Hummers v. Pub. Serv. Electric & Gas Co.

• Decision Date: 20 August 1930
• Docket Number: No. 34.,34.
• Citation: 151 A. 383
• Parties: HUMMERS et al. v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

151 A. 383

HUMMERS et al.

v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. et al.

No. 34.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Aug. 20, 1930.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bergen County.

Action by Violet May Hummers and others against the Public Service Electric & Gas Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and the named defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Argued January term, 1930, before GUMMERE, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J Henry H. Fryling, of Newark, for appellant.

George F. Losche, of New York City, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the public service corporation from a judgment entered against it and in favor of the plaintiffs. The suit was brought to recover compensation for personal injuries received by Violet May Hummers, an infant, who while riding on a scooter bicycle was struck and severely injured by an automobile truck owned by the corporation and driven by its employee, the defendant Ankelein, and also for the expenses and losses incurred by her father as the result of the injuries to his child. The case of the plaintiffs was based upon the contention that the accident occurred through the negligent driving of Ankelein, and that the public service corporation, as his master, was responsible for his negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the infant plaintiff for $10,000, and in favor of her father for $3,000, against the defendant Public Service Electric & Gas Company, and in favor of the defendant Ankelein, finding no cause of action as against him. The court charged the jury as the law of the case that the public service corporation was made a defendant because it was the owner of the truck, and that the contention of the plaintiffs was that by reason of the relationship of master and servant the public service corporation should respond in damages for the wrongful acts of the driver. The court then proceeded as follows: "If you determine from all the evidence that this man Ankelein was engaged at the time of the accident as a servant of the Public Service Corporation, and that he was engaged in the scope of his duty, then if you find that he was guilty of negligence and such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, of course his master is responsible for his acts. It is your duty to decide from all the evidence in the case whether or not the defendant Ankelein was engaged in the work of his master, the Public Service Co., in such a way as to render the Public Service Co. liable for his negligent act."

The verdict...