related motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 91; 94.

I. Setra's Motion to Dismiss

A brief background specifically relating to Setra's motion to dismiss is necessary. Bisson, the driver of the bus, has asserted crossclaims against Setra, the manufacturer of the bus, for negligent repair of the bus's transmission prior to the crash and for breach of warranty. Based on the allegations underlying his crossclaims, Bisson's version of events leading to the crash is generally as follows: On July 22, 2011, the bus Bisson was driving experienced mechanical problems relating to its transmission. As a result of these problems, Bisson was either driving the bus at a slow rate of speed or merging back onto the highway after a stop when Timothy Hume failed to yield the right of way to the bus. Timothy Hume then crashed his tractor-trailer into the back of the bus.

Bisson goes on to allege that Farr's Coach, which is Bisson's employer and the lessee of the bus, provided a warranty claim to Setra in the days prior to the crash concerning the bus'sdamaged transmission. In connection with its receipt of this claim, Setra undertook to repair the transmission, yet failed to properly do so and returned the bus to Farr's Coach while representing that the transmission was fixed. The transmission then, of course, broke down right before the crash on July 22, 2011.

Thus, Bisson has brought three crossclaims relating to the bus's transmission against Setra. ECF No. 51 at ¶¶ 29-60. Setra has now moved to dismiss those crossclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 73.

A motion to dismiss crossclaims under Rule 12(b)(6) is evaluated under the same standard as a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Mathis v. United Homes, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418-19 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The Court accepts the allegations in the crossclaims as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the crossclaimant's favor. See Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the Court need not accept as true "[l]egal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations." In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the allegations "must contain sufficient factual matter . . . 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombty, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this standard, the factual allegations must permit the court "to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In short, the crossclaimant must set forth "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting the claim for relief. Twombty, 550 U.S. at 556.

As a federal court in the state of New York sitting in diversity jurisdiction, the Court applies the substantive law of New York in analyzing the crossclaims. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

Each of Bisson's crossclaims is analyzed separately below.

1. Negligent Repair of the Bus's Transmission

Defendant Bisson first asserts a crossclaim based on negligence against Setra. ECF No. 51 at ¶¶ 29-38. Notably, Bisson also asserts this same crossclaim against Daimler Buses North America, Ltd. ("Daimler"), which is another defendant in this case and which is, according to the Amended Complaint, the parent company of Setra. ECF No. 37 at ¶ 42. Bisson alleges that "prior to the July 22, 2011 accident, [Setra and Daimler] received and accepted a meritorious warranty claim presented by the Plaintiff's employer, Farr's Coachlines Limited, the le[s]see of the bus, concerning problems with the bus's transmission system." ECF No. 51 at ¶¶ 30-31. Setra and Daimler then allegedly failed to repair the transmission "and thereby breached their duty of reasonable care." Id. at ¶ 32. Setra and Daimler subsequently returned the bus to Farr's Coach and "represent[ed] that the bus, the transmission system and related systems were fully repaired and that the bus was fit to return to service over the roads." Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. Farr's Coach and Bisson relied on these representations and returned the bus to operation. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. On July 22, 2011, the bus's transmission failed as a result of Setra and Daimler's negligent repair, and Bisson was not able to bring the bus to highway speed. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. Bisson was then involved in the crash whereby he sustained serious injuries. Id.

In short, Bisson is making out a claim in tort for negligent repair of the transmission on the basis of a "warranty claim," i.e., a contractual agreement, where Setra agreed to repair the transmission. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. The Court notes briefly at the outset that under New York law, a breach of contract generally does not give rise to a separate claim in tort. See Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389 (1987). Furthermore, "merely charging a breach of a 'duty of due care', employing language familiar to tort law, does not, without more, transform a simple breach of contract into a tort claim." Id. at 390. This general principle issomewhat problematic for Bisson as he makes clear from the opening paragraphs of the negligent repair crossclaim that the genesis for the crossclaim is a contractual relationship between the relevant parties. ECF Nos. 51 at ¶ 30 ("Defendants Setra and Daimler Buses received a warranty claim before July 22, 2011 . . . ."); 51 at ¶ 31 (Defendants received and accepted a meritorious warranty claim presented by . . . [Farr's Coach] . . . concerning problems with the bus's transmission system.").

There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that a simple breach of contract will not give rise to a claim in tort. For instance, where the contracting parties have a special relationship "of trust and confidence" that transcends the contract, New York courts have found that the contract breach can also give rise to a tort. See, e.g., Rich v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 398 (1882). Notably, New York courts also examine the "nature of the injury, the manner in which the injury occurred, and the resulting harm" in determining whether conduct that breaches a contract may further result in tort liability. Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540, 552 (1992).

Here, for two reasons, the Court finds that it is at least possible for Bisson to state a negligence claim apart from his breach of contract claims. First, New York courts have indicated that repairers may be independently liable in tort "if, in response to a complaint concerning the very same operation which later caused the injury, the repairer undertook to make repairs and negligently failed to inspect to find the actual defect." Vermette v. Kenworth Truck Co., 488 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (3d Dep't 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 714 (1986). Bisson's crossclaims allude to this basis for tort liability by stating that Setra was summoned to repair the transmission, and it then indeed undertook to repair the transmission. ECF No. 51 at ¶¶ 31-32. Second, the Court observes that Bisson is seeking damages for injuries beyond the pure economic loss that is typically associated with breaches of contract. Id. at ¶ 36. Bissonseeks damages for, among other injuries, permanent disability and pain and suffering. See id. These injuries are the sort of personal injuries that are typically associated with tortious conduct. Cf. Bellevue S. Assocs. v. HRH Constr. Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 282, 293-295 (rejecting a tort claim against a defendant who had supplied defective floor tiles largely because the plaintiff's injury was not personal injury or property damage). In sum, it is possible for Bisson to...