Hummelshime v. State
| Decision Date | 02 March 1915 |
| Docket Number | 32. |
| Citation | 93 A. 990,125 Md. 563 |
| Parties | HUMMELSHIME et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Allegany County; M. L. Keedy, Judge.
"To be officially reported."
Theodore A. K. Hummelshime and others were convicted of conspiracy and they appeal. Affirmed.
George Louis Eppler and Arch. A. Young, both of Cumberland (Whiting & Eppler, of Cumberland, on the brief), for appellants.
Edgar Allan Poe, Atty. Gen., and Albert A. Doub, Special State's Atty., of Cumberland, for the State.
The appellants were convicted in a trial by jury, in the circuit court for Allegany county, upon an indictment which charged them with having unlawfully conspired to demand from a certain Elmer J. Miller the sum of $800 for the purpose of corruptly influencing two of the accused in the performance of their official duties as members of the city council of Cumberland; the sum mentioned being intended as a bribe to secure the votes of the two councilmen in favor of the payment of a claim against the municipality held by the firm of Merrill-Ruckgaber Company in the amount of $8,000. A brief preliminary statement of the circumstances under which the prosecution developed will facilitate our discussion of the questions raised by the record.
In August, 1914, some persons, undisclosed by the proof, acting through Mr. David A. Robb, as their attorney, engaged the William J. Burns Detective Agency to investigate the municipal administration of Cumberland, and particularly the official conduct of Dr. A. K. Hummelshime and Mr. Ward M Eichelberger, two of the members of the city council. The agency detailed for the investigation a detective by the name of Elmer J. Miller. It was arranged to have him appear in Cumberland in the pretended capacity of a representative of the Merrill-Ruckgaber Company, a firm employed in the construction of the dam for the new city water supply, and whose claim for a balance of $8,000 on account of that work remained unpaid. The consent of the firm was obtained for Miller to assume the name of Albert Ruckgaber, one of its members, who was not known in Cumberland, and to confer with the councilmen ostensibly for the purpose of securing a settlement of the claim. The detective arrived in Cumberland on the last day of August. From the 1st to the 6th of September he had a series of interviews with the appellants which were held with them separately, but, according to his testimony, were connected and sanctioned by their co-operation, and culminated in a proposition submitted to him by Harold B. Hummelshime, son of the councilman, that $800 be paid in advance for the votes of his father and Mr. Eichelberger in favor of the allowance of the Merrill-Ruckgaber claim by the city council, with the understanding that the money was to be refunded in the event that the motion for the payment of the claim should be defeated. The defendants do not deny that they had interviews with Miller, under the belief that he was a member of the claimant firm, or that a bribe of $800 for the votes of the two councilmen was discussed and agreed upon, but they testified that he originated the proposal, and that they entertained it only with the object of securing his conviction for attempted bribery. It was planned that the money should be delivered in the city of Washington, and Miller met Harold B. Hummelshime there by appointment for that purpose, but no payment was actually made, except of the sum of $10 on account of the latter's expenses, as the detective concluded that he had succeeded in providing sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution of the defendants upon the present charge.
The primary fact of concerted action on the part of the defendants, in reference to the proposed bribe, being admitted, the real issue in the case was whether the conduct of the accused was actuated by innocent motives or by an unlawful purpose. As the determination of that vital question was exclusively within the province of the jury, and is not subject to review by this court, there is no occasion for us to recite the evidence offered by the prosecution and defense in support of their respective theories.
In our examination of the record we have been unable to find any prejudice to the appellants in any of the rulings. The evidence adduced by the state was kept strictly within its due and proper bounds, and adequate opportunity was afforded for the development of the defense.
The first and second bills of exceptions show that the detective, Miller, after testifying to his first interview with Dr. Hummelshime, was asked to refresh his recollection from verified copies of his notes as to what happened the next day. Upon objection being made, the court ruled that the witness might use the notes simply to aid his memory as to when the next conversation occurred. The inquiry was not pursued, and the notes do not appear to have been used for any purpose, and these exceptions, therefore, need not be further considered.
The third exception was taken to the overruling of an objection to a question propounded to the same witness as to whether a mail chute, in the Woolworth Building, in New York, in which he had placed a letter addressed to Dr. Hummelshime, was connected with the mail box on the lower floor. This was a proper fact to be proven in that connection, and the same question had already been asked and answered in the affirmative without objection.
On cross-examination the detective was asked who was employing the Burns Detectice Agency for the Cumberland investigation. An objection to this question was sustained, but, when it was changed in form so as to inquire whether any of several designated persons had anything to do with the employment of the Agency, the objection was overruled. There is no suggestion that the proper presentation of the defendant's case depended upon a knowledge of the identity of the persons by whom the services of the detective agency were secured. The defendants were, of course, entitled to ask, as reflecting upon the interest or bias of a particular witness, whether he was one of those who had promoted the investigation, and this right was fully protected by the court's ruling. But a general inquiry as to the names of the citizens who were instrumental in having the detective sent to Cumberland could not aid the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused upon the specific charge preferred.
By the fifth bill of exception it appears that the detective was asked...
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